Stary v. City of Brooklyn

• Decision Date: 07 July 1954
• Docket Number: No. 33897,33897
• Citation: 162 Ohio St. 120,121 N.E.2d 11
• Parties: , 54 O.O. 56 STARY et al. v. CITY OF BROOKLYN et al.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 120

162 Ohio St. 120

121 N.E.2d 11, 54 O.O. 56

STARY et al. v. CITY OF BROOKLYN et al.

No. 33897.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

July 7, 1954.

Syllabus by the Court.

1. Sections 1235-1 to 1235-5, General Code, constitute laws of general application, but, by the enactment of those statutes, the General Assembly of Ohio did not pre-empt the field of legislation with respect to regulation of trailer camps or trailer parks so as to bar the enactment of municipal legislation on the same subject.

2. A municipality has the power under Section 3 of Article XVIII of the Constitution of Ohio to enact legislation designed to regulate trailer camps or trailer parks, but such legislation may not be in conflict with the general laws of Ohio with respect to such regulation.

3. A provision in a municipal ordinance requiring the operator of such camp or park to pay to the municipality a license fee which is reasonably related to the expense of supervision of the camp or park and the enforcement of the ordinance is not in conflict with Section 1235-3, General Code, which authorizes the board of health of the district in which the trailer camp or park is located to charge an annual fee for the right to operate such park.

4. The tax required by Section 6292-2, General Code, to be paid by the occupant of a house trailer is not in the nature of a license fee for the privilege of occupying such house trailer.

5. The increased use of house trailers in trailer camps or parks as places of permanent abode creates social problems and problems of municipal government which warrant the enactment of municipal legislation, through the exercise of the police power of a municipality, designed to regulate the operation of such camps or parks.

6. A municipal ordinance which provides for a 60-day maximum period of occupancy of a trailer camp or park with a 90-day minimum period of withdrawal before again occupying any such camp or park within the municipality is not an unconstitutional exercise of legislative power. Renker v. Village of Brooklyn, 139 Ohio St. 484, 40 N.E.2d 925, approved and followed.

This is an action 'for declaratory judgment, injunction and equitable relief' brought by Earl L. and Myrtle M. Stary, partners doing business as Ideal Trailer Park, against the city of Brooklyn located in Cuyahoga county and the mayor, chief of police, building inspector and fire chief of the city of Brooklyn. The petition was filed November 2, 1951.

In May of 1952, A. W. Christian and Ralph H. Bassett, by leave, intervened as petitioners. They were occupants of the trailer camp here involved. The plaintiffs seek judgment in reference to the validity of an ordinance enacted by the city of Brooklyn regulating trailers and trailer camps within the limits of the city of Brooklyn. The original ordinance was enacted July 8, 1940, and was amended in some particulars on three occasions, the last being in 1947. Section 7 of the ordinance against which the criticisms of the plaintiffs are chiefly directed has not been changed so far as the record reveals. That section provides:

'It shall be unlawful for any person to park or occupy a trailer in a trailer camp for more than sixty days, and no trailer camp licensee shall permit a trailer or occupants thereof to remain in a trailer camp for more than sixty days; nor shall a trailer licensee permit a trailer or the occupants thereof to re-enter the trailer camp for ninety days after the expiration date of a former occupancy; and it shall be unlawful for the occupants of a trailer to park or occupy a trailer in any trailer camp for ninety days after the expiration date of a former occupancy in any other trailer camp within the village limits.'

The same ordinance was the subject of litigation on a previous occasion and the decision of this court in respect thereto, rendered April 1, 1942, is reported as Renker v. Village of Brooklyn, 139 Ohio St. 484, 40 N.E.2d 925. In that case, the constitutionality of the ordinance was attacked, with particular reference to section 7, and this court held the ordinance constitutional.

In the present action, which was instituted approximately nine years after the decision of this court in the Renker case, the plaintiffs urge the following three principal grounds for relief against the ordinance, which they assert did not exist at the time of the trial of the Renker case:

(1) Change in conditions, including particularly a great increase in the use of house trailers, increase in the average size thereof and great improvements in their construction and equipment.

