Staples v. City of Spencer
| Decision Date | 19 January 1937 |
| Docket Number | 43603. |
| Citation | 271 N.W. 200,222 Iowa 1241 |
| Parties | STAPLES v. CITY OF SPENCER. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Appeal from District Court, Dickinson County; F. C. Davidson, Judge.
This is an action to recover damages for personal injuries received by the plaintiff due to a fall upon an icy street crossing in the defendant city. There was a trial to a jury resulting in a verdict for plaintiff. At the close of plaintiff's evidence defendant moved for directed verdict, based on insufficiency of evidence and failure to prove freedom from contributory negligence, which was overruled by the court and which motion was renewed at the close of all the testimony and was again overruled. From the ruling of the court on motions to direct verdict and from judgment upon the verdict against the defendant city, it has appealed.
Affirmed.
Extreme weather conditions, operating to foil human obligations of duty, are usually deemed in law as " acts of God."
George A. Heald, Jr., of Spencer, for appellant.
Cornwall & Cornwall, of Spencer, and H. E. Narey, of Spirit Lake, for appellee.
The accident causing the injury which is the basis of this action occurred on the forenoon of December 11, 1934, in the city of Spencer, Iowa, as the plaintiff was passing from the southwest corner of the intersection of Main and Fourth streets to the southeast corner of said intersection. Main street runs north and south and constitutes primary roads U.S. 18 and U.S. 71, and Fourth street extending east and west is also a heavily traveled street. This crossing was therefore perhaps the busiest thoroughfare for pedestrians and likewise vehicular traffic on the highway over Main and Fourth streets was perhaps greater than that of any other section of the defendant city. According to the evidence, the snowfall in Spencer up to the date of the accident was as follows: On November 30, 1.5 inches; December 2, .5 inch; December 3, 7 inches; and on December 5, 1 inch. The official weather bureau record discloses that the temperature during all this period from November 30 to December 11 ranged from a maximum of 30 degrees above zero to a minimum of 7 degrees below zero. At no time was the temperature above freezing. There was testimony, however, to the effect that the temperature at times, even though slightly below freezing, was sufficiently mild so that with the pressure of the heavy traffic, it would cause the snow to sufficiently soften or melt and run together or pack down upon the crossing, forming an icy substance. The evidence shows that the city officials on the 3d of December, by means of steel scrapers, cleaned off this particular crossing, as well as others, cleaning a foot passage six or seven feet wide, practically down to the pavement, and that on the 6th, 7th, and 8th of December they also cleaned the snow off the street for several blocks north and south of this crossing and hauled the same away on trucks; that through the central part of the street where the traffic of the cars was heaviest it was impossible to get all the snow off, and the hundreds of cars passing over the crossing would deposit some of this snow from the street upon the crossing and which was packed down by the traffic; so that on the day of this injury there was a coating of icy substance from an inch to two or three inches thick on the crossing, and across and through this icy substance were the tracks or corrugations made by the vehicular traffic, and that these grooves or corrugations were from an inch to two inches in depth; that there were several of these corrugations through this street crossing where the accident took place; and that the plaintiff, in attempting to cross, stepped into one of these depressions, wheel tracks, or corrugations, slipped and fell, breaking her hip.
The plaintiff alleges in her petition that this snow had been allowed to remain on the street, and the melting and freezing of the snow and the continuous use of the streets had caused the street crossing to become rough and uneven, and that the city had not removed the snow and ice, but had permitted it to remain in such condition for a period of about two weeks; the particular grounds of negligence being:
" 1. In permitting the snow to remain on the street for a period of about two weeks,
and without making any reasonable effort to cause the snow to be removed.
2. In permitting the snow to remain on the street for such length of time that it was caused by the weather to freeze and thaw and become rough and uneven and irregular by the travel of pedestrians and vehicles over the same.
3. Because the defendant failed to use ordinary and reasonable care to remove the snow and ice and to clear the pathway across the intersection for pedestrians.
4. Because the defendant knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known that if the snow and ice were permitted to remain and freeze and that it would become rough and irregular and uneven and would be dangerous to the public and pedestrians rightfully using the crossing.
5. That the city was negligent because it failed to put on the ice any sand or cinders or other substance which would prevent pedestrians from slipping and falling thereon."
The law governing the question involved in this case is quite well settled in this state, and we will make only brief reference thereto. In the first place, cities and towns are officered and managed by human agencies which are subject to finite limitations, and there is no principle of law or justice which exacts from city officials the impossible. Neither is a municipality an insurer of the safety of its sidewalks or street crossings in relation to snow and ice. Wilson v. City of Clinton, 204 Iowa, 1183, 216 N.W. 698.It is not enough to prove that the street was in a condition dangerous for pedestrians, but the plaintiff must go farther and sustain her burden of showing that the city was negligent; that it failed to do something which it reasonably could have done and which would have removed the danger which the plaintiff encountered. Ritchie v. City of Des Moines, 211 Iowa, 1026, 233 N.W. 43.
This court has recognized a slight distinction or difference in the details of the city's duty in the maintenance of a street crossing as compared with its duty in the maintenance of sidewalks. Beardmore v. Incorporated Town of New Albin, 203 Iowa, 721, 211 N.W. 430; Tollackson v City of Eagle Grove, 203 Iowa, 696, 213 N.W. 222.The feebleness of human agencies and efforts in attempting to cope with the power of the elements is recognized by all courts and is aptly described by the late Justice Evans in his inimitable style in the Ritchie Case supra, 211 Iowa, 1026, at page 1035, 233 N.W. 43, 47, in these words: ...
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