Stapel v. Stapel, Appeal No.: 2009AP1195
| Decision Date | 14 July 2010 |
| Docket Number | Appeal No.: 2009AP1195,Cir. Ct. No. 2008CV547 |
| Parties | Nina Stapel, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Alberdina Stapel and Rudolph Stapel, Defendants-Respondents. |
| Court | Wisconsin Court of Appeals |
APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Sheboygan County: GARY LANGHOFF, Judge. Affirmed.
Before Brown, C.J., Anderson and Snyder, JJ.
¶1 Nina Stapel has appealed from a judgment dismissing her amended complaint against the respondents, Alberdina Stapel and her son, Rudolph Stapel. In awarding judgment, the trial court granted motions for summary judgment filed by Alberdina and Rudolph, and denied a motion forsummary judgment filed by Nina. We conclude that the trial court properly granted summary judgment to Alberdina and Rudolph and affirm the judgment.
¶2 When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we apply the same methodology as the trial court and decide de novo whether summary judgment was appropriate. Turner v. Taylor, 2003 WI App 256, ¶7, 268 Wis. 2d 628, 673 N.W.2d 716. We first examine the pleadings to determine whether a claim for relief has been stated and whether a genuine issue of material fact is presented. Lambrecht v. Estate of Kaczmarczyk, 2001 WI 25, ¶21, 241 Wis. 2d 804, 623 N.W.2d 751. If the pleadings state a claim and demonstrate that material factual issues exist, our inquiry shifts to the moving party's affidavits or other proof to determine whether a prima facie case for summary judgment has been presented. Id., ¶ 22. If the moving party has made a prima facie case, the affidavits or other proof of the opposing party must be examined to determine whether there exist disputed material facts, or undisputed material facts from which reasonable alternative inferences may be drawn, sufficient to entitle the opposing party to trial. Id.
¶3 Merely alleging a factual dispute will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment. Helland v. Kurtis A. Froedtert Memorial Lutheran Hosp., 229 Wis. 2d 751, 756, 601 N.W.2d 318 (Ct. App. 1999). The party that opposes a summary judgment motion must set forth specific evidentiary facts showing that a genuine issue exists for trial. See id. "It is not enough to rely upon unsubstantiated conclusory remarks, speculation, or testimony which is not based upon personal knowledge." Id. If a determination of law will conclude the case, summary judgment should be granted. Northwest Eng'g Credit Union v. Jahn, 120 Wis. 2d 185, 187, 353 N.W.2d 67 (Ct. App. 1984).
¶4 In her amended complaint, Nina alleged that in 1980, she and Rudolph were married, employed, and living in Montana. Nina alleged that they were contacted by Rudolph's parents, Alberdina and Lukas, who requested that they return to Wisconsin to operate the family farm. Nina alleged that Lukas and Alberdina promised that if they did so, Rudolph and Nina would have the option of buying the farm in the future. Nina alleged that in reliance upon this promise, she and Rudolph terminated their employment and returned to Wisconsin where they commenced operating the farm in January 1981. Nina also alleged that in 1981, Lukas and Alberdina executed an option (the 1981 option) which gave her and Rudolph the option to purchase the farm on or before December 31, 1988 for $213,700.
¶5 Nina alleged that from 1980 to 1996, when Lukas died, Lukas and Alberdina represented to Nina and Rudolph that they would have the right to buy the farm in the future, and that Alberdina made similar representations from 1996 to 2006. Nina alleged that in reliance on the representations that they would have the right to buy the farm in the future, she and Rudolph made substantial improvements to the farm property in 1981 and thereafter, and Lukas and Alberdina knew of these improvements and recognized them as consideration for the right to buy the farm. Nina further alleged that in 1986 and before the expiration of the 1981 option, Lukas and Alberdina executed an option (the 1986 option), which gave her and Rudolph the right to purchase the real estate belonging to Lukas and Alberdina in the town of Mosel for $125,000. She further alleged that in 1989, Lukas and Alberdina executed an Option Right of First Refusal (the 1989 option), which granted Nina and Rudolph the right to purchase the farm property described in Schedule A of the 1989 option for $180,000.
