Stark v. Perpich

Decision Date02 August 1984
Docket NumberNo. CIVIL 4-84-656.,CIVIL 4-84-656.
Citation590 F. Supp. 1057
PartiesMatthew STARK, Plaintiff, v. Governor Rudy PERPICH; Paul J. Tschida, Commissioner of Public Safety and Brendan McDonald, President of St. Cloud State University, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Minnesota

Stephen Patrick Doyle, Doyle & Michales, and Linda Ojala, Minnesota Civil Liberties Union, Minneapolis, Minn., for plaintiff.

Hubert H. Humphrey, III, Atty. Gen., State of Minn., Thomas L. Fabel, Deputy Atty. Gen., and Linda F. Close, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., St. Paul, Minn., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER INCORPORATING FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

MacLAUGHLIN, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction. The plaintiff seeks to have the defendants enjoined from conducting a roadside drunk driving survey of motorists that would involve stopping automobiles on public roads and administering blood alcohol content breath tests to consenting drivers.

FACTS

The proposed survey, to be conducted by private researchers hired by the state and assisted by the State Highway Patrol, is designed to gather current data about the attitudes and behavior of individuals who drink and drive. By measuring the blood alcohol content of motorists who are stopped and asked to participate in the survey, the researchers hope to discover, among other things, what impact Minnesota's new, tougher drunk driving laws have had on the incidence of drunk driving.

The researchers plan to establish 16 roadside test sites around the state, eight of which would be located in the Twin Cities metropolitan area. Vehicles would be stopped at each of the sites four nights a week for a period of four weeks. Approximately 1,000 drivers would be interviewed in all.

Vehicles would be stopped according to the following procedure. Large illuminated signs bearing the words "Traffic Survey Ahead" would be placed along the roadway at least one-tenth of a mile before each test site to notify drivers of the survey. Vehicles would be pulled off the road into the test site by State Highway Patrol officers using flashing red lights or other signalling devices. Vehicles would be selected on a random basis; once the lead researcher at a test site advises the police officers that a survey station is vacant and a new subject is needed, the officers are to direct the next approaching vehicle into the survey site. A driver's refusal to enter the survey site would not by itself make the driver subject to pursuit or arrest.

Once directed into the survey site, subjects would be informed of the purpose of the stop by the researchers. Drivers would be told that the survey is voluntary, that they are not under arrest, and that the information obtained from the survey will be kept confidential and cannot be used against them. Drivers who agree to participate in the survey would be asked to sign an informed consent form. They would then be given a blood alcohol content breath test and asked a series of questions by the researchers. The entire stop would last about 15 minutes. Drivers who decline to participate in the survey and who appear to be sober would be free to leave.

If a driver fails the breath test (blood alcohol content in excess of .10 percent), or if the researchers otherwise believe the driver to be drunk, the driver would not be allowed to resume driving but would instead be offered alternative transportation home within a reasonable distance, or free lodging in a nearby motel. Drivers who appear to be intoxicated would be encouraged to accept alternative transportation or lodging, but as a last resort, the police officers would be informed and the driver would be subject to arrest.

DISCUSSION

The plaintiff contends the proposed survey procedures violate the fourth amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures (made applicable to the states by the fourteenth amendment) by allowing police to stop motorists without a reasonable and articulable suspicion that a crime has been committed. The plaintiff further contends the state has demonstrated no state interest sufficient to justify this alleged intrusion on fourth amendment rights. Accordingly, the plaintiff asks the Court to enjoin the defendants from conducting the proposed survey.

A. Legality of Police Stops of Vehicles

It is clear that a police stop of an automobile is a seizure that implicates the fourth amendment regardless of how brief the stop is, or how limited its purpose. E.g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1395, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979). It is also clear that, in the absence of a reasonable, articulable suspicion of unlawful conduct, law enforcement officials cannot use roving patrols to stop vehicles randomly at the discretion of the police. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663, 99 S.Ct. at 1401; United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 2581, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975). The potential for abuse of the officers' discretion makes such random, discretionary stops unconstitutional.

On the other hand, the use of fixed checkpoints to stop all passing vehicles or to stop a portion of all vehicles on a systematic basis has been upheld. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 566-67, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 3086-87, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116 (1976); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663, 99 S.Ct. at 1401 (dictum). Such stops are permissible when used to further an important state interest because they minimize the exercise of official discretion and because they tend to frighten motorists less than roving patrol stops since drivers can see that all traffic is subject to being stopped. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 559, 96 S.Ct. at 3083.

The legality of any plan for police stops of vehicles involves two considerations. First, does the plan incorporate safeguards to minimize the discretion of officers making the stops? Second, do the asserted state interests in making the stops justify the intrusion on motorists' fourth amendment rights? After careful consideration, the Court has determined the proposed survey is constitutional, provided the following additional safeguards are implemented.

1. Official discretion.

The proposed survey procedures contain several checks on the exercise of discretion by officers making the stops. First, the locations of the test sites are chosen by the researchers, not by law enforcement officers in the field. This factor satisfies the requirement that checkpoint sites be chosen by management personnel. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 559, 96 S.Ct. at 3083; State v. Olgaard, 248 N.W.2d 392, 394-95 (S.D.1976). As a further check on official discretion, the Court hereby orders that the sites selected for the survey be chosen without regard to any racial, ethnic, or economic characteristics of the surrounding population or neighborhood, or of the population using the roadway.

The second check on official discretion is that the police officers stationed at the survey sites will have no discretion in selecting which vehicles are stopped. The researchers will indicate to the officers when another subject is needed and the officers will stop the next available vehicle. To insure neutral selection, the Court hereby orders that all police officers participating in the survey be instructed in writing that they are to stop the next available vehicle that can be stopped with safety, without regard to the race, sex, age or any other characteristic of the driver or passengers, and without consideration of the age, make, or condition of the vehicle.

The final check on official discretion is that the police officers will have no contact with the occupants of the stopped vehicles other than to direct the...

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11 cases
  • Ingersoll v. Palmer
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • December 19, 1985
    ...473 N.E.2d at p. 3; Little v. State, supra, 479 A.2d at pp. 905-906; State v. Golden, supra, 318 S.E.2d at p. 694; Stark v. Perpich (D.Minn.1984) 590 F.Supp. 1057, 1059 [traffic survey for intoxication].) In contrast, most of the checkpoints found unconstitutional have not provided adequate......
  • Com. v. Trumble
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • October 15, 1985
    ...Cases from other States which have considered roadblocks executed under guidelines are supportive. See, e.g., Stark v. Perpich, 590 F.Supp. 1057 (D.Minn.1984); State v. Golden, 171 Ga.App. 27, 318 S.E.2d 693 (1984); Little v. State, 300 Md. 485, 479 A.2d 903 (1984). Cf. State ex rel. Ekstro......
  • Arias, In re
    • United States
    • California Supreme Court
    • October 9, 1986
    ...the departments to set up sobriety checkpoints aimed at apprehending and deterring drunk drivers. (See, e.g., Stark v. Perpich (D.Minn.1984) 590 F.Supp. 1057, 1059-1060; State ex rel. Ekstrom v. Justice Court (1983) 136 Ariz. 1, 663 P.2d 992, 1000 (Feldman, J., conc.); State v. Olgaard (S.D......
  • People v. Mayoff
    • United States
    • California Supreme Court
    • December 31, 1986
    ...standards may be considered an important factor in determining the appropriateness of injunctive relief. (See, e.g., Stark v. Perpich (D.Minn.1984) 590 F.Supp. 1057 [injunction against drunk driving survey checkpoint denied where promulgation of standards minimized police discretion]; Note,......
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