Starkweather v. Emerson Manufacturing Company
| Decision Date | 16 November 1906 |
| Citation | 109 N.W. 719,132 Iowa 266 |
| Parties | L. A. STARKWEATHER, Appellee, v. EMERSON MANUFACTURING COMPANY, Appellant |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Appeal from Polk District Court.-- HON. JAMES A. HOWE, Judge.
ACTION at law to recover damages for breach of a contract of employment. Trial to a jury, verdict and judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Reversed.
Reversed.
Ryan Ryan & Ryan, for appellant.
C. C. & C. L. Nourse, for appellee.
On or about October 1, 1900, plaintiff and defendant entered into a written contract whereby plaintiff was engaged as a traveling salesman for the term of one year, at the agreed salary of $ 1,100 per year, payable in equal monthly installments. Defendant was also to pay plaintiff's necessary and legitimate traveling expenses while engaged in the business upon itemized statements rendered. Plaintiff agreed not to be engaged or interested in any other business during his term of employment, and further stipulated that he would follow all of defendant's instructions whether verbal, written or printed. The contract also contained these further provisions:
If employed by you, I will faithfully and diligently, in all respects and at all times, endeavor to promote your business interests. I hereby agree that all improvements or betterments which shall occur to me during my employment, and which are applicable to any article or any manufacture, by you or to methods of manufacture, I will fully disclose to you, and the same shall become your property. I will execute all papers to fully possess you thereof and if patentable will aid you in procuring a patent for your benefit. This contract may be cancelled by you at any time for my incompetency, dissipation, misconduct, or violation of your instructions. Should my services prove unsatisfactory at the expiration of six months from date, you are at liberty to cancel this contract and to discontinue paying salary and expenses by your giving me thirty days' notice of such intention.
The part of this quotation in italics was written into the contract with pen and ink, the remainder of it being in print. Plaintiff claims that defendant wrongfully discharged him, without notice, on or about December 10, 1900, and that since that time and during the period covered by the contract he has been unable to earn more than $ 200. He further alleges that defendant had paid his salary and traveling expenses down to the time of his discharge, and that there was still due and owing him the sum of $ 616.67. Defendant admitted the making of the contract, and that it had paid plaintiff his salary and traveling expenses down to December 1, 1900. It also alleged that it had advanced to plaintiff the sum of $ 100 over and above his salary and expenses for the time he worked, and it asked judgment for that amount against plaintiff. It also alleged that it discharged plaintiff at or about the time stated for incompetency, dissipation, misconduct, and violation of instructions, and that it is not indebted to him in any amount whatever. Plaintiff admitted the receipt of the $ 100 referred to in defendant's answer, but said he used it as salary and for traveling expenses. Upon these issues the case was tried to a jury, resulting in a verdict for plaintiff in the sum of $ 729.19. Defendant filed a motion for a new trial, and, upon the submission thereof, the trial court made the following order: "This cause coming on for hearing on the motion of defendant for a new trial, it was ordered that unless plaintiff shall, within 30 days, remit the amount allowed by the jury for the last five months of the year of employment, which amount, with interest, the court finds, after allowing credit for moneys earned during that period, to be the sum of $ 328.04, a new trial shall be granted on the ground that the court erred in submitting the question to the jury as to the right of plaintiff to recover for the said last five months." Plaintiff thereupon filed a remittitur, and judgment was rendered against defendant for the sum of $ 348.16. Defendant thereupon appealed.
Several propositions are relied upon for a reversal, to the more important of which we shall refer. It will be noticed that defendant did not plead a discharge by reason of the unsatisfactory character of plaintiff's services, but that its alleged ground for discharge was plaintiff's incompetency, misconduct, and violation of instructions. Defendant introduced testimony to support its right to discharge, and was clearly entitled to have that matter submitted to the jury. Indeed, that was the main issue in the case. Instead of doing so, the trial court submitted the case to the jury on the theory that defendant was relying upon a discharge by reason of the unsatisfactory character of plaintiff's services after he had been in defendant's employ for the term of six months. We cannot better state the views of the trial court than to quote from its instructions the following:
(3) You are instructed that, under the contract between plaintiff and defendant, identified as Exhibit 1, and the evidence in the case, the plaintiff is entitled to his salary under said contract for October and November, 1900, which it appears from the undisputed evidence he has already received, and, in addition thereto, he is entitled to recover his salary under said contract for the period of 4 months and 30 days from December 1, 1900, provided, however, that from such sum which plaintiff is entitled to recover for such period of 4 months and 30 days you will deduct such sum as you find from the evidence, by a preponderance thereof, plaintiff earned or might have earned elsewhere by reasonable industry and diligence on his part during said period of 4 months and 30 days. . . . (4) From the evidence and admissions of the parties it appears, without controversy, that the defendant is entitled to recover of the plaintiff the sum of $ 100 on his counterclaim. (5) By the terms of the contract between plaintiff and defendant, which said contract was for a period of one year, it is provided that after the expiration of 6 months and 30 days of said period, should the services of plaintiff prove unsatisfactory to the defendant, the defendant might cancel said contract by notice therefor to the plaintiff. It appears from the...
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