(2) The enactment by the General Assembly of Ohio in 1951 of an act (Sections 1235-1 to 1235-5, inclusive, General Code) with respect to the regulation of house-trailer parks, in which act the Public Health Council was authorized to 'make regulations to be of general application throughout the state governing the location, layout, construction, drainage, sanitation, safety and operation of house-trailer parks.'

(3) The adoption in December 1951 by the Public Health Council of comprehensive regulations with respect to trailer parks pursuant to the aforesaid statutory authorization.

In the instant case, the Common Pleas Court, 114 N.E.2d 633 held that there is no conflict between the statutes above referred to and the city ordinance; that the ordinance in question is a valid exercise of the police power of the city; and that the plaintiffs are not entitled to injunctive relief.

Upon appeal the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the Common Pleas Court.

The cause is in this court upon the allowance of a motion of the plaintiffs to certify the record.

Pickrel, Schaeffer & Ebeling, Maurice J. Leen, Jr., Dayton, and Stanton, Mercer & Hagan, Cleveland, for appellants.

Michael L. Hearns, Cleveland, for appellees.

MIDDLETON, Judge.

In argument the plaintiffs (appellants) state three questions of law, which in substance parallel the above-stated claims. They are:

(1) Have conditions so changed that the decision in the Renker case should be modified or overruled?

(2) Does the legislative enactment of 1951, which gives to the Public Health Council power to make regulations of general application throughout the state, supersede the power of a municipality to enact the ordinance here being challenged? If it does not, is the ordinance in conflict with state statutes and, therefore, unconstitutional?

(3) Is the ordinance an illegal exercise of the police power in that it is arbitrary and unreasonable or without direct relation to the public health, safety or welfare, and hence in violation of Section 1, Article XIV, Amendments, Constitution of the United States, and of Section 1 of Article I of the Constitution of Ohio?

The testimony and the agreed statement of facts indicate that the average trailer in plaintiffs' park at the time of trial of this case was 25 feet, 9 inches, in length by 8 feet in width, outside dimensions. The average inside floor area was approximately 200 square feet. In the Renker case the average floor space of the trailers was shown to have been approximately 119 square feet.

Although the record shows that the trailers presently in this park are each equipped with water, sewer and electrical connections, many of the trailers are not equipped with individual toilets or shower facilities. The occupants of trailers not so equipped are compelled to use the public toilets and shower facilities provided in two comfort buildings on the premises. Although not established by any evidence, it is stated in the plaintiffs' brief that trailers are generally of greater size today than they were some ten or twelve years ago; that all new trailers 22 or 23 feet in length are 'independent trailers,' fully equipped with toilet, shower, washstand and bathroom facilities; that some trailers are as much as 50 feet long, sell for approximately $7,500, and are fully equipped; and that a large investment of capital is required to establish a trailer park.

Although the advance in the art of trailer construction, the increase in use of trailers and the increased investment in trailers may be conceded, such changes in conditions do not, in the judgment of this court, materially affect the problem faced by municipalities in the regulation of trailer camps or present a situation legally different from that presented in the Renker case. In fact, the increase in the number of house trailers and the popularity of their use would seem to intensify the problem faced by municipalities rather than to alleviate it.

The underlying and controlling problem is whether the public health, safety or welfare of the municipality is affected by the growth of permanent settlements within the municipality, comprised of numerous small buildings in close proximity, each having a floor area equal only to that of an average size room, but housing a family consisting of from two to six persons.

Recognizing the ever increasing importance of the problems growing out of the operation of trailer camps, several states, including Ohio, have passed legislation on the subject. The Ohio act, which was passed in 1951, is so brief that we quote, as follows, the entire act:

Section 1235-1, General Code, Sections 3733.01 and 3733.02, Revised Code:

'The public health council, subject to the provisions of the administrative procedure act, shall have the power to make regulations to be of general application throughout the state governing the location, layout, construction, drainage, sanitation, safety, and operation of house trailer parks. For the purposes of this act a house trailer park shall be defined as any site, lot, field, or tract of land upon which three (3) or more house trailers used for habitation are parked either free of charge, or for revenue purposes, and shall include any roadway, building, structure, vehicle or enclosure used or intended for use as a part of the facilities of such house trailer park. House trailer...