STARLITE LTD. v. LANDRY'S RESTAURANTS
Decision Date | 30 March 2010 |
Docket Number | A09-0995.,No. A09-0859,A09-0859 |
Parties | STARLITE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, Respondent, v. LANDRY'S RESTAURANTS, INC. f/k/a Landry's Seafood Restaurants, Inc., a Delaware corporation, Appellant. |
Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
David Bradley Olsen, John N. Bisanz, Jr., Henson & Efron, P.A., Minneapolis, MN, for respondent.
Peter W. Carter, P. Joshua Hill, Charles K. LaPlante, Dorsey & Whitney LLP, Minneapolis, MN, for appellant.
Considered and decided by LANSING, Presiding Judge; HALBROOKS, Judge; and RANDALL, Judge.*
In litigation arising from a guaranty of a lease agreement, the district court concluded that a lease that was accepted after the offer expired was an enforceable contract by virtue of waiver. On that theory, the district court granted summary judgment. Because we conclude that under Minnesota case law the doctrine of waiver cannot be used to extend the time for acceptance in the formation of a contract, we reverse and remand.
Contemporaneously, Seafood House's parent corporation, Landry's Restaurants Inc. (Landry's) executed a written guaranty of Seafood House's April 30 lease agreement that presumed Starlite's acceptance.
Starlite signed and returned the lease agreement on May 11, 1998, five days after the offer's May 6 deadline. Seafood House occupied the property and built a restaurant on the premises. Seafood House paid rent and property taxes through May 2007 when it vacated the property.
Beginning with the occupancy of the property, Starlite sent monthly "resident statements" to Seafood House and Landry's that set forth the monthly rent owed and any past-due balance. Starlite continued to send these statements to Seafood House and Landry's after Seafood House stopped paying rent in June 2007. Each of these statements reflected that the past-due balance was increasing. Starlite sent a letter to Landry's in January 2008 demanding that Landry's, as a guarantor of the lease, pay the past-due balance and the rent going forward. Starlite sent a second letter in July 2008. Landry's did not make any payments to Starlite.
Starlite sued Landry's for payment under the guaranty and moved for summary judgment. Landry's argued, among other things, that the lease was void because Seafood House's offer had expired before it was accepted and, therefore, Landry's was not liable under the guaranty. Starlite argued that Seafood House waived the deadline in its offer through its performance. The district court granted summary judgment to Starlite, concluding that Seafood House waived its deadline for acceptance by occupying the property and paying the amounts owed. The district court ordered Landry's to pay Starlite damages for taxes, interest, past rent, late fees, and attorneys' fees.
Landry's appeals from summary judgment arguing that summary judgment is not available on this theory because a term of acceptance cannot be waived by performance. Landry's also argues that factual questions preclude summary judgment even if the deadline for acceptance could be waived, and that the damages were improperly calculated.
Can the doctrine of waiver apply to extend the time for acceptance and allow formation of a contract?
On appeal from summary judgment, we determine whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Yang v. Voyagaire Houseboats, Inc., 701 N.W.2d 783, 788 (Minn.2005). In assessing the evidence, we take the view most favorable to the party against whom judgment was granted. Motorsports Racing Plus, Inc. v. Arctic Cat Sales, Inc., 666 N.W.2d 320, 323 n. 1 (Minn.2003). When the material facts are not in dispute, our review of the district court's application of law is de novo. In re Collier, 726 N.W.2d 799, 803 (Minn.2007).
A fundamental purpose of contract law is to protect the reasonable expectations of the parties who enter into the bargain, which, in turn, promotes and facilitates business agreements. See 1 Arthur Linton Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 1.1 (1993) ( ). Contracts allow entities to create new legal obligations for themselves and one another. See Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 Colum. L. Rev. 799, 806-07 (1941) ( ). Enforcement of a contract's legal obligations in a way that is consistent with the parties' stated expectations provides certainty and predictability in contractual relationships.
The district court determined that Seafood House's conduct in occupying the property and paying rent and taxes for nine years waived the deadline in Seafood House's offer. Landry's agrees that a party to a contract can waive a term of performance through conduct but argues that this principle does not apply to contract formation and that a defect in the acceptance cannot be waived. Based on our reading of Minnesota case law, we agree.
The law governing contract formation is distinct from that of contract performance. The Minnesota Supreme Court has recognized that distinction in stating that Henry Simons Lumber Co. v. Simons, 232 Minn. 187, 193-94, 44 N.W.2d 726, 730 (1950).
States differ in whether they recognize waiver of a term for acceptance. Compare Sabo v. Fasano, 154 Cal.App.3d 502, 201 Cal.Rptr. 270, 271 (1984) ( ); Kansas City v. Indus. Gas Co., 138 Kan. 755, 28 P.2d 968, 970 (Kan.1934) (same); Beirne v. Alaska State Hous. Auth., 454 P.2d 262, 264-65 (Alaska 1969) (same); with 22 W. Main St., Inc. v. Boguszewski, 34 A.D.2d 358, 311 N.Y.S.2d 565, 567 (1970) ( ); Morrison v. Rayen Inv., Inc., 97 Nev. 58, 624 P.2d 11, 12 (1981) (same); Frandsen v. Gerstner, 26 Utah 2d 180, 487 P.2d 697, 700 (1971) ( ).
Minnesota case law recognizes that when an offer specifies a deadline for acceptance and that time passes, the offeree's power to accept lapses and an offeree's late acceptance cannot create a contract. Two cases demonstrate this recognition: Callender v. Kalscheuer, 289 Minn. 532, 184 N.W.2d 811 (1971) and Rooney v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 310 Minn. 256, 246 N.W.2d 170 (1976).
In Callender, a property administrator who offered to sell property required the deposit of an earnest-money check and an executed contract by a specified date. 289 Minn. at 532-33, 184 N.W.2d at 812. The potential purchaser failed to meet the deadline but claimed that the date had been extended orally and sued for breach of contract. Id. at 533, 184 N.W.2d at 812. The Minnesota Supreme Court held that no contract was formed when acceptance occurred after the written offer had expired. Id. ( ). The Callender court looked to long-standing precedent in stating this principle. See id. ( ). Similarly, in Rooney a corporation offered to sell a property and required that the potential purchaser deposit the remainder of the purchase price and additional documents by a specified date. 310 Minn. at 257-58, 246 N.W.2d at 171-72. Although the potential purchaser did not make these deposits by the deadline, he argued that the sellers had represented to him that they extended the deadline several months. Id. at 261, 246 N.W.2d at 173. Relying on Callender, the court held that in the absence of a written extension, the seller's offer expired at the time specified in the offer and could not be waived to form a completed contract. Id. at 267, 246 N.W.2d at 176.
Both Callender and Rooney rely, in part, on the statute of frauds in rejecting the concept of waiver in contract formation because the appellants were arguing that the offers were modified orally. Callender, 289 Minn. at 533, 184 N.W.2d at 812; Rooney, 310 Minn. at 266-67, 246 N.W.2d at 175-76 (citing Scheerschmidt v. Smith, 74 Minn. 224, 228, 77 N.W. 34, 35 (1898)). The statute of frauds, however, does not present the same issue in this case because the law has since developed to allow part performance to remove a contract from the purview of the statute of frauds—and Seafood House and Starlite's relationship for nine years undoubtedly would result in removal. Rosenberg v. Heritage Renovations, LLC, 685 N.W.2d 320, 325-26 (Minn. 2004); Berg v. Carlstrom, 347 N.W.2d 809, 812 (Minn.1984). But the cases also establish that an offer expires on the date it...
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