State Bd. of Bank Control v. Sease
| Decision Date | 06 September 1938 |
| Docket Number | 14747. |
| Parties | STATE BOARD OF BANK CONTROL et al. v. SEASE, Circuit Judge. |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Original proceeding by the State Board of Bank Control of South Carolina and others against the Honorable T. S. Sease as Judge of the Seventh Judicial Circuit of South Carolina etc., for an adjudication that the Board has complete and exclusive jurisdiction in the liquidation of financial institutions of the state enumerated in the act of its creation as subject to its supervision.
Petition dismissed.
John M Daniel, Atty. Gen., and S. R. Watt, Sol., and C. E. Daniel both of Spartanburg, for appellants.
Donald Russell, of Spartanburg, for respondent.
In this suit, the State Board of Bank Control (which hereinafter will be referred to as the Board) is seeking an adjudication that it "has complete and exclusive jurisdiction, power authority and responsibility in the liquidation of the financial institutions of this State enumerated in the Act of its creation as subject to its supervision," and that the Courts of the State are without jurisdiction to appoint receivers for such institutions.
Prior to the institution of this proceeding, Honorable T. S. Sease Judge of the Seventh Judicial Circuit, granted an order in a proceeding pending before him, appointing a receiver for the Mechanics Building and Loan Association of Spartanburg, and in another proceeding pending before him, had issued a rule to show cause why a receiver should not be appointed for the Home Building and Loan Association of Spartanburg. In the receivership suit involving Mechanics Building and Loan Association, the Board was not a party. In the suit involving Home Building and Loan Association, the Board was a party defendant.
At the time of the granting of the two receivership orders, the Board, acting under the authority of Act No. 802 of the Acts of the General Assembly of 1936 (page 1484), had appointed a conservator for each of the two associations. In the Mechanics Building and Loan Association case the conservator was appointed after the institution of the action for the receiver, but before the appointment of the receiver; in the Home Building and Loan Association case the conservator was appointed before the institution of the receivership action.
The Board takes the position that Judge Sease was without power to make the receivership orders in question, whether the Act creating the Board is construed to confer exclusive jurisdiction for the liquidation of building and loan associations on the Board, or only jurisdiction concurrent with that of the Courts; and that having taken jurisdiction of such associations by the appointment of a conservator for each, before the receiver was appointed in either case, the jurisdiction of the Board is in any aspect of the case paramount, and that the orders appointing receivers should be declared to be of no effect.
On the Board's petition, the Chief Justice of this Court granted an order directing Judge Sease to show cause before this Court why the order prayed in the petition should not be granted.
The return of Judge Sease is in effect an assertion by him of his exercise of authority in accordance with his understanding of the applicable principles of law. Arguments have been filed on behalf of the Board and by attorneys acting as Amici Curiae.
The legal points argued before the Court cover a wide range. They involve such questions as whether it is within the power of the Legislature to confer either concurrent or exclusive jurisdiction over the liquidation of financial institutions upon an administrative board, without specific provision for resort to the Courts by persons affected by the orders of the Board; whether the Legislature intended, in the Act now in question, to deprive the Courts of jurisdiction to appoint receivers for financial institutions upon the application of interested parties; whether the Board is such an instrumentality of the State as is exempt from suit.
We do not deem it proper to go into these broad questions as we find it necessary to dispose of the case on procedural grounds.
The principles governing the granting of a Writ of Prohibition are fully discussed in the case of Johnson v. Jones et al., 160 S.C. 63, 158 S.E. 134, 77 A.L.R. 235. Among these principles as there set forth are the following:
The Writ of Prohibition "should be used with forebearance and caution, and only in cases of necessity." [page 137.] Its principal use is to prevent the assumption and exercise of jurisdiction by a lower tribunal in cases where wrong, damage and injustice are liable to follow such action.
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