Stansfield v. Gardner
| Decision Date | 08 October 1937 |
| Docket Number | 26387. |
| Parties | STANSFIELD v. GARDNER. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Rehearing Denied Nov. 4, 1937.
Syllabus by the Court.
1.
(a) Although in the present case the defendant was originally under a duty to provide a special attendant, as provided by contract with the father of the plaintiff, for the patient while being treated and cared for in the hospital of the defendant, it was shown by competent evidence that at the time of the injury to the plaintiff the defendant was under no special duty to have an attendant with the plaintiff constantly, the father having authorized the defendant to limit the special supervision in accordance with the latter's judgment, consistently with the condition of the plaintiff, as determined by the defendant, in order to reduce the expense being sustained by the father, who advised that he did not wish to be "penny wise and pound foolish," but desired to leave the entire matter in the hands of the defendant. The defendant having given his judgment that the special attendant was necessary only while the patient was outside of the building, and having in good faith acted to his prejudice on the authority given by the father and made a reduction in charges, the father would be estopped from claiming that the original contract in reference to the special attendant had not been fully complied with; and hence the plaintiff could not complain in that respect, although he would nevertheless not be deprived of the right to avail himself of the protection otherwise afforded under the law as to the care and diligence due him as a patient by the defendant. Whether at the time of the injury ordinary and reasonable care on the part of the defendant required that the plaintiff have an attendant with him at the moment of his injury was a question for the jury.
(b) The evidence, though conflicting, was sufficient to authorize the jury to return a verdict for the defendant.
2-10. None of the special grounds of the motion for new trial shows reversible error.
11. The court did not err in overruling the motion for new trial.
Error from City Court of Decatur; Frank Guess, Judge.
Action by C. A. Stansfield against W. A. Gardner. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff brings error.
Affirmed.
In a hospital patient's action for injuries, an instruction that if the jury believe the people who had charge of plaintiff, under the care of defendant, were the agents of defendant, etc., is not erroneous as requiring the jury to determine an issue of agency not raised by the pleadings, and because the attendants were in fact employees, where, in view of the full charge, the jury could not have been confused or required to enter upon an inquiry not necessary as to the liability of defendant for the negligence of the attendants.
J Howell Green, of Decatur, for plaintiff in error.
Bryan, Middlebrooks & Carter, of Atlanta, and B. H. Burgess, of Decatur, for defendant in error.
Charles A. Stansfield brought suit against W. A. Gardner for damages on account of injuries which he sustained because of alleged negligence of the defendant at a time when the plaintiff was a patient in the private hospital operated by the defendant. The defendant denied the material allegations of the petition, and specially pleaded that the plaintiff was placed in the hospital by his parents under an original agreement that the defendant was to be paid $50 as an admission fee, $35 per week for room and board, and $25 per week for a special attendant for the patient; that in January, 1935, the father requested the defendant to dispense with the special attendant, and it was agreed between the father and the defendant that the defendant would not furnish the patient with a special attendant at all times, but would furnish such an attendant only when the patient was out of the hospital building for walks, exercise, etc., and that thereafter the total charges for all services rendered to the patient, including room and board, were reduced to $50 per week, including the services of a special attendant while the patient was outside of the hospital building. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant. The plaintiff filed a motion for new trial on the general grounds and on several special grounds which are hereinafter referred to. The exception is to the judgment overruling the motion for new trial.
The material evidence on the trial of the case was substantially as follows: The plaintiff, before his illness which made necessary his treatment in the hospital of the defendant, was an adult young man of superior mentality. He had received a Master of Arts degree from a university of note, and was further prosecuting his studies for a Doctor's degree when he suffered a nervous breakdown which resulted in temporary insanity. On or about August 18, 1934, at the instance of his parents, he was placed in the institution of the defendant at Stone Mountain, Ga., in order that he might be properly cared for and treated for his mental condition. The defendant, Gardner, made an admission charge of $50, and it was agreed that the father would pay $35 per week for the son's board and $25 per week for a special attendant. The defendant, who was a physician, and was a specialist in nervous and mental diseases, subsequently diagnosed the patient's mental condition as dementia praecox. There was testimony from one or two other physicians that it was of the manic depressive type. It was shown that a person suffering from the latter type is susceptible to contrasting moods, sometimes experiencing a feeling of lofty well being, manifested by intense activity, and at other times falling into marked depression, in which last-named condition there is a frequent tendency to commit suicide. In the case of dementia praecox there is sometimes, though less often than in the other type, a similar tendency. The plaintiff, who has been declared to be fully recovered, testified that he could recall that in his stay at the hospital he was often disposed to destroy himself and meditated on how he might accomplish that end, but that the opportunity did not present itself. Attendants and his nurse testified that at no time did he indicate that in his condition he might harm himself. One of the attendants testified that he had accompanied him to the top of Stone Mountain, an enormous monolith in the vicinity of the hospital, and that the plaintiff had been near the edge thereof, but made no effort to commit suicide by jumping or otherwise; and that during their walks he had many opportunities to throw himself in front of automobiles but never did. It was found necessary, in the early part of his stay at the hospital, to confine the patient in a room fortified by bars in order to prevent his escape and to properly protect him. But there was testimony that he had gradually improved, had gained weight, and his mental condition was such, shortly before the injuries sued for, that he realized the need of the treatment he was receiving, expressed a desire to co-operate, and the defendant had written to the patient's father that he hoped the son would be able to return home in a few weeks. The plaintiff, however, testified that about a week before the occurrence he had been confined in the "locker," but, although at the time of the injury he was rooming on the second floor, where patients were not in barred rooms, he had little confidence in himself and so expressed himself to the defendant.
As the case involves the question of what care and attention the plaintiff was entitled to receive as a patient, it is pertinent to set out here certain correspondence between the father of the plaintiff and the defendant. On January 28 1935, the father wrote to the defendant as follows: ...
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