Starkey v. Shoop
| Decision Date | 26 February 2021 |
| Docket Number | Case Nos. 20CA3705 |
| Citation | 2021 Ohio 564 |
| Parties | DONALD STARKEY, Petitioner-Appellant, v. TIMOTHY SHOOP, Warden, Respondent-Appellee. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
APPEARANCES:
Donald Starkey, Appellant, Pro Se.
Jeri Fosnaught, Assistant Attorney General, for Appellee.
{¶1} This is an appeal from a Ross County Court of Common Pleas judgment entry that dismissed Appellant, Donald Starkey's, petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus. After our review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
{¶2} On May 29, 2014, the State charged Appellant with six counts of unlawful sexual conduct with a minor in violation of R.C. 2907.04 and three counts of sexual imposition in violation of R.C. 2907.06. State v. Starkey, 4th Dist. Licking No. 14-CA-92, 2015-Ohio-3115, ¶ 1. On September 3, 2014, Appellant pled guilty to three counts of unlawful sexual conduct and three counts of sexual imposition involving a thirteen-year-old victim. Three weeks later, he filed a motion to withdraw his plea arguing that "shortly after his guilty plea, the [Appellant], after giving much thought to the situation, decided that he did not want to proceed with sentencing, and, in the alternative, would like to go to trial, as he strongly feels he is not guilty to the charges herein." However, at the hearing two days later, Appellant decided not to withdraw his guilty plea. During this hearing, the following exchange occurred:
On October 13th, the trial court imposed an aggregate nine-year prison term.
{¶3} On appeal, Appellant raised two assignments of error: (1) "the trial court committed harmful error in failing to fully inquire into Defendant-Appellant's request to withdraw his previously entered guilty pleas," and (2) "the sentencing of Appellant was in error." Id. at ¶ 6,7. With regard to Appellant's first assignment of error, the court of appeals stated:
During the hearing, appellant was represented by counsel who indicated appellant wished to withdraw his motion and proceed with the presentence investigation. When specifically asked, appellant agreed that was his plan. Appellant then cooperated with the presentence investigation, and during the over two week period through sentencing, did not deny his guilt. Id., ¶ 11.
The court of appeals then concluded: "Upon review, we do not find that the trial court failed to fully inquire." Id., ¶ 12. The court of appeals also overruled Appellant's second assignment of error, and, on July 31, 2015, issued a judgment affirming the trial court's judgment of conviction. Id., ¶ 20, 21.
{¶4} More than four years later, on February 27, 2019, Appellant, acting pro se, filed a "motion to vacate void plea." Appellant's brief stated that he "still maintains his innocence," argued that his "counsel and the court failed to properly advise him of the penalties associated with the guilty plea," and "the court did not explain the registration requirements of Tier II sex offenders," thereby rendering his plea in violation of Crim.R. 11, i.e. his plea was not knowingly, voluntarily or intelligently entered. On April 29, 2019, the trial court dismissed Appellant's motion, finding it was an untimely filed petition for post-conviction relief.
{¶5} On December 17, 2019, Appellant filed a petition in the Ross County Court of Common Pleas for a writ of habeas corpus to compel the Appellee, Timothy Shoop, the Warden, to release him from prison. Appellee filed a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss Appellant's petition.
{¶6} On February 4, 2020, the trial court issued a judgment granting Appellee's motion, dismissing Appellant's petition. The trial court reasoned that habeas corpus was not cognizable because: (1) Appellant had a remedy in the ordinary course of the law, (2) Appellant was not entitled to immediate release from prison, (3) Appellant failed to comply with R.C. 2969.25(A), and (4) Appellant failed to comply with R.C. 2969.25(C)(1). It is from this judgment that Appellant appeals, asserting four "issues," which we will treat as assignments of error. Because each "assignment" is resolved on the same or similar grounds, we will address all four assignments of error together.
