Stark v. Connally

Decision Date11 September 1972
Docket Number72-1157.,No. 72-1045,72-1045
Citation347 F. Supp. 1242
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of California
PartiesFortney H. STARK, Jr., et al., Plaintiffs, v. John B. CONNALLY, Jr., Secretary of the Treasury of the United States, et al., Defendants. The CALIFORNIA BANKERS ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff, v. John B. CONNALLY, Jr., Secretary of the Treasury of the United States, et al., Defendants.

Henry Ramsey, Jr., Charles C. Marson, Peter Sheehan, American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Northern California, Inc., San Francisco, Cal., and Neil Horton, Deene Solomon, Oakland, Cal., for plaintiffs Stark and others.

Philip E. Diamond, John M. Anderson, Edgar B. Washburn, Landels, Ripley & Diamond, San Francisco, Cal., for plaintiff California Bankers Assn.

James L. Browning, Jr., U. S. Atty., John M. Youngquist, Asst. U. S. Atty., Chief, Tax Div., San Francisco, Cal., and John J. McCarthy, Chief, General Litigation Section, Tax Div., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., for defendants Connally and others.

Before HAMLIN,* Circuit Judge, and EAST and SWEIGERT, District Judges.

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

SWEIGERT, District Judge.

Plaintiffs in No. 72 1045 include several named individuals who are bank customers, also the American Civil Liberties Association, suing on behalf of itself as a bank customer and also on behalf of such of its numerous members as are also bank customers; also a bank —the Security National Bank. The only plaintiff in No. 72 1157 is the California Bankers Association, suing on behalf of its membership, which comprises all California banks.

These plaintiffs seek to enjoin the Secretary of the Treasury from enforcing the provisions of the so-called Bank Secrecy Act, enacted by the Congress on October 26, 1970, to be effective May 1, 1971, and the Regulations issued thereunder on March 31, 1972 (but by their own terms not effective until July 1, 1972) upon the grounds that such enforcement poses grave and irreparable injury to their constitutional rights— their right to freedom from unreasonable search; their constitutional right of privacy; their privilege against self-incrimination; their right to due process as it may affect banks and bank customers, and also the right of private association protected by the First Amendment.

The Bank Secrecy Act (12 U.S.C. Sec. 1829b; 31 U.S.C. Secs. 1051-1122) requires banks and similar financial institutions to keep certain records and authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to require such institutions and persons participating in transactions with such institutions to report financial transactions to the Secretary for the stated reason (Sec. 1051) that such records and reports have a high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax and other regulatory investigations.

The record-keeping provision of the Act is 12 U.S.C. Sec. 1829b—implemented by Treasury Regulation 31 C.F.R. subpart C, Secs. 103.31-103.37. Section 1829b(b)(c)(d) broadly requires financial institutions to maintain, not only customary ledger card records for commercial and savings accounts, but also to maintain microfilm of all checks, drafts or similar instruments drawn on or presented for payment or received for deposit or collection—an authorization which the Secretary has implemented (Regulation 103.31-103.37) with exceptions only for large accounts involving dividend, payroll or employee and medical benefit checks.

The temporary restraining order heretofore issued in this case has not been directed to the record-keeping provisions of the Act, and since we find no constitutional violation in these record-keeping provisions, as such, we reject plaintiffs' contentions insofar as those portions of the Act are concerned.

Turning, however, to the reporting provisions of the Act, those provisions are contained in Title 31 U.S.C. Secs. 1081, 1082, 1083, 1101 and 1121 and have been implemented by Treasury Regulations 31 C.F.R. Part 103, sub-part B, Secs. 103.21-103.26. These reporting provisions fall into two categories: (1) Those relating to foreign financial transactions (Secs. 1101 and 1121), and (2) those relating to domestic financial transactions (Sec. 1081).

Since, in our opinion, the reporting provisions relating to foreign transactions present no great problem we will first dispose of plaintiffs' challenges to those provisions.

