Starr v. Southern Cotton Oil Co.
| Decision Date | 13 May 1914 |
| Docket Number | 484. |
| Citation | 81 S.E. 776,165 N.C. 587 |
| Parties | STARR v. SOUTHERN COTTON OIL CO. |
| Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
Appeal from Superior Court, Gaston County; Harding, Judge.
Action by James Starr against the Southern Cotton Oil Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Reversed, and new trial granted.
In an action for injuries to an employee of a cotton oil mill company, questions asked to show whether defendant company had any stockholders in the county in which the suit was brought, and as to whether defendant was a combination or trust, were improper.
This action was brought to recover damages for injuries received in the operation of a cotton seed linter, alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant. Plaintiff was employed as a sweeper and cleaner of the machines in the linter room, and was injured while attempting to clean one of the linters under the direction of Will Thompson. This machine, called a linter, removes the lint from the cotton seed, after the cotton has been ginned, and the removal is accomplished by means of brushes and saws. Plaintiff's arm was caught by the saws, and it was so lacerated that it had to be amputated. He alleges these as grounds of negligence: (1) That he was required to work and operate an inherently dangerous machine, and by a dangerous and unsafe method; (2) defendant failed to furnish him the necessary and proper appliances for the performance of the work; (3) plaintiff was required to perform the work in the manner aforesaid, without having the necessary warning, information and instruction beforehand, as he was inexperienced. Defendant denied that it had been negligent, and alleged that plaintiff's injury was caused by his own negligence in attempting to clean the linter in a dangerous way, when a safe method had been provided. The plaintiff was permitted to ask the following questions, against the objections of the defendant: Question. "If any member of the jury is in the employ of or connected with any insurance indemnity company that insures against liability for personal injury, will you please make it known?" The defendant objected to the foregoing question. The court overruled the defendant's objection, and stated that such question could be asked for the purpose of obtaining information upon which counsel for plaintiff might make peremptory challenge if he desired to do so, and for no other purpose. None of the jurors responded to the question, and there was no evidence offered by either side to show that the defendant had or did not have indemnity insurance. That question was asked before the impaneling of the jury.
During the course of the cross-examination of Victor L. Smith, a witness for defendant, the court permitted plaintiff to ask the following questions:
It is unnecessary to set out the case so far as the exceptions relating to the question of negligence and liability therefor are concerned, as will appear from the opinion. There was a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for $2,000, and defendant appealed from the judgment thereon.
Tillett & Guthrie, of Charlotte, for appellant.
Mangum & Woltz, of Gastonia, for appellee.
WALKER J. (after stating the facts as above).
The court erred in permitting the questions which were asked and objected to, as above stated. They were clearly calculated to prejudice the defendant and to prevent a fair and impartial trial, which is the first and most important object in the administration of justice. The law seeks to ascertain the truth and, upon it alone, to adjudge the rights of the parties.
It was entirely irrelevant to this controversy to inquire whether any of the jurors were employed by or connected with an insurance company, without admission or proof that the defendant was indemnified by such a company. The question plainly carried with it the suggestion that defendant was so insured, when there was not the slightest proof of the fact. It was not only objectionable, as calculated to prejudice the jury by the suggestiveness of the question and its implication that defendant did carry insurance of that kind and therefore the defendant would not have to shoulder the recovery, but, in its stead, some unknown, and, in this case mythical, company, which stood behind it, and this without any proof to sustain the implied charge, but it placed the defendant before the jury at a great disadvantage, in that it may be that there is no such insurance, or, if there is insurance, it may not be of the kind that covers this risk or liability of defendant, as in Clark v. Bonsal & Co., 157 N.C. 270, 72 S.E. 954, or in some other respect or for some other reason it may not protect the defendant. So that the defendant is left defenseless against any such attack, which was made not openly, but by innuendo. The fact that there was no attempt to show that there was such insurance suggests that, in this case, it did not exist, and yet the jury is permitted to act upon the hypothesis that it does exist and will shield the defendant from any harm. The capital vice of this kind of examination, if allowed, is that it is based upon the supposition, not always ill-founded, that a juror is prone to be more just and considerate towards his friend or associate, or one whom he knows, and with whom he may be thrown in daily contact, and towards whom he entertains a more friendly disposition, than towards a mere stranger. Somehow we instinctively lean that way, it is thought, whereas a jury should be free from any such influence or bias, in order that they may execute justice and maintain the truth, and not be...
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