Stasmas v. State Indus. Com'n

• Decision Date: 08 February 1921
• Docket Number: 11544.
• Citation: 195 P. 762,80 Okla. 221,1921 OK 46
• Parties: STASMAS v. STATE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ET AL.
• Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

195 P. 762

80 Okla. 221, 1921 OK 46

STASMAS v. STATE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ET AL.

No. 11544.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma

February 8, 1921

Syllabus by the Court.

The Workmen's Compensation Law should be construed fairly indeed liberally, in favor of the employee.

Injury resulting from an assault by a workman upon a fellow workman while the latter is engaged in the work of the master is an "accidental personal injury arising out of and in the course of employment" within the meaning of the term as used in section 1 (article 2) of the Workmen's Compensation Act.

The test of liability under the Workmen's Compensation Law for injuries arising out of and in the course of employment is, not the master's dereliction whether his own or that of his representatives acting within the scope of their authority, but is the relation of the service to the injury of the employment to the risk.

Appeal from State Industrial Commission.

Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Law by Adolf Stasmas employee, opposed by Rock Island Coal Mining Company employer. From refusal of compensation by the State Industrial Commission, the employee appeals. Reversed and remanded, with directions.

J. S. Arnote, of McAlester, for plaintiff in error.

S. P. Freeling, Atty. Gen., and R. E. Wood, Asst. Atty. Gen., for State Industrial Commission.

A. W. Harries, of McAlester, for Rock Island Coal Mining Co.

KANE J.

This is an appeal from the action of the State Industrial Commission in refusing to allow the petitioner compensation for personal injuries incurred while in the employ of the Rock Island Coal Mining Company as a miner. There is no controversy between the parties concerning the facts disclosed by the evidence, which may be briefly summarized as follows:

At the time of the injury and for some time prior thereto, Stasmas, the petitioner, was in the employ of the Rock Island Coal Mining Company in the capacity of a coal miner. On the day of the injury he was at work in rooms 48 and 49. About 1 o'clock of that date the mine shut down, and word was sent to the miners and to the petitioner that the mine had stopped work and that it was necessary for the workmen to depart from their working places and proceed to the surface. Upon receiving these directions, the petitioner with other workmen left his working place and passed up through the entries and passageways of the mine to the bottom of the shaft for the purpose of taking the cage out of the mine. While waiting at the bottom of the shaft for the cage to arrive, the petitioner asked Tom Woods, an assistant mine foreman and a fellow employee of the petitioner who was present where the cage was, saying that he (the petitioner) wanted the cage to go out of the mine. Whereupon Woods becoming angry applied an ugly epithet to the petitioner, adding: "Why don't you go up the air shaft?" Upon the petitioner resenting the insult of Woods the latter picked up a 2X4 scantling and struck petitioner over the head, knocking him down and crushing and breaking his skull so severely that he remained unconscious for some time. The cage which was temporarily out of order, arriving shortly after the encounter, the petitioner was taken out of the mine and from the mine to his home, from which he was taken next day to the hospital at McAlester, where he remained ten days. As the result of this injury the petitioner was unable to work for a period of about six weeks, his mind being seriously affected for a period of one month. The claim for compensation filed by the petitioner before the State Industrial Commission was denied upon the ground that the disability of the petitioner was not the result of accidental personal injury arising out of and in the course of his employment. This ruling is assigned as error. In our opinion this ground for reversal is well taken.

The part of section 1, art. 2, c. 246, of the Session Laws of 1915, generally known as the Workmen's Compensation Act, necessary to notice provides as follows:

"Every employer subject to the provisions of this act shall pay or provide as required by this act compensation according to the schedules of this article for the disability of his employee resulting from an accidental personal injury sustained by the employee arising out of and in the course of his employment, without regard

to fault as a cause of such injury, except where the injury is occasioned by the willful intention of the injured employee to bring about injury of himself or of another."

A casual reading of this section makes it fairly obvious that the petitioner's right to recover depends upon an affirmative answer to two questions: (1) Were his disabilities the result of accidental personal injuries? (2) Did they arise out of and in the course of his employment? It seems clear to us, in view of the rule of construction many times announced by this and other courts, that the Workmen's Compensation Law should be construed fairly, indeed liberally, in favor of the injured workman, that both of these questions must be answered in the affirmative.

It is now well settled in these workmen's compensation cases that the fact that an injury is the result of the willful or criminal assault of another does not prevent the injury from being accidental. In re McNicol, 215 Mass. 497, 102 N.E. 697, L. R. A. 1916A, 309 and notes; L. R. A. 1917D, 112; Western Indemnity Co. v. Pillsbury, 170 Cal. 686, 151 P. 398; Western Metal Supply Co. v. Pillsbury, 172 Cal. 407, 156 P. 491, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 390; Re Heitz, 218 N.Y. 148, 112 N.E. 750; Re Von Ette, 223 Mass. 56, 111 N.E. 696, L. R. A. 1916D, 641; Willis v. Pilot Butte Mining Co. (Mont.) 190 P. 124; 1 C.J. 390, and cases cited.

The latter authority defines the word "accident"...