Staples v. State
| Decision Date | 22 March 1924 |
| Docket Number | (No. 8951.) |
| Citation | 260 S.W. 641 |
| Parties | STAPLES, Secretary of State, et al. v. STATE ex rel. KING et al. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Luther Nickels and W. W. Nelms, both of Dallas, and J. S. Callicutt and Richard Mays, both of Corsicana, for appellants.
W. A. Keeling, Atty. Gen., and L. C. Sutton, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellees.
This is an original proceeding for contempt in this court, instituted on the motion of the relators filed in this cause while it was pending on appeal. The parties sought to be held in contempt are S. L. Staples, secretary of state, one of the appellants in the above cause, and W. A. Keeling, Attorney General of the state.
The basis for the contempt proceedings appear from the following brief statement:
The relators, who are appellees in this cause, C. E. King, P. C. Short, and L. E. McGee, filed in the district court of Navarro county, in the name of the State of Texas, and on their own relation, quo warranto proceedings to prevent the secretary of state from certifying to the election boards of the state, to be printed on the official ballots for use in the approaching general election to be held on November 7, 1922, the name of Earle B. Mayfield as nominee of the Democratic party for the office of United States Senator. The first paragraph of the petition states the capacity in which appellees brought said suit, and is as follows:
"Comes now the state of Texas, ex relatione C. E. King, who resides in Navarro county, Tex., and who is a citizen of said county and state, and P. C. Short and L. E. McGee, who reside in Dallas county, Tex., and come said relators as petitioners in their own right, and complain of," etc.
It is alleged that the said Mayfield had forfeited his right to have his name so placed on the official ballots to be voted in the ensuing election because of violations by him and by others in his interest of certain statutory restrictions and regulations in reference to expenditure of money in political campaigns in this state. It was apparent from the petition that relators did not have any other interest in the subject-matter of the suit than that possessed by every other citizen of this state. In other words, it was the redress of a public wrong sought to be accomplished by said suit, and not that of a private wrong which had deprived these relators of some valuable right.
The suit was filed on October 3, 1922, and on presentation of the petition to the district judge, he indorsed his approval on same, ordered it filed, and ordered process to issue thereon returnable on the 16th day of October, 1922, and set the cause for hearing on said date. The prayer for a temporary writ of injunction was also granted on condition that a proper bond in the sum of $1,000.00 be filed. The said bond was approved and filed and the temporary writ of injunction issued restraining the said secretary of state from certifying to the election boards the name of Earle B. Mayfield for appearance on the official ballots as such nominee for said office, and restraining the election boards from having printed said name on the official ballots. Notice of appeal from this order was duly entered by appellants on the 10th day of October, 1922, and the record was duly filed in this court on the 11th day of October. This cause was advanced by this court and set down for an early submission, at which time it was duly submitted. After its submission this court deemed it advisable to certify to the Supreme Court of Texas for decision certain questions involved in the suit. These questions submitted for a determination by the Supreme Court the issue as to the legal capacity of appellees to institute and maintain the suit filed under section 9, c. 88, Acts 36th Leg. (Vernon's Ann. Civ. St. Supp. 1922, art. 3174¼b); also the issue of the constitutionality of said section 9 if it should be held that appellees were authorized by said section to bring said suit, either in their own right or in the name of the state of Texas.
As shown by its caption, said chapter 88 is an act designed to prevent the control of primary elections by the use of money, and to regulate and limit the expenditure of money to promote or defeat the candidacy of persons for nomination for office in primary elections in this state, etc. Said section 9 reads as follows:
The Supreme Court announced its decision on the questions certified on the 27th day of October, 1922, and is to the effect that the petition in the attempted quo warranto proceedings in the district court of Navarro county was fatally defective, in that, under the law of this state, and under the clear intendment of said section 9, no suit of this character could be filed in the name of the state of Texas except on the petition of either the Attorney General of the state or a district or county attorney, and answered the question in reference to the legal capacity of appellees to institute said proceedings in the following language:
"Appellees were not possessed of legal capacity or right to institute and maintain this suit, and therefore the district court and the judge of the district court of Navarro county were without jurisdiction to act upon or hear same."
The constitutionality of said section 9, as construed by the court, requiring either the Attorney General or a district or county attorney of the state to join in any suit filed under said article, was upheld.
The opinion of the Supreme Court in answer to the said certified questions was immediately sent to this court, and, on the 28th of October, 1922, this court delivered its opinion in conformity to the holding of the Supreme Court, and accordingly entered its judgment in this cause to the effect that appellees did not have the legal right to bring and maintain this suit, and that by reason thereof the judgment of the court below granting the temporary writ of injunction was reversed and the said writ of injunction in all things dissolved and held for naught.
The decision of the Supreme Court on certified questions is reported in 112 Tex. 61, 245 S. W. 639, and the decision of this court is reported in 244 S. W. 1066.
After the Supreme Court had rendered its decision pronouncing the district court of Navarro county without jurisdiction to hear and determine the cause presented, the secretary of state, acting under a statutory duty, requested the Attorney General to advise him in reference to his duty in the premises, and on October 28, 1922, the Attorney General, after a careful consideration of the matter, in consultation with his assistants, gave the following opinion, and advice to the secretary of state:
Upon receipt of this advice the secretary of state sent by wire to the various election boards in this state his certificate that Earle B. Mayfield was the nominee of the Democratic party in this state, and that his name should be placed on the official ballots, as such, to be furnished the voters on the general election to be held on November 7, 1922.
Immediately upon this court rendering its opinion on the said 28th day of October, appellees filed a motion for rehearing, and this motion was pending at the time the Attorney General advised the secretary of state as set out above, and at the time the secretary of state sent his said certificate to the said election boards.
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