Stanton v. City of Skidmore

• Citation: 620 S.W.3d 245
• Decision Date: 12 January 2021
• Docket Number: WD 83441
• Parties: Rickie L. STANTON, Appellant, v. CITY OF SKIDMORE, Missouri, Respondent.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Missouri (US)

620 S.W.3d 245

Rickie L. STANTON, Appellant,

v.CITY OF SKIDMORE, Missouri, Respondent.

WD 83441

Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District.

Filed: January 12, 2021

Application for Transfer to Supreme Court Denied March 2, 2021

Application for Transfer Denied May 4, 2021

Rick L. Stanton, Skidmore, appellant pro se.

Jean A. Maneke, KCMO for respondent.

Before Division Three: Edward R. Ardini, Jr. P.J., and Alok Ahuja and Gary D. Witt, JJ.

Alok Ahuja, Judge

Rickie L. Stanton filed a petition for declaratory relief in the Circuit Court of Nodaway County, contending that a nuisance ordinance enacted by the City of Skidmore was invalid. The City asserted two counterclaims, alleging that Stanton had violated the nuisance ordinance and a separate parking ordinance. The circuit court granted the City summary judgment on Stanton's petition and on its counterclaims. Stanton appeals. We affirm the grant of summary judgment to the City on Stanton's petition, and on the City's counterclaim alleging violation of the nuisance ordinance. Because the City failed to establish the content of its parking ordinance with competent evidence, we reverse the grant of summary judgment on the City's second counterclaim, and remand for further proceedings on that claim.

Factual Background

Stanton owns property in Skidmore, on which he operates a salvage and wholesale business dealing in scrap metal and reclaimed lumber. Part of Stanton's property adjoins a public alleyway.

In 2015 the Skidmore City Council enacted a nuisance ordinance. On December 28, 2018, the City's attorney notified Stanton that he was violating the nuisance ordinance by parking prohibited vehicles on his property; by storing pallets and other refuse on his property; and by allowing weeds and other "rank growth of vegetation" on the property. The letter advised Stanton that he was required to abate the nuisance on his property within seven days, or the City would take further action against him.

At Stanton's request, the City Council held a hearing on the citation on January 28, 2019. Although the City presented evidence at the hearing, Stanton did not testify or present any evidence of his own. Following the hearing, the City Council issued its Findings of Fact and Order Regarding Appeal, finding that Stanton was in violation of the nuisance ordinance. The City Council's Order found that "there is an accumulation of debris, refuse, rubbish, trash or nuisances, on the city's right of way" adjoining Stanton's property. The Order also found that Stanton was violating the nuisance ordinance by storing unstacked lumber, from which nails had not been removed, outside of the property's "rear yard." The Order found that Stanton was also violating the nuisance ordinance by storing abandoned, unlicensed and "junk" vehicles on his property which were visible from adjacent properties, and that Stanton was not exempt from the prohibition on vehicle storage because he was not operating a licensed salvage, auto repair, or auto towing or storage facility. The Order specified that, if Stanton did not abate the nuisance by February 25, 2019, he would be fined $100.00 per day for any continuance of the nuisance; the Order also advised Stanton that the City might seek equitable relief in the circuit court if the nuisance were not timely abated.

On March 11, 2019, Stanton filed a petition for declaratory judgment and judicial review in the Circuit Court of Nodaway County. In Count I, Stanton's petition alleged that the nuisance ordinance is invalid because: "the statutory provisions relating to the passage of city ordinances were not followed"; the ordinance was purportedly passed in 2015 but no vote of the City Council was taken at that time; the ordinance is unconstitutionally vague and ambiguous; the ordinance denies Stanton due process of law because the City Council heard and decided his appeal, after making the initial decision to cite Stanton; and the ordinance is inconsistent with state law. In Count II, Stanton alleged that the nuisance ordinance is unconstitutional as applied, because it was being selectively enforced against him. Count II also alleged that the nuisance ordinance had the effect of prohibiting Stanton's pre-existing "business of salvage and pallet rehabilitation," and therefore constituted a taking of his property without just compensation. In Count III, Stanton alleged that the City had abandoned the alleyway adjoining his property by failing to maintain it, and that he had acquired ownership of the alley property by adverse possession.