{¶7} In his first assignment of error, Appellant argues the trial court abused its discretion by not following precedent that required the trial court to inform him regarding sexual offender registration obligations, which he alleges violated Crim.R. 11, i.e. his plea was not knowing, intelligent, or voluntary. In his second assignment of error, Appellant alleges that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to fully consider his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. In his third assignment of error, he asserts that the trial court committed plain error by not granting his petition because he is factually innocent. Lastly, Appellant alleges that he was denied his right to equal protection when the trial court denied his motion for an extension of time to reply to the Appellee's motion to dismiss.
{¶8} In response, the Appellee argues that Appellant's claims are not cognizable in a habeas action because he had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law, Appellant is not entitled to immediate release from prison, Appellant failed to comply with R.C. 29269.25 when he filed his habeas action, and the trial court's decision denying his motion for an extension of time to respond is within the trial court's discretion. Therefore, the Appellee argues because Appellant's claims are not cognizable in a habeas action, the trial court's judgment should be affirmed.
LAW
{¶9} A court may dismiss a habeas action under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted "if, after all factual allegations are presumed true and all reasonable inferences are made in [the petitioner's] favor, it appears beyond doubt that he could prove no set of facts entitling him to the requested extraordinary relief in habeas corpus." Smith v. Sheldon, 157 Ohio St. 3d 1, 2019-Ohio-1677, 131 N.E.3d 1, ¶ 5, quoting Keith v. Bobby, 117 Ohio St.3d 470, 2008-Ohio-1443, 884 N.E.2d 1067, ¶ 10.
Appellate review of a dismissal for failure to state a claim is de novo. Hammond v. Perry, 4th Dist. Hocking No. 12CA27, 2013-Ohio-3683, ¶ 11, citing Allen v. Bryan, 4th Dist. Hocking No. 12CA15, 2013-Ohio-1917, ¶ 7. This means the reviewing court "affords no deference to a trial court's decision and, instead, applies its own, independent review to determine if the Civ.R. 12(B)(6) requirements were satisfied." Id., citing McDill v. Sunbridge Care Ents., Inc., 4th Dist. Pickaway No. 12CA8, 2013-Ohio-1618, at ¶ 10.
{¶10} "Habeas corpus petitions are governed by R.C. [Chapter] 2725." Steele v. Jenkins, 4th Dist. Ross No. 18CA3630, 2018-Ohio-4103, ¶ 9. "A habeas corpus petition is available to any person who is 'unlawfully restrained of his liberty * * * to inquire into the cause of such imprisonment, restraint, or deprivation.' " Hinton v. Shoop, 4th Dist. Ross No. 17CA3619, 2018-Ohio-3647, ¶ 11, quoting R.C. 2725.01. "[T]he petitioner has the burden of establishing his right to release." Id. ¶ 12, citing Halleck v. Koloski, 4 Ohio St.2d 76, 77, 212 N.E.2d 601 (1965); Yarbrough v. Maxwell, 174 Ohio St. 287, 288, 189 N.E.2d 136 (1963). "[I]f the petition states a claim for which habeas corpus relief cannot be granted, the court should not allow the writ and should dismiss the petition." Id., citing Pegan v. Crawmer, 73 Ohio St.3d 607, 609, 653 N.E.2d 659 (1995).
{¶11} " ' "Like other extraordinary-writ actions, habeas corpus is not available when there is an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." ' " Lloyd v. Robinson, 4th Dist. Ross No. 14CA3462, 2015-Ohio-1331, ¶ 19, quoting Billiter v. Banks, 135 Ohio St.3d 426, 2013-Ohio-1719, 988 N.E.2d 556, ¶ 8, quoting In re Complaint for Writ of Habeas Corpus for Goeller, 103 Ohio St.3d 427, 2004-Ohio-5579, 816 N.E.2d 594, ¶ 6. " 'An appeal is generally considered an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law sufficient to preclude a writ.' " State v. Bradford, 4th Dist. Ross No. 17CA3613, 2018-Ohio-1907, ¶ 10, quoting Shoop v. State, 144 Ohio St.3d 374, 2015-Ohio-2068, 43 N.E.3d 432, ¶ 8. "The fact that a direct appeal may no longer be available to [a petitioner]...
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