Starrett v. Mckim
Decision Date | 24 May 1909 |
Citation | 119 S.W. 824,90 Ark. 520 |
Parties | STARRETT v. MCKIM |
Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
Appeal from Benton Chancery Court; T. Haden Humphreys, Chancellor affirmed.
Decree affirmed.
Rice & Dickson, for appellant.
The statute, Kirby's Dig., § 2709, is intended to make provision for the widow, and not the children, where the estate is a new acquisition. The statute excludes grandchildren, the word "children" meaning the immediate offspring. 25 S.C. 358; 8 Words & Phrases, Jud Def. 1115; 56 Ala. 260; 13 R. I. 149; 8 So. 392; 68 Miss 141; 39 Cal. 529; 53 Am. St. Rep. 453; 103 Mass. 287; 65 Ark 521; 64 Tex. 110; 3 Am. & Eng. Enc. of L., 1st Ed. 231.
J. H. Carmichael, for appellees.
Under the facts shown, appellees succeeded to the share which would have fallen to their mother in the lands of her father, whose death preceeded hers. 51 Ark. 54, and authorities cited; 55 Ark. 210; 80 Ark. 252.
This is a controversy between a widow on the one side and grandchildren of a decedent on the other, as to dower interest of the former in lands (not the homestead) left by said decedent. The widow claimed one-half of the land in fee simple, and the grandchildren insist that she takes only an estate for life in one-third of the land. The case involves a construction of the following statute:
Sec. 2709, Kirby's Digest.
Does the word "children" as used in the statute include grandchildren?
The court has held that, so far as the statute relates to dower in personal property, the word "children" means lineal descendants in any degree. Britton v. Oldham, 80 Ark. 252, 96 S.W. 1066. Judge RIDDICK, speaking for the court, after quoting the statute said: We conclude that the same construction must be given to the statute, so far as it relates to real estate.
It must be conceded that the word "children," either in a popular or technically legal sense, does not include grandchildren, and its meaning is confined to descendants of the first degree; and it is undoubtedly the rule that where this word is used in a statute it must be construed to mean only descendants of the first degree unless it is apparent from the context that a broader meaning was intended. 7 Cyc. 123-128 and cases cited.
An analysis of the language of the entire section of the statute shows clearly that the word was used in the broad sense to include descendants of any degree, in contradistinction to collateral heirs. The purpose of the statute is to prescribe the dower interest of a widow as against collateral heirs when there are no descendants, and as against creditors; and it is divisible into four separate provisions, the first two relating to land which was a new...
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...and the descent and distribution rights of Millridge, Sr.'s grandchildren. Approximately one hundred years ago, in Starrett v. McKim, 90 Ark. 520, 119 S.W. 824 (1909), our supreme court was faced with determining whether the word "children" included "grandchildren" in a predecessor dower st......
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