State Bank of Buckley v. Nebraska Bridge Supply & Lumber Co.

• Citation: 151 P. 253,87 Wash. 142
• Decision Date: 31 August 1915
• Docket Number: 12731.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Washington
• Parties: STATE BANK OF BUCKLEY v. NEBRASKA BRIDGE SUPPLY & LUMBER CO.

151 P. 253

87 Wash. 142

STATE BANK OF BUCKLEY v. NEBRASKA BRIDGE SUPPLY & LUMBER CO.

No. 12731.

Supreme Court of Washington

August 31, 1915

Department 1. Appeal from Superior Court, King County; R. B. Albertson Judge.

Action by the State Bank of Buckley against the Nebraska Bridge Supply & Lumber Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.

M. H Ingersoll, of Seattle, for appellant.

Winfield R. Smith, of Seattle, for respondent.

PARKER J.

The plaintiff seeks recovery of the invoice price of shipments of four car loads of lumber made by the Clyde Lumber Company to the defendant, resting its right of recovery upon assignments to it by the Clyde Lumber Company of the invoices and the bills of lading issued by the carrier. Trial before the superior court without a jury resulted in findings and judgment in favor of the plaintiff, from which the defendant has appealed.

Respondent is a banking corporation, with its place of business at Buckley, in King county. The appellant and the Clyde Lumber Company are corporations dealing in lumber, with places of business in King county. On the 25th, 27th, 28th, and 29th days of December, 1912, respectively, the Clyde Lumber Company delivered to the Northern Pacific Railway Company a car load of lumber for shipment to W. D Moreland at points in Iowa, Wisconsin, and Minnesota. These shipments were so made at the request of appellant in pursuance of an agreement for the sale of the lumber by the Clyde Lumber Company to appellant. We assume, therefore, that the effect is the same as if the shipments had been made direct to appellant. At that time the Clyde Lumber Company was indebted to appellant in a sum equal to more than twice the total sale price of the lumber so shipped. It was agreed between the Clyde Lumber Company and appellant, a short time previous, that the sale price of the lumber should be credited upon the indebtedness due appellant from the Clyde Lumber Company. Instead of carrying out this agreement, the Clyde Lumber Company caused bills of lading to be issued by the railway company upon each of the shipments in its own name as consignor, naming W. D. Moreland as consignee. It then assigned and delivered to respondent the invoices for the lumber and the bills of lading, and received from the respondent advances thereon. Respondent thereby became the owner and holder of the bills of lading, and entitled to the lumber or the purchase price thereof, unless by reason of the nonnegotiability of the bills of lading such right did not accrue as against appellant. At the time of taking the assignments of the bills of lading and invoices, respondent had no knowledge of appellant's claim to the lumber, other than as the claim of a purchaser with the purchase price wholly unpaid. Respondent then forwarded to appellant by mail the assigned bills of lading and invoices, requesting payment of the purchase price of the lumber as shown by the invoices. Upon so receiving the assigned invoices and bills of lading, the appellant kept the same, neglected to pay the purchase price to respondent as demanded, and by the surrender of the bills of lading to the railway company secured possession of the four car loads of lumber.

Counsel for appellant contend that, since the Clyde Lumber Company caused the bills of lading to be issued with the name of Moreland therein as consignee, that being the same in effect as if naming appellant as consignee, the delivery of the lumber to the railway company for shipment was in law the delivery to appellant, resulting in title then passing to appellant. This contention would possibly be well founded, if the bills of lading were nonnegotiable, and...