Starks v. Field

Decision Date20 April 1939
Docket Number27357.
Citation89 P.2d 513,198 Wash. 593
PartiesSTARKS v. FIELD et al.
CourtWashington Supreme Court

Department 2.

Action by H. H. Starks against Robert B. Field and others to quiet title to realty, to have a collateral agreement adjudged void, to effect the return of certain securities, and to obtain an accounting. From a judgment dismissing the action plaintiff appeals.

Affirmed.

Appeal from Superior Court, Chelan County; C. G Jeffers, judge.

John A Adams, of Wenatchee, and C. P. Borberg, of Seattle, for appellant.

A. N Corbin, of Wenatchee, Herman Howe, of Leavenworth, and Crollard & O'Connor, of Wenatchee, for respondents.

SIMPSON Justice.

Plaintiff instituted action in the superior court for the purpose of quieting title to real property, to have a collateral agreement adjudged void, to effect the return to him of certain securities, and to obtain an accounting.

We briefly state the pertinent portions of the complaint as follows: The first portion alleges the corporate capacity of the Peshastin Fruit Growers Association and The Leavenworth State Bank, and that A. G. Stage is president of the former corporation and Robt. B. Field of the latter; that Herman Howe is an attorney practicing at Leavenworth; that plaintiff is the son and sole legatee under the will of his father, Melzar Whittlesey Starks, who died March 30, 1934; that March 2, 1933, his father made and executed two deeds conveying to plaintiff the real property in controversy.

It is further alleged that the value of the real property and personal estate including the securities owned by the testator at the time of his death was $85,000; that the deeds were not delivered to plaintiff at the time of their execution, but were placed in a safety deposit box in the Leavenworth State Bank, and were delivered to plaintiff by Robert B. Field after the death of Melzar Whittlesey Starks and were then filed for record. Plaintiff alleged that March 2, 1934, Melzar Whittlesey Starks gave to defendant Peshastin Fruit Growers Association a crop lien to secure advances to him of sums not to exceed $20,000, and that thereafter the Association made other advances to plaintiff, the exact amounts of which are unknown, and that the net profits of the fruit crop were reported to plaintiff to have been insufficient to discharge the obligation created by the advances.

Allegations were then made that the testator was, at the time of his death, indebted to the liquidator of the Dryden State Bank, and owed debts to other banks in the total sum of $8,836; that November 1, 1934, defendant Peshastin Fruit Growers Association, acting through defendant Stage, represented to plaintiff that the Association was unwilling to finance his crop for the following year, for years, unless plaintiff would give a power of attorney to defendant Stage authorizing him to act for plaintiff in matters pertaining to the management and control of plaintiff's business affairs, and threatened to resort to legal proceedings to liquidate the indebtedness due the Association; and that thereafter, November 28, 1934, because of the representations made to him, plaintiff executed and delivered to defendant Stage an agreement and power of attorney, which instrument was drawn by defendant Howe at the direction of defendants Field and Stage, and recited that plaintiff was then indebted to defendant Leavenworth State Bank and to the other banks to whom his father had been indebted.

Another allegation was to the effect that defendant Field stated and represented to plaintiff that it was necessary in order that plaintiff should not lose the property of his father's estate that he endorse the notes evidencing his father's obligations to the banks and that he signed the notes as an apparent co-maker.

