Starr v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co

Decision Date01 November 1911
Citation72 S.E. 484,156 N.C. 435
CourtNorth Carolina Supreme Court
PartiesSTARR v. SOUTHERN BELL TELEPHONE & TELEGRAPH CO.
1. Electricity (§ 19*)—Actions—Evidence-Jury Question.

In an action against a telephone company for an injury by lightning which resulted from its negligence in leaving unconnected wires in premises from which it had removed a telephone, the question of whether lightning was transmitted by these wires held for the jury.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Electricity, Dec. Dig. § 19.*]

2. Electricity (§ 16*)—Operation — Removal of Wires from Building—Negligence.

Where a telephone company after removing an instrument from a house took off the lightning arrester, and severed the ground connections, but left the unattached wires^ in the building, it is guilty of negligence, and is_ liable for any injury caused by the transmission of lightning over such wires.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Electricity. Dec. Dig. § 16.*]

3. Evidence (§ 9*)—Trial (§ 192*)—Judicial Notice—Lightning.

That lightning is frequently discharged and passes to the earth, and that lightning is likely to pass along metal wires, and that a human body is also a good conductor, and, if in contact with a wire charged with electricity, the circuit may ground through the body, are matters of common knowledge, and a proper matter of judicial notice, and in an action against a telephone company for injuries by lightning, conducted by its wires into a building from which the telephone had been removed, the court properly charged the jury as to those facts.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Evidence, Ceut. Dig. § 8; Dec. Dig. §9;* Trial, Cent. Dig. §§ 432-434; Dec. Dig. § 192.*]

Appeal from Superior Court, Guilford County; Allen, Judge.

Action by Henry F. Starr against the Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

H. E. W. Palmer, Brutus J. Clay, and Wilson & Ferguson, for appellant.

R. C. Strudwick and W. P. Bynum, for appellee.

CLARK, C. J. [1] The defendant removed a telephone from the plaintiff's house, but for its own convenience left the wires leading into plaintiff's porch still connected with its general system of wires, and with the loose ends twisted together and hanging down six or eight inches from the plate of the porch. At the same time tbe defendant removed the lightning arrester, and severed the ground connection of the said wires. There was evidence that the wires left in this condition were dangerous on account of the means thus afforded of their conducting lightning which might strike any part of the defendant's general system of wires into the house, and that the plaintiff was unaware of this danger, but relied upon the defendant to leave the wires in a safe condition. One afternoon in June, 1909, the plaintiff was sitting on his porch under said wires, when a storm accompanied by thunder and lightning came up. The plaintiff arose to go into his house, and, as he stood up, the ends of said wires being about 18 inches from and to the left of his head, there came a violent clap of thunder, and a ball or bolt of lightning struck him on the left and back of his head, which the plaintiff claims came from the ends of said wires, rendering him unconscious and seriously injuring him. The jury found that said injuries were caused in this mode and by the negligence of the defendant.

The defendant's chief contention is that the court erred in not granting its motion to nonsuit the plaintiff; but we think not. The matter was one peculiarly one of fact, and was for the jury to determine. It is true no one saw the discharge of the lightning leap from the wires and strike the plaintiff on the left and back of his head. But the evidence justified the jury in finding such to be the fact. When one fires a pistol at another, no one sees the ball strike the body, but the pointing the pistol within proper distance, its discharge, and the wound are evidence from which the jury can infer the cause of the wound.

In dealing with this dangerous agency of electricity, if the defendant left its wires for its own convenience hanging in the plaintiff's porch, it was negligence for which it was liable if tbe injury...

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11 cases
  • Gasca v. Texas Pipe Line Co.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US
    • June 30, 1925
    ... ... decedent. Jackson vs. Wisconsin Tel. Co., 88 Wis ... 243; 60 N.W. 430; 26 L. R. A. 101; rr vs. South Bell ... Tel. Co., 156 N.C. 435, 72 S.E. 484. If we are ... ...
  • Shaw v. North Carolina Pub. Serv. Corp.
    • United States
    • North Carolina Supreme Court
    • April 14, 1915
    ...St. Rep. 857; Houston v. Traction Co., 155 N. C. 4, 71 S. E. 21; Harrington v. Wadesboro, 153 N. C. 437, 69 S. E. 399; Starr v. Telephone Co., 156 N. C. 435, 72 S. E. 484; Benton v. Public Service Corporation, 165 N. C. 354, 81 S. E. 448. The maxim res ipsa loquitur applies in many cases, f......
  • United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Rochester
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • January 9, 1926
    ...to the employment of decedent. Jackson v. Wisconsin Tel. Co., 88 Wis. 243, 60 N. W. 430, 26 L. R. A. 101; Starr v. South Bell Tel., etc., Co., 156 N. C. 435, 72 S. E. 484." Under the rules so indicated, we feel unable to say that the witness Kelley was incompetent and that the trial court e......
  • Small v. Southern Pub. Utilities Co
    • United States
    • North Carolina Supreme Court
    • May 6, 1931
    ...of Greensboro, for appellee. STACY, C. J. The case was properly submitted to the jury on authority of what was said in Starr v. Tel. Co., 156 N. C. 435, 72 S. E. 484; Lawrence v. Power Co., 190 N. C. 664, 130 S. E. 735; Carpenter v. Power Co., 191 N. C. 130, 131 S. E. 400; McAllister v. Pry......
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