Stapleford v. Perrin, s. 81-396

• Decision Date: 28 December 1982
• Docket Number: Nos. 81-396,81-401,s. 81-396
• Citation: 453 A.2d 1304,122 N.H. 1083
• Parties: Jerome H. STAPLEFORD v. Everett I. PERRIN, Warden of New Hampshire State Prison. STATE of New Hampshire v. Jerome H. STAPLEFORD.
• Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

Page 1304

453 A.2d 1304

122 N.H. 1083

Jerome H. STAPLEFORD v. Everett I. PERRIN, Warden of New Hampshire State Prison.

STATE of New Hampshire v. Jerome H. STAPLEFORD.

Nos. 81-396, 81-401.

Supreme Court of New Hampshire.

Dec. 28, 1982.

Gregory H. Smith, Atty. Gen. (Richard C. Nelson, Asst. Atty. Gen., on the brief and orally), for the State.

Robert L.J. Nebling, Portsmouth, by brief and orally, for Jerome H. Stapleford.

BATCHELDER, Justice.

Jerome H. Stapleford petitioned this court for a writ of habeas corpus in response to an order that he begin serving a previously suspended sentence; he also filed an appeal challenging the imposition of a sentence on a conviction which had been marked "continued for sentence." These cases were consolidated for briefing and argument because they both arise out of the same proceeding in Superior Court (Bean, J.). Stapleford asserts that the procedures afforded him when the sentences were imposed were constitutionally inadequate. For the following reasons, we remand.

On December 18, 1980, pursuant to a plea bargain agreement, Jerome Stapleford appeared in superior court in connection with a Strafford County indictment and a series of Rockingham County district court convictions which he was appealing. Stapleford pleaded guilty on the Strafford County indictment and waived his appeals of the district court convictions. In exchange, the State recommended the following sentences which were imposed by the presiding judge:

(1) Pursuant to a guilty plea on a Strafford County indictment alleging leaving the scene of a personal injury accident, a sentence of not more than three years nor less than one and one-half years in the New Hampshire State Prison, the first nine months suspended.

(2) On a Rockingham County misdemeanor plea to complaint of receiving stolen property, a sentence to the Rockingham County House of Correction for eight months.

(3) Upon Stapleford's waiver of the appeals, the district court convictions were marked "Continued for Sentence."

A review of the sentencing transcript indicates that both the prosecution and the defense intended that Stapleford immediately commence serving his sentence in the house of correction. While serving this sentence, Stapleford was to participate in alcoholic rehabilitation and work release programs. Because Stapleford was to be given seventy-one days pretrial confinement credit on his house of correction sentence, he would be free for over three months prior to the commencement of the State prison sentence from which the first nine months had been suspended. It was anticipated that during this span of freedom, Stapleford would prove himself sufficiently rehabilitated so as to warrant favorable consideration of a motion to suspend the entire State prison sentence.

In August 1981, shortly before the nine months on the suspended portion of the State prison sentence had elapsed, Stapleford moved to suspend the rest of that sentence. Because of the pretrial confinement credit on the house of correction sentence, Stapleford had been free for nearly four months. The State, however, filed a timely objection which alleged that the defendant's assertion of good behavior during this span of freedom was unsupported. The State ascribed to Stapleford a course during his span of freedom which included a series of arrests for offenses ranging from driving while intoxicated to criminal mischief and harassment. In addition, the State also filed motions to bring forward two of the misdemeanor convictions which had been marked "Continued for Sentence."

Pursuant to these cross-motions, the hearing which is the subject of this appeal was held October 1, 1981, before the original sentencing judge. At the hearing, the State offered no evidence in support of its motion other than a statement from the prosecutor reciting Stapleford's arrest record and his conviction on a misdemeanor in district court from which an appeal was pending. The next day, the court issued the following order on Stapleford's motion to suspend the State prison sentence:

"Motion to suspend sentence is denied. The sentence imposed on December 18, 1980 is brought forward and the defendant is to serve the 1 1/2 to 3 year sentence at the State Prison, credit for pretrial confinement is 81 days.... The above sentence is to commence on October 2, 1981. Defendant's exception noted."

The State had also moved to bring forward two of the convictions marked "Continued for Sentence." While the court denied one of the motions, in regard to the other motion, it ruled:

"Motion granted. The defendant is sentenced to twelve months in the Rockingham County House of Correction and fined $1,000, PA waived. This sentence to be consecutive to the sentence imposed on Strafford County indictment # 2011. Defendant's exception noted."

Stapleford asserts that the procedures afforded him when his motion was denied and when the previous criminal dispositions were modified to his detriment were constitutionally defective. Specifically, he argues that his due process rights were violated because the hearing was an inadequate forum to challenge the State's assertions. He contends that mere allegations without proof of actual conduct are insufficient to trigger punishment. He also challenges the failure of the trial court to state on the record the reasons for the action taken. In support of his contentions, he cites Stone v. Shea, 113 N.H. 174, 304 A.2d 647 (1973).

Before we address the merits of these issues, it is important to review the trial court's sentencing authority which is set forth in detail in RSA chapters 651 and 504. Trial judges have broad authority to provide for extended terms of imprisonment, a range of fines, probation, and conditional or unconditional discharge. RSA 651:2 (Supp.1981). Additionally, pursuant to RSA 504:1 (Supp.1981), the court may continue a case for sentence, suspend the imposition or execution of sentence or any part thereof, or place a defendant on probation which may include the performance of public service work. It is clear from the...