Starkey v. Colquitt Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs
| Decision Date | 25 November 2014 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 7:14-CV-19 (HL) |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Georgia |
| Parties | DEANA STARKEY, Plaintiff, v. COLQUITT COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS and LYNN PURVIS, CLERK OF COURT COLQUITT COUNTY, GEORGIA, Defendants. |
Before the Court are the Motion to Dismiss the Complaint (Doc. 4) by Defendant Colquitt County Board of Commissioners ("Board of Commissioners") and the Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint (Doc. 18) by the Board of Commissioners, Defendant Colquitt County, Georgia ("Colquitt County"), and Defendant Lynn Purvis, Clerk of Court, Colquitt County, Georgia ("Purvis") (collectively "Defendants"). In light of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint (Doc. 9) and Defendants' motion to dismiss it,1 the Board of Commissioners' first motion todismiss is moot. The motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint is granted in part and denied in part.
To avoid dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). A claim is plausible if its factual allegations allow "the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. The plausibility standard "calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence" of the defendant's liability. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the court must accept "all well-pleaded facts ... as true, and the reasonable inferences therefrom are construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1273 n. 1 (11th Cir. 1999). However, this tenet does not apply to legal conclusions in the complaint. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. "[C]onclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of fact, or legal conclusions masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal." Oxford Asset Mgmt., Ltd. v. Jaharis, 297 F.3d 1182, 1188(11th Cir. 2002). A court must dismiss the complaint if, "on the basis of a dispositive issue of law, no construction of the factual allegations will support the cause of action." Marshall Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. Marshall Cnty. Gas Dist., 992 F.2d 1171, 1174 (11th Cir. 1993) ().
On January 29, 2007, Plaintiff Deanna Starkey ("Plaintiff") was hired by Carolynn Marshall ("Marshall"), who was at that time the clerk of the superior, state, and juvenile courts for Colquitt County, Georgia. Marshall was Plaintiff's supervisor during the entirety of her employment. Plaintiff suffers from Crohn's disease. On multiple occasions, Plaintiff approached Marshall to explain the effects of the disease and request that, if she were tardy to work, she be allowed to make up the time later rather than be disciplined. Instead of granting the request, Marshall reprimanded Plaintiff when she was tardy. (Ex. 5 to Plaintiff's Response to the Motion to Dismiss, Doc. 23; Amended Complaint, ¶¶7-8).
On September 8, 2009, Marshall provided a memorandum to Plaintiff and other employees informing them that, after three absences, they would need a doctor's excuse for any additional absence from work. Plaintiff again tried to explain to Marshall that the symptoms of Crohn's disease, including diarrhea,could appear unexpectedly and that she needed some flexibility in her work schedule and in complying with Marshall's demands. The supervisor refused to let Plaintiff make up the time she missed from work and never offered her leave under the Family Medical Leave Act ("FMLA").2 However, Marshall did not require other employees to provide doctor's excuses for their absences, and she permitted them to work during lunch breaks to compensate for their being late to work. (Id. at ¶¶9-11).
On September 11, 2009, Plaintiff was absent part of the work day while visiting her doctor. When Plaintiff returned to work, Marshall confronted her and asked what the doctor had said. After Plaintiff said the doctor needed to run more tests, Marshall replied, Plaintiff explained that the tests would indicate what stage her disease was in and if it were worsening. (Id. at ¶12).
Plaintiff's doctor wrote a letter to Marshall explaining Plaintiff's disease and its symptoms. When Plaintiff gave Marshall the letter, the supervisor angrily said, "Oh, is your doctor going to write me a letter?" After reading some of the letter, Marshall told Plaintiff, (Id. at ¶13).
