Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. State

• Decision Date: 22 November 1939
• Docket Number: No. 7412.,7412.
• Citation: 133 S.W.2d 767
• Court: Texas Supreme Court
• Parties: STANOLIND OIL & GAS CO. et al. v. STATE et al.

133 S.W.2d 767

STANOLIND OIL & GAS CO. et al. v. STATE et al.

No. 7412.

Supreme Court of Texas.

November 22, 1939.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Error from Court of Civil Appeals of Third Supreme Judicial District.

Boundary suit by the State of Texas and others against the Stanolind Oil & Gas Company and others. A judgment upon a directed verdict in favor of the State was affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part by the Court of Civil Appeals, 114 S.W.2d 699, and named defendant and others bring error.

Reversed, and judgment of the trial court reformed and, as reformed, affirmed.

Turner, Rodgers & Winn, of Dallas, Clay Tallman and Donald Campbell, both of Tulsa, Okl., Collins, Jackson & Snodgrass, of San Angelo, Cantey, Hanger, McMahon, McKnight & Johnson, Warren Scarborough, Gillis A. Johnson, and Ira Butler, all of Fort Worth, Henry H. Brooks, of Austin, and Geo. T. Wilson, of San Angelo, for plaintiffs in error.

Wm. McCraw, Former Atty. Gen., H. Grady Chandler, of Austin, and Gerald C. Mann, Atty. Gen., for defendants in error.

J. B. Dibrell, Jr., of Coleman, John Sayles, of Abilene, Bryan, Suhr, Bering & Bell and E. H. Suhr, all of Houston, and Wagstaff, Harwell, Douthit & Alvis, of Abilene, amici curiæ.

SHARP, Justice.

This suit was filed by the State against the Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., the Cardinal Oil Co., the Dogie Oil Co., George D. Morgan, J. H. Arthur, Bob Reid, H. W. Compton, M. D. Bryant, J. H. Tyler, Eulia B. Tyler, and V. C. Hogan, to recover a tract of land 122.5 varas wide by 1208.9 varas long, lying between the west line of Tyler Survey No. 1 and the east line of T. C. Ry. Co. Survey No. 104, in Pecos County, Texas. It was contended by the State that the land sued for was vacant, but was subject to the rights of certain defendants to purchase or lease same for oil and gas producing purposes; and all the parties asserting such rights were made parties to the suit, so that, in addition to establishing that the land was not included in prior grants, the relative rights of certain of the defendants might be determined, as between themselves and as between themselves and the State. Upon the trial of the case, and based upon an instructed verdict, the trial court entered judgment. This judgment provided in effect as follows:

(a) That the State recover the entire tract of 122.5 varas wide by 1208.9 varas long.

(b) That the application for lease upon such land on behalf of Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. was invalid.

(c) That Bryant had a prior right to obtain from the State a mineral lease under Article 5421c, Vernon's Ann.Civ.St., upon the most westerly and most northerly part of that area recovered by the State. The area awarded to Bryant was a strip off the west side thereof 50.9 varas wide east to west and along the north side of the area of 45.9 varas wide from north to south.

(d) That the Cardinal Oil Co. had a valid lease upon a strip approximately 52.6 varas wide at the south end and 50.3 varas wide at the north end, immediately east and south of the area awarded to Bryant; which lease had been granted upon the applications of Bob Reid and J. H. Arthur.

(e) That the Dogie Oil Co. had a valid lease upon an area 19 varas wide and immediately east of the Cardinal Oil Co. area. Both the Dogie Oil Co. and the two Cardinal Oil & Gas Co. leases together extended north and south 1163 varas, thus leaving the strip along the north edge of the area recovered by the State 45.9 varas wide, which was included in the area awarded to Bryant. (1208.9 minus 1163 leaves 45.9).

(f) That Tyler was not entitled to assert a prior right to purchase the area awarded the State under his application for inquiry under Article 5323, Revised Civil Statutes, and that he was not entitled to a lease upon the area, or any part thereof, under the 1931 Leasing Act (Vernon's Ann.Civ.St. art. 5421c).

From this judgment both the Stanolind Oil & Gas Company and Tyler duly perfected appeals to the Court of Civil Appeals; and that court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, denying the application of Tyler to purchase and to lease, and also denying the Stanolind application to lease, and in all other respects reversing and remanding the cause. 114 S.W.2d 699.

Stanolind Oil & Gas Company contends that the trial court erred in not sustaining its plea in abatement grounded upon the nonjoinder of certain parties claiming interests in Surveys 104 and 34½. The state and its privies contest this plea on the following grounds: (1) It was not filed in due order of pleading, and was waived; (2) it was defective, in that it did not allege the nature and extent of the interest claimed by the nonjoinder parties; (3) the plea was properly overruled, because no evidence was offered in support of it; and (4), that as to the Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. the overruling of such plea was harmless.