REPORTING OF FOREIGN FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS

31 U.S.C. Sec. 1101 (Reports of Exports and Imports of Monetary Instruments) provides in substance that whoever knowingly transports monetary instruments from the United States or into the United States or receives such at the termination of the transportation to the United States in an amount exceeding $5,000 shall file a report in such form and detail as the Secretary may require setting forth certain specified (sub. b) information—with certain qualifications (sub. c) as to common carriers.

Regulation 103.23 (Reports of Transportation of Currency or Monetary Instruments), implementing Section 1101, excepts transfers through normal banking procedures and makes some other exceptions (sub. c).

31 U.S.C. Sec. 1121 (Foreign Transactions) provides in substance that the Secretary of the Treasury, having due regard for the need for controlling export and import of currency and also due regard to avoidance of unreasonably burdening legitimate transactions with foreign financial agencies, shall by regulation require residents of the United States, who engage in any transaction with a foreign financial agency, to maintain records or file reports, or both, setting forth such of the certain stated information as the Secretary may require. (See also, Sec. 1122).

Regulation 103.24, implementing Section 1121, provides in substance that each person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, having a financial interest in a bank, securities or other financial account in a foreign country, shall report such relationship as required on his federal income tax return.

We are of the opinion that these portions of the Act, dealing with export and import of monetary instruments and with foreign monetary interests or accounts, do not violate any constitutional provision.

First of all, there is the general rule (which must always be the point of departure in cases calling for judicial review of legislation enacted by the Congress), that the wisdom of legislation and the need for it are matters for the Congress to decide and the Courts should not substitute their judgment for that of the Congress. (See, Justice Stewart dissent in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965) at 526.) The foregoing reporting provisions of the Act are limited to a narrowly described area of international financial transactions and the Congressional decision falls within the general rule.

The Supreme Court, when dealing with matters of reporting to and surveillance by the executive, has traditionally recognized a distinction between domestic surveillance, on the one hand, and surveillance where foreign nations are involved, pointing out that what might be impermissible in domestic cases may be constitutional where foreign powers are involved. See, United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, pp. 2132, 2133, p. 2139, 92 S.Ct. 2125, 32 L. Ed.2d 752 (1972).

Furthermore, the Act contains procedural protections applicable to its provisions for reporting these foreign transactions. For example, with respect to enforcement of Section 1101, the Act (Section 1105) provides that, if the Secretary has reason to believe that monetary instruments are being transported without reporting or with false reports, he may apply to the Court for a search warrant. Similarly, with respect to enforcement of Section 1121(b) (foreign transactions) that section provides that no person required to maintain records under the section shall be required to produce or disclose the same except with a duly authorized subpoena or summons as may be otherwise required by law.

We conclude that these provisions violate no constitutional guarantee and that, since these provisions, requiring report of certain foreign financial transactions, are clearly separable from provisions pertaining to the reporting of domestic financial transactions, plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction as to the former is denied.

REPORTING OF DOMESTIC FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS

A more formidable problem is presented by the Act's provisions authorizing the Secretary to require reporting to him by financial institutions, and also by persons participating in transactions with them, of domestic financial transactions.

31 U.S.C. Sec. 1081 (Domestic Currency Transaction-Reports) provides that transactions involving any financial institution shall be reported to the Secretary at such time and in such manner, and in such detail, as the Secretary may require, if they involve the payment, receipt or transfer of United States currency or such other monetary instruments, as the Secretary may specify, in such amounts, denominations, or both, or under such circumstances, as the Secretary shall by regulation prescribe.

Section 1082 provides that the report of any such transaction shall be signed or otherwise made both by the domestic financial institutions involved and by one or more of the other parties thereto or participants therein as the Secretary may require.

Regulation 103.22 (Reports of Currency Transactions), which partially implements these sections, requires financial institutions to report transactions involving currency of more than $10.000.

It will be noted that, although to date the Secretary has required reporting only by the financial institutions and then only of currency transactions over $10,000, he is empowered by the Act, as indicated above, to require, if he so decides, reporting not only by the financial institution, but also by other parties to or participants in transactions with the institutions and, further, that the Secretary may require...

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