Plaintiff reported Marshall's reaction to the letter to Kathy Willis ("Willis"), the human resources director for Colquitt County. Willis told Plaintiff that the human resources department could not discipline Marshall because she was a publicly elected official. Willis told Plaintiff to file a grievance against Marshall with the Department of Labor. In October 2009, Plaintiff again complained to Willis of Marshall's treatment. Plaintiff also reported that Marshall was falsifying her time records and docking her pay in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act.3 (Id. at ¶¶14-15).
On November 24, 2009, Marshall wrote a memorandum to Plaintiff reprimanding her and threatening termination if she were tardy to work one more time. Marshall also discussed Plaintiff's medical information with Terry McMullen, another county employee. On December 2, 2009,4 Marshall told McMullen that "the ax is about to fall" and that Plaintiff (Id. at ¶¶16-17).
Marshall's actions exacerbated Plaintiff's medical condition. On December 4, 2009, Plaintiff requested intermittent leave under the FMLA, which Marshall tried to block. Nevertheless, Plaintiff used FMLA leave from February 15-18,2010. When Plaintiff returned to work on February 19, Marshall fired her. (Id. at ¶¶18-19).
On August 10, 2010, Plaintiff faxed an intake questionnaire to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") asserting that she had been subjected to employment discrimination on the basis of her disability and that she had suffered retaliation. Plaintiff listed the Colquitt County Board of Commissioners as her employer and described Marshall as the individual who had treated her unlawfully. On the questionnaire, Plaintiff provided the address for the Board of Commissioners, its approximate number of employees, and her own name, address, and phone number. She did not sign the questionnaire under an oath or affirmation as to the veracity of the information she provided. (EEOC Intake Questionnaire, Ex. 1 to Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Doc. 23). On December 26, 2010, Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC against the Board of Commissioners. Her charge stated that she had suffered discrimination on the basis of her age and disability and that she had endured retaliation. Her signature on the charge was verified. (Charge of Discrimination, Ex. C to Affidavit of Deborah Murkerson, Doc. 6-3).
After receiving a right to sue letter from the EEOC, Plaintiff filed suit in this Court on February 18, 2014. On May 19, 2014, she amended her Complaint to add Colquitt County and Lynn Purvis, as the Clerk of Court, Colquitt County,Georgia5 as defendants. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants are liable for discrimination and retaliation in violation of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ("Rehab Act"), 29 U.S.C. § 794, and the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. She claims that her condition of Crohn's Disease qualified as, or at least was perceived as, a disability; that Marshall treated her differently than similarly situated, non-disabled employees; and that the supervisor retaliated against her for reporting this treatment. According to Plaintiff, Defendants are liable for Marshall's actions. (Amended Complaint, ¶¶20-36).
Plaintiff agrees with Defendants that her claims under the Rehab Act are barred by the statute of limitations. These claims are dismissed.
Defendants contend that Plaintiffs' ADA claims must be dismissed because she failed to exhaust her administrative remedies before filing this lawsuit. Their specific contention is that she did not file a charge within 180 days of the alleged discrimination. The Court disagrees. Exhausting administrative remedies on an ADA claim requires a plaintiff in Georgia to file a charge ofdiscrimination with the EEOC within 180 days of the discriminatory or retaliatory act. See Chestnut v. Ethan Allen Retail, Inc., 971 F. Supp. 2d 1223, 1230 (N.D. Ga. 2013) (citing Wilkerson v. Grinnell Corp., 271 F. 3d 1314, 1317 (11th Cir. 2001)). A questionnaire would qualify as a charge if it is verified, made under oath or affirmation, by the charging party and contains the following information: 1) the name, address, and telephone number of the charging party; 2) the name and address of the employer; 3) a clear and concise statement of the facts; 4) the employer's approximate number of employees; and 5) a statement indicating whether the charging party has begun state proceedings against the employer. Chestnut, 971 F. Supp. 2d at 1229 (citing 29 CFR § 1601.12). To be a charge, a document "must be reasonably construed as a request for the [EEOC] to take remedial action to protect the employee's rights or otherwise settle a dispute...
To continue reading
Request your trial