The complaint stated that January 16, 1935, defendant Howe proceeded to probate his father's estate and filed a final account and petition for distribution wherein it was represented that the claims of the banks to which the testator was indebted had been settled and withdrawn; that plaintiff was inexperienced in matters of business and relied upon the business judgment and integrity of defendants; that on February 14, 1935, and as a part of the conspiracy of the defendants to deprive plaintiff of his property by fraud and deceit, defendant Stage, without the knowledge or consent of plaintiff, executed and delivered to defendant Leavenworth State Bank a collateral agreement prepared by defendant Howe wherein and whereby all the personal property of plaintiff from his father was purportedly pledged to the Leavenworth State Bank as collateral security to certain notes owed by plaintiff's father; that on or about February 16, 1935, defendant Stage, acting as attorney in fact for plaintiff and also as managing officer of Peshastin Fruit Growers Association, executed and delivered to the Association a mortgage in the sum of $30,000 upon all of the productive portion of plaintiff's real property and upon the crops to be grown thereon during the year 1935. The complaint also recites that plaintiff protested to the defendants that it was not necessary to mortgage the real property, but the defendants represented to him that unless the real property was mortgaged, the Association would be unable to negotiate its crop mortgage and secure the secondary financing necessary to enable it to handle the transaction, when in fact funds were available to it upon an assignment of the crop mortgage; that the real estate mortgage was placed upon the property for the purpose of enabling defendants to deprive plaintiff of his real property as part of a conspiracy existing between them; that June 24, 1935, defendant Stage again mortgaged the crops for the year 1935 as an attorney in fact for plaintiff; and that on June 26, 1935, the defendant Association, by an instrument in writing, assigned the crop chattel mortgage to the Spokane Bank for Co-operatives.

The complaint further sets out that at the end of the crop season of 1935, defendant Stage, acting as attorney in fact for plaintiff and also as the managing officer of defendant Association, notified plaintiff that the operations on plaintiff's farm had been unsuccessful; that plaintiff was indebted to the Association in a large amount; and that all of the defendants represented to plaintiff that a suit was about to be commenced against him to recover the indebtedness and the only way he could avoid the suit was to convey to the Association the real property which had been mortgaged and fifty-five acres of land not under irrigation, then owned by plaintiff; that no accounting was then or ever made or given to plaintiff showing the amount of his indebtedness, if any, to the Association; that as part of the transaction defendant Stage orally promised and represented to plaintiff on behalf of defendant Association that, if after a year or two of operation of the farm, they would have realized sufficient profit to liquidate the claimed indebtedness from plaintiff to the Association, the property would be recoveyed to him; and that plaintiff relying upon the defendants' promises executed a deed to the defendant association for the sum of $5,000, which was paid to him.

The collateral agreement, attached to and made a part of the complaint and signed by defendant Stage and plaintiff pledged eighty shares of common stock and two hundred fifty shares of preferred stock of the Peshastin Fruit Growers Association, twelve shares of the capital stock of The Leavenworth State Bank, and all other intangibles of plaintiff held by that bank at the time of the...

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22 cases
  • Stafford v. Field, 7585
    • United States
    • Idaho Supreme Court
    • May 9, 1950
    ...Realty Co. v. Detroit Sav. Bank, 274 Mich. 80, 264 N.W. 297; White v. McCoy Land Co., 229 Mo.App. 1019, 87 S.W.2d 672; Starks v. Field, 198 Wash. 593, 89 P.2d 513 at 515; Fruit v. Stacy, 168 Kan. 632, 215 P.2d 140, 13 C.J. 399; 17 C.J.S., Contracts, § 172, p. There was thus good considerati......
  • Centric Corp. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co.
    • United States
    • Oklahoma Supreme Court
    • December 16, 1986
    ...by use of threats had a mind of less than ordinary firmness, there was all the more reason to afford protection. 14 Starks v. Fields, 198 Wash. 593, 89 P.2d 513, 515 (1939). 15 Rich & Whillock v. Ashton Development, see note 2, 204 Cal.Rptr. at p. 89, supra. citing Leeper v. Beltrami, 53 Ca......
  • Johnson v. Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Company
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Western District of Louisiana
    • January 24, 1958
    ...and Improvement Company, 109 La. 13, 22, 33 So. 51; Sistrom v. Anderson, 51 Cal.App.2d 213, 124 P.2d 372, 376; Starks v. Field, 198 Wash. 593, 89 P.2d 513, 515; Voellmeck v. Harding, 166 Wash. 93, 6 P.2d 373, 84 A.L.R. 608; 17A American Jurisprudence 564, et seq., verbo "Duress and Undue In......
  • Lawless v. Central Production Credit Ass'n
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • May 20, 1992
    ...common law duress. (See generally Centric Corp. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co. (Okla.1986), 731 P.2d 411, 415; see also Starks v. Field (1939), 198 Wash. 593, 598, 89 P.2d 513, 515 (which involved a complaint to avoid a contract based on a theory of business compulsion).) The rationale behind econ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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