State Bar v. Retail Credit Ass'n

Decision Date27 November 1934
Docket NumberCase Number: 25594
Citation167 Okla. 246,1934 OK 691,37 P.2d 954
PartiesSTATE BAR v. RETAIL CREDIT ASS'N et al.
CourtOklahoma Supreme Court
Syllabus

¶0 1. Injunction -- Jurisdiction to Restrain Series of Acts or Course of Conduct Though Punishable as Statutory Offenses.

Ordinarily injunction will not lie purely to restrain or prevent commission of crime, but where injunction is fully warranted to restrain a series of acts or a course of conduct, the court is not deprived of jurisdiction by the mere fact that acts constituting statutory offenses must be enjoined as incidental to the general relief sought.

2. Attorney and Client--Unauthorized Practice of Law by Corporation and Its Agents and Acts Tending to Bring Administration of Justice Into Disrepute Held Enjoinable at Suit of State Bar.

Under provisions of the State Bar Act, chapter 22, O. S. 1931, the State Bar may maintain an action to enjoin the unauthorized practice of law by a corporation and its agents, and to enjoin acts which are unauthorized and illegal and which tend to bring into disrepute the practice of law, and the administration of justice.

Appeal from District Court, Oklahoma County; Sam Hooker, Judge.

Action by the State Bar against the Retail Credit Association et al. to restrain unauthorized acts and practices, and acts constituting the practice of law. From an order sustaining defendants' demurrer to plaintiff's petition, the plaintiff appeals. Reversed and remanded, with directions.

Hayson & Lukenbill and Horace Thompson (C. B. Stuart, of counsel), for plaintiff in error.

Stuart, Bell & Ledbetter, for defendants in error.

WELCH, J.

¶1 In this action the plaintiff seeks to enjoin certain acts, dealings, and conduct of the defendant, on the theory that in some instances they constitute the unauthorized practice of law; that they include a repeated and systematic holding out of the defendant as authorized to give legal advice and render legal services, when defendant is wholly without such authority, and upon the theory that these, and additional acts of the defendant, constitute a fraud on the defendants, customers, and a fraud on the people and the public, and that such fraud is perpetrated in the name of certain legal and judicial phrases and by the use of pretended legal and judicial forms, and in pretense of familiarity with, and the right to use, the courts of Oklahoma in coercing and forcing the payment of money. And the plaintiff avers that such acts and conduct of defendant, customarily and regularly engaged in, tend to bring into disrepute the law, the judiciary, the practice of law, and the administration of justice by inferring that all are subservient to defendant in making good its threats against debtors. And plaintiff contends that such acts and conduct of the defendant tend to seriously hinder the administration of justice by reason of the promotion of ill repute thereof as aforesaid. This is not a verbatim copy, but a statement of the substance of plaintiff's allegations. Some further and more exact references to the allegations of plaintiff's petition will be made later.

¶2 The defendant demurred to plaintiff's petition upon four grounds as follows:

"(1) That the court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the action.
"(2) Because there is a defect of parties defendant.
"(3) Because there is a defect of parties plaintiff.
"(4) That the petition does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants, or either of them."

¶3 This demurrer was sustained, and plaintiff's petition dismissed, the grounds of sustaining the demurrer being the conclusion of the trial court that the plaintiff had no capacity to maintain the action, or, as expressed in the journal entry of the trial court, "has no capacity to sue herein." It is that action of the trial court that is here presented for review.

¶4 The plaintiff is an association specifically created by law, with general power to sue and be sued (chapter 264, Session Laws 1929, chapter 22, art. 2, O. S. 1931), so the plaintiff has capacity in general to sue in the district courts of this state, and has capacity to sue here, unless the subject-matter of this action is such as not to come within the scope of plaintiff's capacity to sue. In considering that, we are at least to some extent directed to the fourth ground of demurrer, and must consider some of the various allegations of the petition. If the petition alleged facts upon which plaintiff is entitled to sue, and which create a condition that may be dealt with by injunction, then we must reverse the trial court.