¶6 Nina alleged that she and Rudolph commenced divorce proceedings in 2005. She alleged that during these proceedings, Rudolph, through his attorney, advised Alberdina that the 1986 option was unenforceable. Nina alleged that Rudolph also advised Alberdina that under the terms of the 1989 option, she could cancel that option. Nina alleged that Alberdina signed a cancellation of the 1989 option on March 16, 2006. She alleged that Alberdina would not have attempted to cancel the 1989 option if Rudolph had not induced her to do so. Nina also alleged that after this cancellation, she served Alberdina with a notice of intent to execute the 1986 option.
¶7 Based upon these factual allegations, Nina made three claims involving Alberdina: (1) requesting declaratory judgment that the 1986 and/or 1989 options were valid and enforceable; (2) alleging that Alberdina should be equitably estopped from refusing to honor the 1986 and/or 1989 options based upon principles of promissory estoppel; and (3) alleging that Alberdina would be unjustly enriched if Nina's right to purchase the property was not recognized.
¶8 Claims four through nine of Nina's amended complaint alleged claims against Rudolph. She claimed tortious interference with contract or prospective contract, alleging that Rudolph interfered with the 1986 option by advising Alberdina through his attorney that it was unenforceable, and interfered with the 1989 option by inducing Alberdina to execute a cancellation of it. Nina also alleged that Rudolph breached a duty of good faith and fair dealing owed by him to her. She alleged that Rudolph was liable for intentional, negligent, and strict liability misrepresentations to her. She also alleged that Rudolph engaged in "Constructive fraud/Breach of a fiduciary duty" by his conduct, and that he was liable for punitive damages.
¶9 Applying the standards for appellate review of a trial court decision on motions for summary judgment, we conclude that the trial court properly dismissed all of Nina's claims.1 We address her claims seriatim.2
¶10 Nina's claim for declaratory judgment that the 1986 and/or 1989 options were valid and enforceable was properly dismissed. Initially, we note that on appeal, Nina does not dispute that the 1981 option expired on December 31, 1988, and that the 1989 option was cancelled by Alberdina pursuant to its express language providing that the option shall be open until cancelled in writing by the seller. On appeal, she argues that the trial court erred in determining that the 1986 option was unenforceable under the statute of frauds, WIS. STAT. § 706.02 (2007-08).3
¶11 An option to purchase real estate that does not conform to the statute of frauds is void. Wadsworth v. Moe, 53 Wis. 2d 620, 623, 193 N.W.2d 645 (1972). To comply with the statute of frauds, the contract must be reasonably definite as to the property conveyed. Id.; WIS. STAT. § 706.02(1) (b). When anindividual owns more than one parcel of land in the same locality, the description in the document must be sufficiently definite so that a person might know to a reasonable certainty to which parcel or parcels the document relates. Wadsworth, 53 Wis. 2d at 624. Pursuant to § 706.02(2), a conveyance may satisfy the requirement that it identify the land involved: (a) by specific reference to extrinsic writings in existence when the conveyance is executed; (b) by physical annexation of several writings to one another, with the mutual consent of the parties; or (c) by several writings that show expressly on their faces that they refer to the same transaction, and which the parties have mutually acknowledged by conduct or agreement as evidences of the transaction.
¶12 The 1986 option does not satisfy these requirements. The 1986 option states that it gives Nina and Rudolph the exclusive option to purchase the real estate of Lukas and Alberdina "situated in the Town of Mosel, Sheboygan County, Wisconsin, and particularly described in Schedule A attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference thereto." While a document captioned Schedule A is attached to the option, it is blank and contains no real estate description.
¶13 Nina contends that the option is saved because when she received it from Lukas in 1986, she also received a handwritten document signed by Lukas and Alberdina and captioned "Esstate (sic) Planning." That document states:
¶14 This notation in the "Esstate (sic) Planning" document does not clearly identify the land to which it refers. Most importantly, Nina's argument fails because nothing in the 1986 option refers to this document or indicates that it is incorporating this document. By its express language, the 1986 option states that it is incorporating the real estate description contained in Schedule A, which is blank. Determining that the document captioned "Esstate (sic) Planning" constituted the description of the real estate referred to in the 1986 option would therefore be inconsistent with the express language of the option.
¶15 While Nina attested that she received the document captioned "Esstate (sic) Planning" from Lukas with the 1986 option, this is insufficient to demonstrate physical annexation under WIS. STAT. § 706.02(2)(b) because nothing indicates that all of the parties mutually consented to inclusion of the "Esstate (sic) Planning" document in the option. Moreover, the "Esstate (sic) Planning" document contains additional terms that are...
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