State Bank & Trust Co. v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 06 April 1929
• Citation: 109 Conn. 67,145 A. 565
• Parties: STATE BANK & TRUST CO. v. CONNECTICUT GENERAL LIFE INS. CO.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

145 A. 565

109 Conn. 67

STATE BANK & TRUST CO. v. CONNECTICUT GENERAL LIFE INS. CO.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

April 6, 1929

Appeal from Superior Court, Hartford County; Allyn L. Brown, Judge.

Action by the State Bank & Trust Company, guardian, against the Connecticut General Life Insurance Company, to recover amount of policy of life insurance, brought to superior court and tried to a jury. Verdict for plaintiff which the court set aside, and plaintiff appeals. No error.

James E. Cannon and Ufa E. Guthrie, both of Hartford, for appellant.

Francis W. Cole and Lucius F. Robinson, Jr., both of Hartford, for appellee.

Argued before WHEELER, C.J., and MALTBIE, HAINES, HINMAN, and BANKS JJ.

BANKS J.

The plaintiff is the guardian of the two minor beneficiaries under a life insurance policy issued by the defendant to David Maislen on June 30, 1925. Maislen died on January 30 1926, of a tumor of the brain. The policy in suit is what is known as a nonmedical policy issued by the company without medical examination to its policyholders who had passed its regular examination within two years. The defense is that the assured procured the issuance of the policy by certain false and fraudulent misrepresentations contained in his application dated June 24, 1925, and in the application for his previous policy dated September 9, 1924, which was made a part of the application for the policy in suit and a basis for the issuance of that policy. The alleged misrepresentations of the assured are that as of September 9, 1924, he stated: (1) He was then in good health; (2) he had never had renal colic; (3) he had never had a discharge from the ear; (4) he had never been an inmate of a hospital. And that as of June 24, 1925, he stated: (5) He had not been ill since September 9, 1924; (6) he had not consulted any physician since that date; and (7) he was not on June 24, 1925, affected by any disease or inflrmity. That these representations were made by the assured in the answers to questions contained in his applications is not in dispute. In its reply the plaintiff admits that the assured was a patient at the Hartford hospital from July 22 to July 26, 1919, and that he was a patient at that hospital a second time from October 11 to October 17, 1924. The plaintiff denied that the assured had been ill since September 9, 1924, except for a slight attack of left ureteral calculus for which he was treated at the Hartford hospital in October, 1924, and denied that he had consulted any physician or other medical practitioner since September 9, 1924, other than his brother, who was a physician, and the attending physician at the Hartford hospital. It appeared from testimony offered by the plaintiff, and which was undisputed, that the assured consulted Dr. Seigell, an eye, ear, and throat specialist, twelve times between September 21, 1923, and April 1, 1925.

Upon the pleadings, therefore, and the undisputed evidence, it appears that representations 4, 5, and 6, at least, were not true. The plaintiff contends that even so the verdict of the jury was justified because (1) recovery is not barred by misrepresentations as to immaterial matters and the question of their materiality was one of fact for the jury, (2) the answers to the questions were substantially if not literally truthful, and (3) the misrepresentations were not made willfully with an intent to deceive.

The policy provides that " the consideration for this insurance is the application, a copy of which is attached hereto and made a part of this contract," and the application states that the former application, in accordance with which the prior policy was issued, is " made a part of this application and the applicant herein agrees that the answers and representations made by him in said former application are full, complete and true, and shall form a basis for any policy issued hereunder."

The claimed misrepresentations are contained in answers to questions appearing in the two applications and relate to the health of the applicant. That they were material to the risk as matter of law is beyond question. Where the materiality of a representation depends upon inferences drawn from facts and circumstances proved, the question is one for the jury. Where the representation is contained in an answer to a question contained in the application which is made a part of the policy, the inquiry and answer are tantamount to an agreement that the matter inquired about is material. The information given forms the basis of the contract and defines the risk assumed. Jeffrey v. United Order of Golden Cross, 97 Me. 176, 53 A. 1102; Mutual Life Ins. Co. v Geleynse, 241 Mich. 659, 217 N.W. 790, 56 A.L.R. 702; Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Pomerantz, 246 N.Y. 63, 158 N.E. 21; Myers v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 83 W.Va. 390, 98 S.E. 424; Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Hurni Packing Co. (C. C. A.) 260 F. 641; Kasprzyk v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 79 Misc. 263, 140 N.Y.S. 211; 1 May on Insurance, § § 185, 186, 187; 14 R. C. L. 1074. " The test of materiality is in the effect which the knowledge of the fact in question would have on the making of the contract. To be a material fact need not increase the risk or contribute to any...