Stanley v. State
| Decision Date | 04 February 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. SC 93121.,SC 93121. |
| Citation | 420 S.W.3d 532 |
| Parties | Travis M. STANLEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent. |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
420 S.W.3d 532
Travis M. STANLEY, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Missouri, Respondent.
No. SC 93121.
Supreme Court of Missouri,
En Banc.
Feb. 4, 2014.
[420 S.W.3d 535]
Scott Thompson, Public Defender's Office, St. Louis, for Stanley.
Karen L. Kramer, Attorney General's Office, Jefferson City, for the State.
PATRICIA BRECKENRIDGE, Judge.
Travis M. Stanley appeals the circuit court's judgment overruling his Rule 24.035 motion for post-conviction relief without an evidentiary hearing. After Mr. Stanley pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement with the prosecuting attorney, the circuit court gave Mr. Stanley a higher sentence than the prosecutor had recommended. Mr. Stanley filed a post-conviction motion seeking to vacate the judgment against him. He asserts in his first amended motion that his plea counsel was ineffective and that the plea and sentencing court erred in not giving Mr. Stanley certain warnings and in not providing him an opportunity to withdraw his guilty pleas. After Mr. Stanley's first post-conviction counsel withdrew from the case, a second appointed lawyer filed a late second amended motion. Mr. Stanley asserts that arguments raised in his late-filed second amended motion are timely because his first appointed post-conviction counsel abandoned him by filing a deficient first amended motion.
This Court holds that counsel's actions did not constitute abandonment and that the arguments raised only in the late-filed second amended motion are time-barred. In addition, the motion court did not err in finding that Mr. Stanley is not entitled to a hearing on the claims raised in his first amended motion—that counsel was ineffective and that the plea and sentencing court erred—because the claims are refuted by the record. The judgment is affirmed.
Mr. Stanley and the state reached a plea agreement in which the prosecuting attorney
[420 S.W.3d 536]
promised to recommend a lower sentence in exchange for Mr. Stanley's pleas of guilty on two counts of failure to register as a sex offender. The state had filed charges against Mr. Stanley in two separate cases: (1) for failing to inform the county sheriff that he changed his address within three days of moving; and (2) for failing to verify his sex offender registration information with the sheriff every 90 days, pursuant to sections 589.400 and 589.414, RSMo Supp.2008, respectively. The maximum punishment for each of these offenses is four years' imprisonment—eight years' imprisonment total if served consecutively. Under the plea agreement, the prosecuting attorney promised to recommend a sentence of three years' imprisonment on each charge, served concurrently, leaving Mr. Stanley free to ask the court for probation. At the sentencing hearing, the state fulfilled its promise by recommending two three-year sentences to run concurrently. After ordering a sentencing assessment report, the court imposed two four-year sentences to run consecutively for the maximum eight-year sentence instead of following the prosecutor's recommendation.
Mr. Stanley's plea counsel filed a written petition to plead guilty, which Mr. Stanley signed and affirmed as true during the plea hearing, describing the terms of the plea agreement and the fact that it was not binding on the court. It states that the prosecuting attorney would “recommended a cap of 3 years on this case and 3 years on [the other] c/c to serve.” It also states that Mr. Stanley was “free to request probation” and that his lawyer informed him “that the range of punishment which the law provides on each count ... is up to four (4) years imprisonment....” Mr. Stanley acknowledged the following in the written plea: “I know that the sentence I will receive is solely a matter within the control of the Judge. I hope to receive leniency, but I am prepared to accept any punishment permitted by law which the Court sees fit to impose.”
Mr. Stanley also entered oral guilty pleas to the two charges. At the plea hearing, the court discussed the terms of the plea agreement and conducted an oral plea colloquy on the record, tracking the language of Rule 24.02(b) and (c).1 In
[420 S.W.3d 537]
answer to the judge's questions, Mr. Stanley confirmed that he had no problem understanding English, that he had not consumed any drugs or alcohol within the previous 40 hours, that he understood the charges against him, and that he intended to plead guilty. He also stated he understood that he did not have to plead guilty, that he had a right to a trial if he wanted one, that no one promised him anything other than the plea agreement, and that no one had threatened him or anyone he cared about to get him to plead guilty. The court also explained the numerous trial rights and the right to an appeal that Mr. Stanley would give up by pleading guilty. Mr. Stanley confirmed that he was satisfied with the services of his plea counsel, that she had investigated the case and negotiated the plea agreement to his satisfaction, and that there was nothing he asked counsel to do that she had not done.