The following undisputed facts appear: On May 13, 1935, Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. was served with citation, and on February 21, 1936, it filed its original answer; and no mention was made of a nonjoinder of parties. On April 11, 1936, the Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. filed an amended answer to the merits, without mentioning this ground of abatement. On April 20, 1936, that Company presented, offered evidence in support of, and procured a ruling upon its motion for continuance, before presenting this plea in abatement, which was not filed or presented until April 20, 1936.

The Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. in its supplemental plea in abatement for nonjoinder of certain parties as defendants herein, alleged in substance as ground therefor that James Cornell and others "now assert the ownership of interests in and to section 104"; that Ida Mae Ramsey and others "assert and claim an interest to the minerals in and under section 104"; that Marathon Oil Co. holds and asserts an oil and gas lease upon a portion of Section 34½; and that the Yates Estate holds and asserts title to Section 34½.

The action of trespass to try title embraces all character of litigation that affects the title to real estate. Hardy v. Beaty, 84 Tex. 562, 19 S.W. 778, 31 Am. St.Rep. 80; Moody v. Holcomb, 26 Tex. 714, 719; Titus v. Johnson, 50 Tex. 224, 237; Rains v. Wheeler, 76 Tex. 390, 393, 13 S.W. 324; Edrington v. Butler, Tex. Civ.App., 33 S.W. 143; 7 Tex.Jur., p. 246, sec. 35, and cases cited.

The following articles of the Revised Civil Statutes define who shall be proper parties in a trespass to try title suit:

Article 7370 reads: "The defendant in the action shall be the person in possession if the premises are occupied, or some person claiming title thereto in case they are unoccupied."

Article 7371 reads: "The plaintiff may join as a defendant with the person in possesson, any other person who, as landlord, remainderman, reversioner or otherwise, may claim title to the premises, or any part thereof, adversely to the plaintiff."

It is also well settled that disputes as to boundaries may be determined in trespass to try title suits. Weaver v. Vandervanter, 84 Tex. 691, 19 S.W. 889; Mahurin v. McClung, Tex.Civ.App., 34 S. W. 1046; Roundtree v. Haynes, Tex.Civ. App., 73 S.W. 435; Nye v. Hawkins, 65 Tex. 600; 7 Tex.Jur., p. 246, sec. 35.

In 32 Tex.Jur., p. 13, sec. 9, it is said: "A necessary party is one who is so vitally interested in the object or subject matter of the suit that a valid judgment cannot be rendered without his presence."

In 32 Tex.Jur., p. 34, sec. 21, it is said: "The question of proper joinder often rests in the discretion of the court, the exercise of which will not be revised unless palpable abuse is shown."

An objection that there is a defect of parties should ordinarily be raised at the earliest opportunity; otherwise the objection will be waived. However, an exception to this rule exists when it is shown that there is a nonjoinder of essential parties. 32 Tex.Jur., p. 140, sec. 98.

The Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. contended that the strip of land involved here was vacant public land, and it claimed a preference right to lease same from the State. The land was surveyed and its four corners marked on the ground by the Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. That company by its acts and admissions represented that it was vacant land. The State also claimed that the land was vacant and subject to lease, and filed this suit against the defendants. The nature of the suit was to determine, as between the parties in this suit, the respective rights of the parties claiming such land or parts thereof. The Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. claimed it all by virtue of its application. Tyler claimed the land by virtue of his letter of inquiry. And other parties claimed certain rights in part of such land, as above described.

This is not a suit for partition, nor is it a suit for the reformation or a cancellation of the lease to Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. on Survey 104. Nor is the State attacking any lease executed by it on this land. The State, as plaintiff, and Bryant and others, as cross acting defendants, seek judgment in the statutory action of trespass to try title against the Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., and none of the others not parties to this suit will be bound by any judgment rendered here against the Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. Stewart v. Kemp, 54 Tex. 248; Heirs of Nancy Tevis v. William E. Armstrong and J. J. French, 71 Tex. 59, 9 S.W. 134; Alford v. Cole, Tex.Civ.App., 65 S.W.2d 813; Johnson v. Moss, Tex.Civ. App., 108 S.W.2d 1110. This is especially true since the decision here in no way adjudicates the rights of those not parties to this suit.

It clearly appears that the parties suggested are not indispensable parties to this suit, and that their claims or rights in this land are not of such nature that a final decree, fixing the rights and interests in the land of all parties before the court, would be wholly inconsistent with equity and good conscience. It was the duty of Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., in filing such plea in abatement suggesting the nonjoinder of certain parties as...