State Auto Ins. Co. v. Stuart

• Decision Date: 24 October 1985
• Docket Number: No. 0584,0584
• Citation: 287 S.C. 235,337 S.E.2d 698
• Court: South Carolina Court of Appeals
• Parties: STATE AUTO INSURANCE CO., Plaintiff, v. Nolen STUART, Walter Stuart, James S. McCraven as Guardian ad Litem for Timothy McCraven, Jean P. Roberts, as Guardian ad Litem for James A. Faust, Nolen Stuart, Jr., Ralph A. Pendergrass, Woodrow M. Price, William J. Price, and Nationwide Insurance Company, Defendants, of whom Nationwide Insurance Company is Appellant, and Nolen Stuart, Walter Stuart, James S. McCraven, as Guardian ad Litem for Timothy McCraven, Jean P. Roberts, as Guardian ad Litem for James A. Faust, Nolen Stuart, Jr., Ralph A. Pendergrass, Woodrow M. Price, and William J. Price are Respondents. Appeal of NATIONWIDE INSURANCE COMPANY. . Heard

Page 698

337 S.E.2d 698

287 S.C. 235

STATE AUTO INSURANCE CO., Plaintiff, v. Nolen STUART, Walter Stuart, James S. McCraven as Guardian ad Litem for Timothy McCraven, Jean P. Roberts, as Guardian ad Litem for James A. Faust, Nolen Stuart, Jr., Ralph A Pendergrass, Woodrow M. Price, William J. Price, and Nationwide Insurance Company, Defendants of whom Nationwide Insurance Company is Appellant and Nolen Stuart, Walter Stuart, James S. McCraven, as Guardian ad Litem for Timothy McCraven, Jean P. Roberts, as Guardian ad Litem for James A. Faust, Nolen Stuart, Jr Ralph A. Pendergrass, Woodrow M. Price, and William J. Price are Respondents. Appeal of NATIONWIDE INSURANCE COMPANY.

No. 0584.

Court of Appeals of South Carolina.

Heard Oct. 24, 1985.

Decided Nov. 25, 1985.

Arthur Lee Gaston of Gaston, Gaston & Marion, Chester, for appellant.

Earl R. Gatlin of Hayes, Brunson & Gatlin, Rock Hill, for respondents.

GOOLSBY, Judge:

In this declaratory judgment action brought by the plaintiff State Auto Insurance Company, Nationwide Insurance Company appeals the holding of the trial judge, sitting without a jury, that Nationwide provides primary liability coverage for an automobile involved in a motor vehicle accident and operated by the respondent Ralph A. Pendergrass. The questions on appeal relate to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings made by the trial judge concerning the ownership of the car and to the admission and exclusion of certain evidence. We affirm.

On November 20, 1981, Pendergrass collided with an automobile operated by the respondent Walter Stuart. Pendergrass was driving a 1973 Chevrolet loaned to him by his girl friend, Annie C. Backstrom.

At the time of the collision, an automobile liability insurance policy issued by Nationwide to James Cole, Backstrom's brother-in-law, listed the Chevrolet as an insured vehicle. The policy also identified Backstrom as the principal driver of the Chevrolet. A State Auto liability policy covered Pendergrass' own car, a 1968 Mercury, which was then in the shop being upholstered.

Records of the South Carolina Department of Highways and Public Transportation did not show Cole held title to the Chevrolet on the date of the accident.

The trial judge based his holding that Nationwide provides primary coverage for the Chevrolet on his finding that Cole was the owner of the car on the date the wreck occurred.

I.

Nationwide contends the policy issued by it to Cole and describing the automobile in question did not afford coverage in this instance because Cole did not own the automobile on the date of the collision.

Ordinarily, the issue of an automobile's ownership in a coverage case is a question of fact. See, e.g., Grain Dealers Mutual Insurance Company v. Julian, 247 S.C. 89, 145 S.E.2d 685 (1965). The determination of the question of ownership depends on the particular facts and circumstances involved in the case. 7 Am.Jur.2d Automobile Insurance § 134 (1980). A certificate of title to an automobile is simply prima facie evidence of ownership and, therefore, is not conclusive of the issue. Tollison v. Reaves, 277 S.C. 443, 289 S.E.2d 163 (1982); see S.C. Code of Laws § 56-19-320 (1976).

In an action tried at law before a trial judge alone in which the ownership of a motor vehicle is at issue, the factual findings of the trial judge regarding the ownership of the motor vehicle will not be disturbed on appeal unless there is no evidence that reasonably supports the trial judge's findings. See Bankers Insurance Company of Pennsylvania v. Griffin, 244 S.C. 552, 137 S.E.2d 785 (1964). We therefore examine the record to determine whether there is any evidence to support the trial judge's finding that Cole, at the time of the collision, owned the automobile in question.

C.J. Tanner testified he purchased the Chevrolet for his wife and put the title to the car in her name. His wife, however, did not like the automobile. So, he mailed the title to the Department requesting it to retitle the car in his name. But before the Department returned the title to him, Tanner sold the Chevrolet to Cole, a fishing buddy.

Cole testified he bought the car for Backstrom. Tanner corroborated Cole's testimony in this regard as did Carolyn Carraway, the loan officer of the bank that financed the automobile.

The bank, according to Cole, Tanner, and Carraway, loaned Tanner the money with which Cole could buy the Chevrolet because Cole could not qualify for a car loan. Backstrom, Cole testified, was unemployed at the time.

Although the bank held Tanner responsible for the payments on the note, Carraway testified "it was understood" between Tanner and Cole that Backstrom would actually make the payments. Tanner and Cole testified, however, that Cole agreed to make any payments Backstrom missed. Cole also stated he intended to remain the owner of the automobile until Backstrom paid the car loan off. Tanner and Cole both...