The City's answer to Stanton's petition asserted two counterclaims. The City's first counterclaim sought a declaration that Stanton was in violation of the City's January 28, 2019 order. The City asked the court to assess a fine against Stanton for his failure to abate the nuisance as required by the City Council's Order, and to issue an injunction prohibiting Stanton from continuing to violate the nuisance ordinance. The City's second counterclaim alleged that Stanton had encroached on or blocked the City's alleyway by placing vehicles, pallets, and other scrap materials in the alley, in violation of a City parking ordinance, Ordinance 2018-POS-B. The City's second counterclaim alleged that violations of Ordinance 2018-POS-B are subject to punishment by a fine of up to $500.00, incarceration for up to 90 days, and assessment of the costs of removing materials encroaching on the right of way. The City asked the court to find that Stanton was in violation of Ordinance No. 2018-POS-B, and impose an appropriate fine or other penalty on him.

Stanton filed an answer denying the allegations in the City's counterclaims on May 1, 2019.

On May 15, 2019, the City filed a motion for summary judgment on its counterclaims. The circuit court granted the motion on August 8, 2019. On the City's counterclaims, the court declared that Stanton "is in violation of the Order of the City of Skidmore dated January 28, 2019," and that Stanton "is in violation of, and continues to violate, the City of Skidmore's City Ordinance 2018-POS-B." The court rejected the City's prayer that the court fine Stanton, or enjoin him from further maintenance of a nuisance. The court denied further relief on the basis that "[t]he present action is one of declaratory judgment, not a criminal matter pertaining to ordinance violations," and that the City had failed to adequately plead a claim for injunctive relief.

On September 13, 2019, the City filed a second motion for summary judgment, this time directed at the claims asserted in Stanton's petition. The circuit court granted this second motion on November 26, 2019, and dismissed Stanton's affirmative claims. The court emphasized that its judgment "is of legal necessity founded on the very narrow procedural issues presented to [the court] by the parties." The judgment states that the City "remain[s] free to pursue enforcement of the ordinance against [Stanton] in the municipal court via a criminal action," and that "[t]his Court is not offering any opinion as to whether the City would have civil enforcement options available to enforce its ordinance or otherwise address nuisance concerns in the City."

Stanton appeals.

Standard of Review

Appellate review of the grant of summary judgment is essentially de novo. "The criteria on appeal for testing the propriety of summary judgment are no different from those which should be employed by the trial court to determine the propriety of sustaining the motion initially." This Court reviews the record in the light most favorable to the party against whom judgment was entered. "Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party has [established], on the basis of facts as to which there is no genuine dispute, a right to judgment as a matter of law."

Newton v. Mercy Clinic E. Cmtys. , 596 S.W.3d 625, 628 (Mo. 2020) (citations omitted). "We will affirm a summary judgment on any theory supported by the record." Lewellen v. Univ. Underwriters Ins. Co. , 574 S.W.3d 251, 265 (Mo. App. W.D. 2019) (citation omitted).

Discussion

Stanton asserts six Points on appeal. We address them in the order presented.

I.

Stanton's first Point argues that the nuisance ordinance's enactment did not comply with the procedural requirements of § 79.130, RSMo. Specifically, Stanton contends that the ordinance was never signed by the Mayor, that the ordinance was not read during the City Council's meeting prior to its passage, and that the vote for and against passage of the ordinance was not properly recorded. Stanton also argues that the ordinance was never properly amended to allow the City Council to serve functions assigned in the ordinance to the (nonexistent) "Director of Public Works" and "City Manager."

Stanton did not preserve the arguments made in Point I in the circuit court, either in his petition or in his summary judgment briefing. Stanton's petition alleged generally that "the statutory provisions relating to the passage of city ordinances were not followed" when the nuisance ordinance was passed. But he alleged no specific defects in the ordinance's enactment in his petition. "Missouri is a fact pleading state." Gardner v. Bank of Am., N.A. , 466 S.W.3d 642, 646 (Mo. App. E.D. 2015) (citation omitted). To state a claim, "a petition must contain a short and plain statement of the facts showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Id. (citing Rule 55.05). The petition must, at a minimum, "plead ultimate facts demonstrating" that the claimant is entitled to relief; mere conclusions are not sufficient. Williams v. Barnes & Noble, Inc. , 174 S.W.3d 556, 560 (Mo. App. W.D. 2005) (citation omitted). "Courts disregard conclusions not supported by facts in determining whether a petition states a cause of action." Id. (citation omitted).

The general allegations of Stanton's petition failed to identify any specific defects in the passage of the City's nuisance ordinance. In addition, he did not allege any...