Stastny v. Pease
| Decision Date | 13 July 1904 |
| Citation | 100 N.W. 482,124 Iowa 587 |
| Parties | JOSEPH STASTNY and IDA B. STASTNY, Appellees, v. A. J. PEASE, Appellant |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Appeal from Linn District Court.--HON. WILLIAM G. THOMPSON, Judge.
SUIT in equity, in which plaintiffs seek the re-establishment of certain liens upon a lot in the city of Cedar Rapids, for subrogation to the rights of the original holders thereof, to enjoin the issuance of a sheriff's deed for said property to the defendant Pease, that a sheriff's certificate issued to him be declared to be no lien upon the property, to cancel the said certificate, and for other equitable relief. The trial court granted the relief prayed, and defendant appeals.
Reversed.
C. W Holbrook and Crissman & Sargent, for appellant.
Bingham & Mekota and Heins & Heins, for appellees.
The facts are not in dispute. It appears that the property in controversy was at one time owned by O. P. Sargent. While he was the owner thereof, and on April 6, 1895, he made a mortgage upon the same to the Perpetual Building & Loan Association to secure the sum of $ 250. On January 11, 1897 he made another mortgage thereon to the same association to secure the sum of $ 200. On January 26, 1897, the defendant secured judgment against O. P. Sargent and his wife, Agnes for the sum of $ 196.07 and costs, which was a lien upon the property junior and inferior to the mortgage liens. In the year 1898 the association holding the mortgages brought suit to foreclose the same, making the Sargents, and no one else, parties defendant, and in October of that year obtained judgment against them for the sum of $ 322.93 and costs, and secured a decree of foreclosure. Pursuant to this judgment and decree the property was sold on November 9, 1898, to the building and loan association for the amount of the judgment and costs and the mortgages were marked "Satisfied" on the margin of the records, by the sale of the premises. On the 20th of September, 1899, Sargent and his wife sold the property in question to the plaintiffs herein for the sum of $ 625, and conveyed the same to them by warranty deed. Before buying the property plaintiffs obtained an abstract of title for the premises, but the abstracter failed to note thereon the defendant's judgment. The property was redeemed from the foreclosure sale in the name of Sargent, but plaintiffs furnished the money--$ 411.31--wherewith to make redemption, and they (the plaintiffs) also paid the county and city taxes for the year 1898, and reimbursed the building and loan association for taxes paid by it for the year 1899, and also paid a poll tax for the year 1893. In all plaintiffs paid to satisfy liens upon the property something like $ 528. As defendant was not made a party to the foreclosure proceedings, he was not, of course, obliged to redeem from the execution sale. But on May 9, 1902, he caused execution to issue on his judgment, which was levied upon the property in controversy, and pursuant to such levy the property was sold at execution sale to the plaintiff in execution, the defendant herein, for the sum of $ 390.44. This sale was had on the 14th day of July, 1902, and a sheriff's certificate was issued to the defendant in accordance with his bid, and his judgment was satisfied. This action, which was originally to quiet title, was commenced on the 13th day of June, 1902, which was after the levy of the execution under defendant's judgment. Finding, no doubt, that they could not succeed in their action to quiet title, plaintiffs amended their petition by asking that they be subrogated to the rights of the original holders of the liens against the property which they paid pursuant to their arrangement with Sargent. The trial court subrogated plaintiffs to the rights of these lienholders, and found that they were entitled to prior liens on the property amounting to $ 528.75; that they had expended $ 200 on the property since their purchase, permitted the defendant to redeem by paying the amount of these prior liens and the further sum of $ 200, expended on the property; and that upon his failure to do so within a time fixed plaintiffs might redeem from defendant by paying him the sum of $ 96.25, with interest, in which event defendant's sheriff's certificate should be set aside and canceled. The appeal is from this decree.
As will be observed, defendant's judgment was a lien upon the property at the time plaintiffs purchased, although, through the fault of the abstracter, they had no actual notice of said judgment. They did have constructive notice thereof, however, for the judgment was of record, and had been since January 26, 1897. The foreclosure suit of the building and loan association was not commenced until some time thereafter, in the year 1898, and defendant was not made a party thereto. As he was not a party, he was not bound thereby, and the foreclosure did not in any manner affect his lien.
Had Sargent himself redeemed from the foreclosure sale, and paid the taxes and other liens, there is no doubt that the lien of defendant's judgment would have immediately become a first one upon the property, and the sale thereof under execution, unless redeemed from by the owner within the statutory period, would have transferred the title to the defendant. This is hornbook law, not needing fortification by authority.
Plaintiffs contend, however, that, as they purchased the property without actual notice or knowledge of defendant's lien paid all but about $ 96 in satisfaction of other liens which were prior in point of time and right to the defendant's judgment lien, they are entitled to be subrogated to the rights of the lienholders whose debts they paid, and that in no event should defendant receive more under his sale on execution than the $ 96.25 which was paid by plaintiffs to Sargent. This presents the exact question in the case, and to that we now turn our attention. Plaintiffs at all times had constructive notice of defendant's judgment. While they agreed to pay $ 625 for the property, they arranged with Sargent to pay off all the incumbrances, and to give him...
To continue reading
Request your trial