Stanwood v. Clancey

• Decision Date: 01 October 1909
• Citation: 106 Me. 72,75 A. 293
• Parties: STANWOOD v. CLANCEY et al.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

75 A. 293

106 Me. 72

STANWOOD

v. CLANCEY et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Oct. 1, 1909.

Exceptions from Supreme Judicial Court, Cumberland County.

Action by George M. Stanwood against Mary Clancey and others. Judgment of nonsuit, and plaintiff excepts. Overruled.

Action on the case to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff, caused by the alleged negligence of the defendants in leaving open or unguarded the door to an elevator in the defendants' building in Portland, and into which the plaintiff stepped and fell. Plea, the general issue. At the conclusion of the evidence for the plaintiff, the presiding justice ordered a nonsuit, and the plaintiff excepted.

The case is stated in the opinion.

Argued before WHITEHOUSE, SAVAGE. CORNISH, KING, and BIRD, JJ.

Dennis A. Meaher and Charles P. Mattocks, for plaintiff.

Libby, Robinson & Ives, for defendants.

SAVAGE, J. Case, to recover for personal injuries caused by the defendants' alleged negligence in leaving open or unguarded the door to an elevator, into which the plaintiff stepped and fell. At the conclusion of the evidence for the plaintiff, a nonsuit was directed, and the plaintiff excepted.

The facts shown, taken most favorably for the plaintiff, are these. The defendants were the owners of an office building on Exchange street, in Portland, which was occupied by their tenants. On the ground floor were two insurance offices, and the second and third floor rooms were mostly lawyers' offices. Between the two insurance offices was the main entrance to the building, leading into a hallway. At the further end of the hallway were the stairs leading to the second and third floors. At the right of the door as one entered, and about five feet distant therefrom, the defendants had placed, and were operating, a passenger elevator. The face of the elevator cage formed a part of the side of the hallway. In the elevator well, below the level of the first floor of the building, was an electric light meter. On the day in question a servant of the electric light company went to the building for the purpose of reading the meter. To enable him to get into the well where the meter was, the boy in charge of the elevator, who was the servant of the defendants, in operating it, ran it up until the floor of the elevator was only a little lower than the top of the doorway in the elevator frame. The electric light man descended into the well, leaving open the door in the elevator frame. While things were in this situation, the plaintiff entered the hallway from the street, and thinking, as he says, that the open space in the elevator frame was the entrance to an office, stepped into it and fell to the bottom of the well, and received serious injuries.

The plaintiff, that morning, according to his own version, had learned that a Mr. York wished to see him, and he went to the latter's office. He learned there that York wished to obtain some gravel from a pit owned by the city of South Portland, of which city the plaintiff was an alderman. The plaintiff refused York's request, but said that he knew a lawyer, whose name he thought was Hanscomb, who had a gravel pit, and he told York that he thought Hanscomb would be the man to see. Thereupon York said "Let's see him." The plaintiff and York then started to ascertain where Hanscomb's office was. The plaintiff had at some time been told that Hanscomb had an office on Exchange street, but neither he nor York knew where it was. When they reached the entrance of the defendants' building, York said: "Let's go in here. Any of these lawyers will tell us where he is." They went in, and the plaintiff stepped into the elevator well, as has been described. It is admitted that Hanscomb did not then have, and never had had, an office in the defendants' building.

Upon these facts it is contended, in support of the order of nonsuit, that the plaintiff was a mere licensee upon the defendants' premises, and that they did not owe to him the duty of using care to prevent his stepping into the open elevator well, and hence that, as to him, at least, they were not negligent. It is also contended that the plaintiff himself was guilty of contributory negligence.

We think the nonsuit was properly ordered. Upon the evidence the jury would not have been warranted in finding for the plaintiff. In such case it is the duty of the court to order a nonsuit, or direct a verdict for the defendant.

In the first place, if the plaintiff was paying the slightest attention to the situation, it is difficult to see how he could have mistaken the opening into the darkness of an elevator well for the entrance to an office, as he testified that he supposed it was. It was a sunshiny day, and the door from the street was wide open, and was only five feet from the elevator. The merest attentive glance Would have disclosed that the opening was not the open door of an office, and should have halted the plaintiff. It is impossible to resist the conclusion that the plaintiff was guilty of that thoughtless inattention which has been said to be the very essence of negligence. See McCarvell v. Sawyer, 173 Mass. 540, 54 N. E. 259, 73 Am. St. Rep. 318; Humphreys v. Portsmouth Co., 184 Mass. 422, 68 N. E. 836.

But we go further. While it is the duty of the owner of a building, having it in charge, to be careful in keeping it safe for all those who come there by his invitation, express or implied, he owes no such duty to those who come there for their own convenience, or as mere licensees. Toward a licensee, the owner owes no duty, except that he shall not wantonly injure him. Dixon v. Swift, 98 Me. 207, 56 Atl. 761; Russell v. M. C. R. R. Co., 100 Me. 408, 61 Atl. 899; Parker v. Portland Publishing Co., 69 Me. 173, 31 Am. Rep. 262. It is well settled that, when the owner of a building fits it up for business, he impliedly invites all persons to come there whose coming is...