¶5 Among other allegations the petition, in substance, charges that the defendant association is a corporation, and maintains and engages in a collection business. That in the transaction of its business it holds itself out to its customers as being competent and possessing authority to render legal services, give legal advice and take legal action to collect claims, demands, or debts; that defendant has no such authority or competency, but upon such representations the defendant solicits and obtains patronage, and transacts its business. That defendant, in its endeavors to collect money from individuals for its own gain and for its customers, habitually and customarily attempts to collect by threats and intimidation; that the defendants throughout their efforts to collect money make use of various legal forms and pretended legal forms denominated by defendant "Bill of Particulars," "Garnishee Demand and Supplementary Notice," "Notice to Employer," "Disclaimer of Liability," "Final Demand for Debt," "Supplementary Proceedings," "Secondary Service," etc., complete copies of such documents so alleged to be used by defendants are attached to plaintiff's petition. By their use the defendants threaten the persons to whom they write, and from whom they seek to collect money, with various and sundry court actions and legal actions, some known to the law and some existing only in the fancy of the defendants and conceived by the defendants to add force to their threats of the dire consequences that will follow the failure of the person addressed to make immediate payment of money to the defendants. These documents, as prepared and used by the defendants, according to plaintiff's petition, are designed to impress the person addressed that the defendants have full right and authority to make use of the law and the process of the courts, and of the courts themselves, to carry out the threats. These threats, according to plaintiff's petition, include threats to harass, annoy, embarrass, and discredit the individual; to destroy or damage his reputation, credit, and standing; to bring about his or her discharge from present or further employment; to "Invoke Against You" (the person addressed) "Supplementary Proceedings" to compel such person to deliver to the court his or her earnings, income, credits, chattels, and personal property; and that the association may cause grievous and vexatious levies to be made.

¶6 The majority of the individuals from whom the defendants attempt to collect money are persons employed for salaries or wages. For them, according to plaintiff's allegations, the defendant association has devised a document entitled "Notice to Employer" in red print. This notice is sent to the individual with a threat that in five days it will be sent to his or her employer. There too is the pretense that the notice is a legal form or commonly used legal document. This notice advises the employer of proceedings against the employee which will or may bring the employer "Trouble, Annoyance and Expense of such proceedings," unless employer's influence is brought to bear on the employee to make him pay. In that notice is a threat that the defendant association will compel the employer to bring all his books, records, and vouchers of every kind into court "for examination and evidence" and a threat to investigate the employee's "working under a false name," and a threat directed to the employer "to subpoena your office against the body" of the individual, and with pretended authority to use the law and the courts to do all these things threatened.

¶7 There is further allegation that the defendants habitually and customarily threaten the individual from whom they seek to collect money that in a week the defendant association will resort to legal action or court action denominated as "Secondary Service," which the association suggests will result in "loss of position, injury to prestige, credit standing, reputation or influence," and "other serious losses or damages." That at the same time, however, the defendants state to such individual that "We Disclaim All Liability," and thereby the defendants purport to say that we have authority to so use the law and the courts, and so use legal and judicial process, but by reason of our "Disclaimer of Liability" the law and the courts can give no redress for whatever devastating damage we cause. It is alleged also that the defendants threaten that nothing will stop the defendant association from so setting in motion the legal and judicial machinery for the purpose of bringing about the above damage and detriment, unless the individual threatened shall immediately "Today" forward a check to the association for the sum demanded.

¶8 It is unnecessary to here set out the exact form of the various documents and written statements alleged to be so used by the defendants. Such documents are prepared with generous use of large black type, large red type, and glaring underscoring of legal phrases, with very conspicuous seals attached. They are designed to terrorize the individual addressed, and to present to him as a monster of retribution the law, the courts of justice, and various and sundry processes, some legal and judicial, and some extrajudicial, and unknown to the law, and all claimed by defendants to be subservient to de...

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