Stanley v. State

Decision Date05 January 2021
Docket NumberSCWC-18-0000141
Citation479 P.3d 107
Parties Edward G. STANLEY, Petitioner/Petitioner-Appellant, v. STATE of Hawai‘i, Respondent/Respondent-Appellee.
CourtHawaii Supreme Court

Edward G. Stanley, petitioner pro se

Sonja P. McCullen, (on the briefs), Honolulu, for respondent

RECKTENWALD, C.J., NAKAYAMA, McKENNA, AND WILSON, JJ., AND CIRCUIT JUDGE MORIKAWA, IN PLACE OF POLLACK, J., RECUSED

OPINION OF THE COURT BY McKENNA, J.
I. Introduction

Edward G. Stanley ("Stanley"), pro se, appeals the Circuit Court of the First Circuit's ("circuit court")1 denial of his second Hawai‘i Rules of Penal Procedure ("HRPP") Rule 40 petition for post-conviction relief ("Second Petition").

Stanley's Second Petition arises from a March 16, 1988 conviction. A jury convicted Stanley of two counts of first degree reckless endangering, as lesser included offenses of attempted first degree murder (Counts I and II); one count of attempted first degree murder (Count III); one count of attempted manslaughter, as a lesser included offense of attempted second degree murder (Count V); and one count of place to keep firearm (Count VI).2 On September 23, 1988, the trial court sentenced Stanley to five-year terms of imprisonment for Counts I and II, life without the possibility of parole for Count III, ten years with a mandatory minimum of five years for Count V, and five years for Count VI. All sentences were to be served concurrently.

In 1989, Stanley's direct appeal from his 1988 convictions was rejected by this court in a brief memorandum opinion. His first HRPP Rule 40 petition ("First Petition") in 1992, alleging different grounds than those contained in this Second Petition, was rejected by this court in a 1994 published opinion. His 2001 HRPP Rule 35 motion was also denied by the circuit court, from which he did not appeal.

Thereafter, Stanley filed the subject Second Petition in 2017, in which he alleged, in relevant part, that his conviction of attempted manslaughter in Count V was based on reckless conduct, and therefore, his sentence was illegal, citing to State v. Pinero, 70 Haw. 509, 778 P.2d 704 (1989), State v. Holbron, 80 Hawai‘i 27, 904 P.2d 912 (1995), reconsideration denied, 80 Hawai‘i 187, 907 P.2d 773 (1995), and State v. Loa, 83 Hawai‘i 335, 926 P.2d 1258 (1996), which held that because the only non-exculpatory circumstance legally capable of mitigating murder to manslaughter is the mitigation of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there is a reasonable explanation ("EMED"), there is no offense of attempted involuntary manslaughter based on reckless conduct ("attempted reckless manslaughter").

The circuit court denied Stanley's Second Petition without an evidentiary hearing. Stanley appealed the denial of the Second Petition to the Intermediate Court of Appeals ("ICA").

In its summary disposition order ("SDO"), the ICA affirmed the circuit court's denial of the Second Petition. See Stanley v. State, CAAP-18-0000141, 2019 WL 3976129 (App. Aug. 22, 2019) (SDO). The ICA ruled, inter alia, that Stanley failed to demonstrate he was convicted of attempted reckless manslaughter, thereby failing to state a colorable claim that his sentence for Count V was illegal. The ICA also ruled Stanley was not entitled to relief under HRPP Rule 40 based on the equal protection claim alleged on appeal because he had not raised the issue before the circuit court in the Second Petition and failed to prove the existence of extraordinary circumstances justifying his failure to raise that claim.

We hold the ICA erred in affirming the circuit court's ruling that Stanley failed to state a colorable claim that he was convicted of attempted reckless manslaughter in his Second Petition. This error requires vacatur of his attempted manslaughter conviction in Count V. On remand, double jeopardy principles bar the State from retrying Stanley for attempted second degree murder in Count V.

Accordingly, we vacate the ICA's October 2, 2019 judgment on appeal entered pursuant to its August 22, 2019 SDO, Stanley's 1988 conviction for attempted manslaughter in Count V, and the circuit court's February 23, 2018 order denying Stanley's Second Petition, and we remand this case to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

II. Background
A. Factual background

This case arose from a March 11, 1988 incident in which Stanley fired gunshots in the vicinity of several individuals, including two police officers, at different intervals, and had also pointed, but not fired, a gun at another police officer. State v. Stanley, No. 13402, at 1-2, 71 Haw. 661, 833 P.2d 898 (Haw. Dec. 14, 1989) (mem.) (" Stanley I").

