Stannard v. Kingsbury
| Decision Date | 24 May 1901 |
| Citation | 60 N.E. 552,179 Mass. 174 |
| Parties | STANNARD v. KINGSBURY. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Elder, Wait & Whitman, for plaintiff.
Burke & Corbett, for defendant.
While there are many exceptions in this case, most of them depend upon the question whether Pub. St. c. 78, § 4, applies to the facts which are disclosed by the plaintiff's testimony or which the jury might have found to be the facts, if they believed the plaintiff's testimony, rather than the evidence for the defendant. The statute in question was first passed in this commonwealth in 1834, c. 182, § 5; Rev. St. c 74, § since. St. 1834, c. 182, § 5; Rev. St. c. 74, § 3; Gen St. c. 105, § 4. It appears in Pub. St. c. 78, § 4, in these words: 'No action shall be brought to charge a person upon or by reason of a representation or assurance made concerning the character, conduct, credit, ability, trade or dealings of any other person, unless such representation or assurance is made in writing and signed by the party to be charged thereby, or by some person thereunto by him lawfully authorized.' The statute of 1834 contained the words, 'to the intent or purpose that such person may obtain credit, money or goods thereupon.' These words were omitted in the Revised Statutes and the subsequent revisions; but it has always been held that the statute was to be construed as if these words still remained, and that the statute does not apply unless the intent or purpose of the representation is to enable a third person to obtain credit, money, or goods by means of it. Medbury v. Watson, 6 Metc. 246, 249, 39 Am. Dec. 726; Norton v. Huxley, 13 Gray, 285, 287; Belcher v. Costello, 122 Mass. 189. In the case at bar, the declaration does not proceed upon the ground that the false representations were made to enable the Lowell Rent Purchase Society to obtain the plaintiff's money, but upon the ground that they were made to induce the plaintiff to place the sum of $5,000 in the defendant's hands for investment. This distinction was careully pointed out by the judge in his charge to the jury, and it was for the jury to say, on all the evidence, which view was correct. The case of Wells v. Prince, 15 Gray, 562, relied upon by the defendant, is distinguishable from the case at bar by the fact that the representations alleged and relied upon were made with the intent of inducing the plaintiffs to make a contract of insurance with a certain insurance company, so that the insurance company might obtain the money of the plaintiffs as the premium for such insurance.
Another exception to the charge of the judge relates to the misrepresentation concerning the Lowell Rent Purchase Society, to the effect that it had been recently incorporated. It was admitted that there was no such corporation, but there was evidence that it was a voluntary association, though the testimony on this point was very indefinite, and it was a disputed question whether there was any voluntary society on June 22d, when the plaintiff paid her money. The judge instructed the jury that the statute applied not only to an individual, but to a corporation or to a society;...
To continue reading
Request your trial