Stanton v. Minneapolis St. Ry. Co., 30444.
| Decision Date | 22 November 1935 |
| Docket Number | No. 30444.,30444. |
| Citation | 263 N.W. 433,195 Minn. 457 |
| Parties | STANTON v. MINNEAPOLIS ST. RY. CO. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Ralph T. Boardman and John F. Dulebohn, both of Minneapolis, for relator.
Sexton, Mordaunt, Kennedy & Carroll, of Minneapolis, for respondent.
Certiorari to the Industrial Commission to review an order granting compensation for the death of relator's husband, Mike Stanton.
For Mr. Stanton, life came to an end about 5 o'clock p. m. of Sunday, October 15, 1933, in the course of his employment by the Minneapolis Street Railway Company, relator here. He was a long-time employee, having worked in the Lake street car barn since 1928. His principal tasks were those of utility repairman and electric control inspector. His was the duty to inspect and keep in repair the controls on thirty-five or forty street cars from time to time housed in the Lake street barn. In addition, he habitually worked with others of the crew in keeping the place clean and shoveling sand from work cars into sand chutes leading into a basement. The sand is brought in during the summer and stored for use as needed. He was shoveling sand at the time he died, just as he had regularly in the summertime during many years. His day off was Saturday. He worked eight hours a day, six days a week, including Sunday.
On the afternoon of October 15, he, with two fellow workers, Tomshek and Milliken, were removing sand from a work car into a chute leading to the storage basement. Two other employees had been working with them, but had quit at 4 o'clock. The sand was damp, moistened to keep down the dust. The work was not being done hastily, the men shoveling for about fifteen minutes and then resting for two or three. Stanton was using a lighter and smaller shovel than those of his two companions. They say that he, being older (he was fifty-eight), could not do and was not doing as much work as they. The Friday before he had complained of trouble with his "wind" — shortness of breath. That afternoon, during a rest period, the men had lighted cigarettes, and Stanton remarked that he might have to quit smoking. It was affecting his "wind." The sand going through the chute accumulated on the floor four feet below and piled up against the wall and clogged the chute. When three men were shoveling, it was customary to have another in the basement to keep the chute clear. The chute having clogged when the car was about two-thirds empty, Stanton was directed by the acting foreman, Tomshek, to go down and clear it. Stanton appeared to be in his usual health. He went into the basement alone. The chute was promptly cleared. His companions on the car continued shoveling for at least five minutes, according to the testimony of both, when, the chute again clogging, a call to Stanton brought no reply.
Milliken went into the basement and found him dead, his body lying on the back, feet in the sand, the shoes covered with two or three inches of it, and the shovel standing upright with blade in the sand just in front of his feet. That is the whole antemortem story. There is no suggestion of accident or fortuitous event other than the death itself — no evidence of blow, sudden strain, more than ordinary exertion, excitement, or aught else to explain why death ensued.
An autopsy did expose the cause, coronary sclerosis with "a fairly recent thrombosis." In the heart itself "were several areas of extensive fibrosis, the muscles replaced by fibrous tissue." The anterior descending branch of the left coronary was completely closed. In that artery was much calcification of the wall, All of these conditions had been of gradual development, save only the clot or thrombus.
The medical testimony for petitioner ascribes the thrombosis, not to any accident or fortuitous event, but solely to exertion, the opinion being that "overexertion" caused death. But the term "overexertion" is used only as indicating a degree of labor exceeding that which the doctors considered safe for any heart already as "tremendously damaged" as was Stanton's. Even so, their whole testimony comes near, if not quite, to being reducible to the arithmetical statement that there was a "fifty-fifty" chance that the man's work had nothing to do with his death. That is, in about one-half of such cases, death is as likely to come while the victim is walking or under other slight physical stress, or even when he is resting. Many such deaths have come without apparent connection with exertion of any kind, and even when the subject was in bed. There was admission from one of petitioner's doctors that "the majority of them" had died when they were not at work. We do not overlook the testimony of another that 50 per cent. is "probably high" as an estimate of the number of such cases where death results without any particular work or exertion.
This summary of all medical testimony for petitioner indicates that, as to cause, the case even from the medical viewpoint is almost, if not quite, one of mere conjecture rather than reasonable inference. It comes close to leaving the evidence in such balance that petitioner has not sustained the burden of proof resting upon her to show the cause of death by fair preponderance of evidence. But we do not base decision upon that ground. We hold rather that there was no showing of accidental cause within the workmen's compensation law, which (Mason's Minn. St. 1927, § 4326(h), defines an accident as "an unexpected or unforeseen event, happening suddenly and violently, with or without human fault, and producing at the time injury to the physical structure of the body." Without stopping to examine the difference, if any, between that and "fortuitous event," used in argument (See Stertz v. Industrial Insurance Commission, 91 Wash. 588, 158 P. 256, Ann. Cas. 1918B, 354), we hold that here was no accident within the meaning of our law.
A fortuitous event is one "happening by chance or accident; occurring unexpectedly, or without known cause." Webster's New International Dictionary ([Unabridged] 2d Ed. [1935]) p. 994. Were that the literal and only test, all sudden deaths happening during the course of an employee's work would be compensable. Obviously, that is not the...
To continue reading
Request your trial