When the judge asked about the plea agreement, the prosecuting attorney responded with the following:
Judge, the State has agreed to a cap of three years combined on these two sentences. I think the defendant knows we're going to ask for three years in each case concurrent. They're going to be free to argue for lesser including probation. I believe that's our agreement, sir.
Mr. Stanley confirmed that this was his understanding of the agreement, and the court later confirmed its understanding by stating to the prosecutor, “[Y]ou're only asking for three, right, a cap of three?” The court conducted the following exchange with Mr. Stanley regarding the maximum punishment the court could impose, despite the plea agreement:
[The court:] [The prosecutor] has agreed that the maximum sentence that could be imposed in these cases will be four years in your case. Do you understand that?
[Mr. Stanley:] Yes, sir.
....
[The court:] We're going to stipulate—the parties have agreed to stipulate that the maximum punishment on each of these offenses is four years. That means the maximum that I could possibly impose would be eight. Now, I'm not saying I'm going to do that, but today I can't promise that I won't. Do you understand that?
[Mr. Stanley:] Yes, sir.
[The court:] Because what I need to find out is what's going on with you and what's going on—what are the exact circumstances of these charges and we're not set up to do that today. I'm going to order a sentencing assessment report, bring you back here in March and then I'll know and we'll all talk about it. Do you understand that?
[Mr. Stanley:] Yes, sir.
[The court:] But it could be as much as eight years. Do you understand that?
[Mr. Stanley:] Yes, sir.
[The court:] Understanding that, is it still your intention to plead guilty to these charges?
[Mr. Stanley:] Yes, sir.
The court did not inform Mr. Stanley, however, that he could not withdraw his guilty pleas if it decided to impose the higher punishment.
Before accepting the guilty pleas, the judge explained the two charges. Mr. Stanley responded that he understood the charges and acknowledged that he failed to periodically update his sex offender registration information with the sheriff and failed to inform the sheriff he had changed his address. Mr. Stanley affirmed that the statements in the written plea petition were true and signed them during the plea
[420 S.W.3d 538]
hearing. The court then accepted the guilty pleas, shortly after finding that Mr. Stanley had admitted all of the elements for each offense, found that he was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and found that the guilty pleas were entered into freely, knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. After ordering a sentencing assessment report, the same judge held a sentencing hearing and imposed on Mr. Stanley the maximum sentences: two four-year sentences to be served consecutively. Neither Mr. Stanley nor his counsel objected that the sentence imposed was contrary to the plea bargain or requested that Mr. Stanley be permitted to withdraw his guilty pleas, and the court entered judgment.
Mr. Stanley filed a timely 2 pro se Rule 24.035 motion to vacate, set aside, or correct the judgment or sentence on April 12, 2010. He alleged in the pro se motion: (1) that the circuit court erred by failing to reject his plea agreement in “open court,” and (2) that his plea counsel was ineffective because she promised Mr. Stanley he would receive a maximum of a three-year sentence if he pleaded guilty, yet she allowed the court to treat the plea agreement as a nonbinding “open plea.” The motion court appointed the public defender's office as Mr. Stanley's post-conviction counsel on April 30, 2010.
After Mr. Stanley's first post-conviction counsel entered his appearance, he filed a timely first amended Rule 24.035 motion on September 30, 2010. 3 The motion was timely because counsel filed it within 60 days of August 9, 2010, which is the date the plea court's transcript was filed with the motion court. SeeRule 24.035(g).4 The first amended motion makes five claims. The first is that the court “violated Rule 24.02(d)(4) when it failed to inform the Parties that it rejected their plea agreement.” The second is that the court “violated Rule 24.02(d)(4) and this Court's holding in Schellert v. State, 569 S.W.2d 735 (Mo. banc 1978), when it failed to afford Movant an opportunity to withdraw his plea after the Court rejected the plea agreement.”
The last three claims in the first amended motion are that Mr. Stanley's guilty pleas were involuntary because his plea counsel was ineffective under the federal and state constitutions. The claims allege that Mr. Stanley's plea counsel erred in three ways: (1) by failing to specifically mention in the written plea petition that Mr. Stanley was to serve his sentences concurrently; (2) by failing to adequately
[420 S.W.3d 539]
explain to Mr. Stanley that the...
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