Starns v. Cowan
| Decision Date | 25 June 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. 00-2328.,00-2328. |
| Citation | 210 F.Supp.2d 1033 |
| Parties | Sandie Watts STARNS, Petitioner, v. Roger D. COWAN, Warden, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Central District of Illinois |
Sandie Watts Starnes, Menard, IL, pro se.
Mary A. Fleming, Office of Illinois Attorney General, Chicago, IL, for Defendant.
On December 18, 2000, Petitioner Sandie Watts Starns filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (# 1) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, alleging that he had been unconstitutionally convicted of first-degree murder. Respondent Roger D. Cowan filed a Response (# 13) on October 9, 2001. The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is now DENIED.
Petitioner was tried in a Champaign County, Illinois, circuit court for the murder of his twenty-eight-year-old neighbor, Denise Butler. A jury found him guilty on January 19, 1995, and he was sentenced to seventy years in prison.
On appeal, Petitioner argued four grounds for overturning his conviction: (1) that the trial court erred when it refused to admit hearsay testimony that another man had confessed to the crime; (2) that the trial court erred when it excluded, as inadmissible hearsay, evidence of the other man's intent to have the victim killed; (3) that the prosecution violated Petitioner's Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses when it stated in closing arguments that Petitioner had been able to shape his testimony based on the statements of witnesses at trial; and (4) that the trial court erred in allowing the State to argue that Petitioner had raped the victim prior to killing her, even though no testimony was presented at trial that the victim was raped. The Illinois Appellate Court, Fourth Judicial District, affirmed the conviction on December 20, 1996, noting that because Petitioner had not objected to the prosecutor's remarks at trial, and in the absence of plain error, his third basis for appeal was waived. People v. Starns, No. 4-95-0166 (Dec. 20, 1996) (unpublished order), slip op. at 12. On May 13, 1996, Petitioner's Petition for Leave to Appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court was denied, and on October 6, 1996, the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. Starns v. Illinois, 522 U.S. 838, 118 S.Ct. 112, 139 L.Ed.2d 65 (1997).
Petitioner next filed a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief on October 1, 1997, arguing: (1) that he received ineffective assistance of counsel; (2) that the evidence did not support guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; and (3) that the jury venire had been unconstitutionally called. This petition was denied by the state circuit court on November 6, 1997, as being without merit. Petitioner appealed, claiming only one issue: that his counsel was ineffective for not raising the question of reasonable doubt on direct appeal. The appellate court affirmed the conviction on October 13, 1999. The court's opinion held that Petitioner's argument was not stated in his original post-conviction petition. People v. Starns, No. 4-97-1136 (Oct. 13, 1999) (unpublished order), slip op. at 3. The court noted that Petitioner had claimed both ineffective assistance of counsel and lack of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, but had never related the two issues. Starns, No. 4-97-1136, slip op. at 4. The court then held that, even if the petition were broadly construed to encompass the current argument, it was still properly dismissed as frivolous. Starns, No. 4-97-1136, slip op. at 4. Petitioner requested leave to appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court. His petition was denied on February 2, 2000.
On December 18, 2000, Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, alleging that he was unlawfully held on three separate grounds. First, he argued that his right to due process of law was violated by the exclusion of testimony that another man had offered money to have the victim killed. Second, he claimed that the prosecutor deprived him of his right to confront witnesses by commenting in closing arguments that Petitioner was able to tailor his testimony based on the statements of other witnesses at trial. Finally, Petitioner argued that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance by not raising the question of reasonable doubt on direct appeal. Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss (# 6) arguing that the Petition was barred by the statute of limitations of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). This motion was denied on August 3, 2001.
As a preliminary issue, Petitioner must have exhausted his state remedies before seeking habeas corpus review: "An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State ... if he has the right under the law of the state to raise, by any available procedure, the question presented." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(c). If state remedies have not yet been exhausted, the petition is barred. Verdin v. O'Leary, 972 F.2d 1467, 1472 (7th Cir.1992). Respondent concedes that Petitioner has exhausted all available state remedies. This court therefore holds that this threshold requirement has been met.
Petitioner's first argument is that his right to due process of law under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as his Sixth Amendment right to present a defense, were violated when the trial judge excluded, on grounds of hearsay, a witness' statement that the victim's boy-friend once offered $300 to have her killed. The excluded statements lent some support to Petitioner's general theory of the case: that he is innocent and another man is responsible for the murder. Respondent argues only that the claim is noncognizable because state evidentiary rulings are matters of state law and are thus not subject to federal review. Because Respondent does not raise the defense of procedural default, presenting it only in response to Petitioner's other two grounds for relief, this court will not consider the issue. See Henderson v. Thieret, 859 F.2d 492, 498 (7th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1009, 109 S.Ct. 1648, 104 L.Ed.2d 163 (1989).
It is true that federal courts "do not sit to correct errors made by state courts in the interpretation and application of state law." Williams v. Lane, 826 F.2d 654, 659 (7th Cir.1987). But Petitioner is arguing that this particular state law violated his right to due process by imposing an impermissible double standard under the rules of evidence. As Respondent concedes, state evidentiary rules are cognizable if they "compromise[] the petitioner's due process right to a fundamentally fair trial." Howard v. O'Sullivan, 185 F.3d 721, 723-24 (7th Cir.1999). This court therefore cannot be barred from reviewing the constitutionality of state rules merely because the rules in question are evidentiary in nature. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 313, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973) ().
Under the AEDPA, the role of a federal court in a habeas proceeding when a state court has already ruled on the merits of an issue is ordinarily limited to determining whether the "state court's decision was contrary to clearly established caselaw by the Supreme Court, or alternatively, that the state court's decision was an unreasonable application of Supreme Court caselaw." Bocian v. Godinez, 101 F.3d 465, 471 (7th Cir.1996). However, "[a] prerequisite for applying this section is that the state court adjudicated the issue ... on the merits." Moore v. Parke, 148 F.3d 705, 708 (7th Cir.1998). In Petitioner's appeal, the state court limited its opinion to the proper application of state rules of evidence, with no discussion of any due process ramifications of those rules. Therefore, "the new standard of review in AEDPA does not apply" and this court must examine the issue of due process de novo. Moore, 148 F.3d at 708.
Petitioner argues that the application of the hearsay rules to his case creates an unconstitutional double standard depriving him of due process of law. The problem arises out of the testimony of a witness, Willie Rushing, at the offer of proof. Rushing said that another man, James Miller, had offered him $300 to have Denise Butler killed. Miller was the father of Butler's child, and had lived with her until about a week before the murder, when a domestic dispute led Butler to obtain an order of protection against him. Apparently because Butler suffered from issues of alcoholism and mental illness, the state took away their daughter shortly after her birth, and Miller blamed Butler for their inability to regain custody. At one point, according to Rushing, Miller said: The trial judge ruled that in order to present this hearsay statement at trial, Miller would first have to be called as a witness, and Rushing's testimony could then be used only to impeach Miller's statements. However, while on the stand Miller was never asked about the offer of $300, so the judge did not allow Rushing to testify about the incident.
Petitioner argues that the state's rules of evidence are fundamentally unfair, since if he had been the one to offer $300 to kill Butler, the evidence would have been admissible under the state's "other crimes" exception to the hearsay rule. Under state law, a solicitation to commit murder is admissible as evidence against a defendant even if it never led to a criminal prosecution. See generally People v. Thingvold, 145 Ill.2d 441, 164 Ill.Dec. 877, 584 N.E.2d 89 (1991). Therefore, according to the state appellate court's interpretation of its rules of evidence, solicitation can be used by the prosecution to convict defendants, but not by the defendants to cast doubt upon their guilt. This rule, Petitioner...
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Wilcox v. Comm'r of Corr.
...trial or on direct appeal because our resolution of the actual prejudice inquiry is dispositive of this appeal. See Starns v. Cowan, 210 F.Supp.2d 1033, 1041 (C.D.Ill.2002) ("[t]his court does not need to examine whether Petitioner had adequate cause for not raising the claim because he can......
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Wilcox v. Comm'r of Corr.
...trial or on direct appeal because our resolution of the actual prejudice inquiry is dispositive of this appeal. See Starns v. Cowan, 210 F. Supp. 2d 1033, 1041 (C.D. Ill. 2002) ("[t]his court does not need to examine whether Petitioner had adequate cause for not raising the claim because he......