On March 16, 1988, a grand jury indicted Stanley with three counts of attempted first degree murder in violation of Hawai‘i Revised Statutes ("HRS") §§ 705-500 (1985),3 707-701(1)(b) (Supp. 1988),4 and 706-656 (Supp. 1988)5 (Counts I, II, and III); one count of attempted first degree murder in violation of HRS §§ 705-500, 707-701(1)(a),6 and 706-656 (Count IV); one count of attempted second degree murder in violation of HRS §§ 705-500, 707-701.5(1) (Supp. 1988), and 706-656 (Count V); and one count of place to keep firearm in violation of HRS § 134-6 (1985) (Count VI).7

The jury trial began on August 8, 1988. On August 16, 1988, the trial court acquitted Stanley of attempted first degree murder in Count IV.8 After the close of the parties’ arguments, the trial court read, and provided to the jury in writing for its deliberations, as follows:

If you are unable to find that the offense of attempted murder in the first degree or second degree has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you may then consider whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty of the included offense of attempted manslaughter.
In a prosecution for attempted murder in the first degree or second degree, attempted manslaughter is an included offense. The offense of attempted manslaughter is committed if the defendant attempted to recklessly cause the death of another person.
In a prosecution for attempted murder in the first degree or second degree, it is also a defense, which reduces the offense to attempted manslaughter, that the defendant was, at the time he attempted to cause the death of another person, under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there is a reasonable explanation. The reasonable-ness of the explanation shall be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the defendant's situation under the circumstances as he believed them to be.
The burden is upon the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not acting under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there is a reasonable explanation. If the State has not done so, you must find the defendant guilty of the included offense of attempted manslaughter. If the State has done so, you must find the defendant guilty of the offense of attempted murder in the first degree or second degree.
If you cannot agree that the prosecution has proven all of the elements of the offenses of attempted murder in the first degree or second degree or attempted manslaughter beyond a reasonable doubt, you may consider the included offense of reckless endangering in the first degree.
A person commits the offense of reckless endangering in the first degree if he intentionally fires a firearm in a manner which places another person in danger of death or serious bodily injury.
....
As to each count, you may bring in either one of the following verdicts:
....
As to Count III, attempted murder in the first degree:
1. Not guilty; or
2. Guilty as charged; or
3. Guilty of the included offense of attempted manslaughter; or
4. Guilty of the included offense of reckless endangering in the first degree.
As to Count V, attempted murder in the second degree:
1. Not guilty; or
2. Guilty as charged; or
3. Guilty of the included offense of attempted manslaughter; or
4. Guilty of the included offense of reckless endangering in the first degree.

The jury began its deliberations on August 16, 1988. During its deliberations, the jury transmitted, in relevant part, three written communications to the trial court. First, the jury requested in relevant part: "We would like a definition of attempted manslaughter & attempted to recklessly cause of [sic] death." The trial court responded in relevant part: "Please refer to the copy of the Court's instructions which have been provided to you."

Second, the jury again inquired: "We request an explanation as to the law what attempted manslaughter entails." The trial court responded: "I regret that I cannot provide you with any further clarification on this question as you already have the Penal Code definition of Attempted Manslaughter in the Court's Instructions."

Third, the jury requested: "We request a copy of Black's Law Dictionary."9 The trial court responded: "The dictionary definitions may not be consistent with the language utilized by the Legislature in the statutes, therefore, I am sorry to inform you that I am unable to grant the request."

Two days later, on August 18, 1988, the jury found Stanley guilty of: two counts of first degree reckless endangering, as lesser included offenses of attempted first degree murder (Counts I and II); one count of attempted first degree murder (Count III); one count of attempted manslaughter, as a lesser included offense of attempted second degree murder (Count V); and one count of place to keep firearm (Count VI). On September 23, 1988, the trial court entered its amended judgment, sentencing Stanley to a five-year indeterminate term of imprisonment for Counts I, II, and VI; life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for Count III; and a ten-year indeterminate term of imprisonment with a mandatory minimum of five years for Count V. The sentences were to be served concurrently.

B. Procedural background

HRPP Rule 40(a)(3) (2006) provides:

(3) Inapplicability. Rule 40 proceedings shall not be available
...

To continue reading

Request your trial
17 cases
  • Rapozo v. State
    • United States
    • Hawaii Supreme Court
    • October 22, 2021
  • State v. Etimani
    • United States
    • Hawaii Court of Appeals
    • January 26, 2022
  • State v. Slavik
    • United States
    • Hawaii Court of Appeals
    • October 27, 2021
  • State v. Gabriel
    • United States
    • Hawaii Court of Appeals
    • April 29, 2022
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT