Starr Indem. & Liab. Co. v. Miami Chocolates, LLC
| Decision Date | 21 August 2018 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO.: 17-CV-23626 |
| Citation | 337 F.Supp.3d 1216 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida |
| Parties | STARR INDEMNITY & LIABILITY CO., Plaintiff, v. MIAMI CHOCOLATES, LLC, Charles McDonald, Judy McDonald, and Peterbrooke Franchising of America, LLC, Defendants. |
Kimberly Nanice Ramey, Butler Weihmuller Katz Craig, LLP, Tampa, FL, Tracy Ann Jurgus, Butler Pappas, Miami, FL, for Plaintiff.
Patrick Glenn Dempsey, Leon Francisco Hirzel, IV, Hirzel Dreyfuss & Dempsey, PLLC, Alaina Brooke Siminovsky, Roberto Zarco, Robert Mitchell Einhorn, Zarco, Einhorn, Salkowski & Brito, P.A., Miami, FL, for Defendants.
OMNIBUS ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This Cause is before the Court upon Plaintiff Starr Indemnity & Liability Company's ("Starr") Motion for Summary Judgment [D.E. 42], and Defendant Peterbrooke Franchising of America, LLC's ("Peterbrooke"), counter Motion for Summary Judgment. [D.E. 64], which Miami Chocolates, LLC, Charles McDonald, and Judy McDonald's (the "MC Defendants") joined [D.E. 67].
Starr, an insurance company, has filed this declaratory action under 28 U.S.C. § 2201, et seq. , requesting that this Court declare that it has no duty to defend or indemnify the MC Defendants against claims that Peterbrooke brought against them in an underlying lawsuit (the "Underlying Suit").1 For context, the Underlying Suit involves an action by Peterbrooke against the MC Defendants, former franchisees, alleging that they had continued operating a previously franchised chocolatier shop as if it remained associated with Peterbrooke even after Peterbrooke had terminated their franchise agreement (the "Agreement"). As a result, Peterbrooke asserted the following claims against the MC Defendants: Count I for trademark infringement in violation of the Lanham Act; Count II for false designations of origin, also in violation the Lanham Act; Count III for trademark infringement in violation of Florida common law; Count IV for common law unfair competition; and Count V2 (alleged against Miami Chocolates alone) for breach of the Agreement.3
The dispute here concerns specifically whether Starr, as the MC Defendants' insurer, must defend and indemnify the MC Defendants against Peterbrooke's abovementioned claims. As to that, Starr contends that each of Peterbrooke's claims in the Underlying Suit is either not covered by or is excluded under the relevant insurance policy (the "Policy").4 And indeed, at a hearing this Court held on July 2, 2018, Peterbrooke and the MC Defendants conceded that all but Count IV, the unfair competition claim, are subject to applicable Policy exclusions. As to Count IV, Peterbrooke and the MC Defendants raised new arguments at the July 2, 2018 hearing for why it is not subject to the same exclusions that they conceded apply to Counts I, II, III, and V. The Court thus allowed the parties to file supplemental briefs regarding coverage of Count IV.
After considering the parties' supplemental briefs, the briefing related to their cross summary judgement motions, the Policy, and the underlying complaint, the Court holds that Starr's Policy also excludes Count IV and that Starr thus has no duty to defend or indemnify the MC Defendants against any claim in Peterbrooke's Underlying Suit.
Whether Starr owes a duty to defend the MC Defendants against Peterbrooke's unfair competition claim depends on (A) what coverage, as well as exclusions from coverage, Starr's Policy provides and (B) what facts Peterbrooke alleged in the Underlying Suit to support its claim. These considerations are addressed in turn.
Regarding coverage and the relevant exclusions, the Policy provides:
Regarding relevant definitions, the Policy provides:
Peterbrooke's underlying unfair competition claim, as does its other four claims, arises from and incorporates the following relevant allegations from its underlying complaint:
[D.E. 1–2. at ¶¶ 15, 28, 30–32].
Based on these allegations, Peterbrooke asserted in the Underlying Suit that the MC Defendants' post-termination use of its intellectual property and other items associated with its brand constituted, among other things, common law unfair competition. And here, Peterbrooke and the MC Defendants now contend that underlying unfair competition claim, unlike the other four claims, is covered under Starr's Policy.
Summary judgment is appropriate where the pleadings and supporting materials establish that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 ; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The moving party bears the burden of pointing to the part of the record that shows the lack of a genuine issue of material fact. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970) ; Allen v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 121 F.3d 642, 645 (11th Cir. 1997). Once the moving party does so, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to go...
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