State Bd. of Retirement v. Boston Retirement Bd.

• Decision Date: 08 February 1984
• Citation: 391 Mass. 92,460 N.E.2d 194
• Parties: STATE BOARD OF RETIREMENT v. BOSTON RETIREMENT BOARD; Boston Police Patrolmen's Association, Incorporated, intervener.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 194

460 N.E.2d 194

391 Mass. 92

STATE BOARD OF RETIREMENT v. BOSTON RETIREMENT BOARD;

Boston Police Patrolmen's Association, Incorporated, intervener.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,

Suffolk.

Argued Nov. 7, 1983.

Decided Feb. 8, 1984.

Kelam S. Derderian, Asst. Corp. Counsel, Boston, for Boston Retirement bd.

Paul E. Shanley, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen. (James F. Driscoll, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., with him), for State Bd. of Retirement.

Frank J. McGee, Marshfield, for intervener, submitted a brief.

Before HENNESSEY, C.J., and WILKINS, LIACOS, ABRAMS and O'CONNOR, JJ.

LIACOS, Justice.

The defendant, the Boston retirement board, and the intervener-defendant, Boston Police Patrolmen's Association, Incorporated, appeal from a Superior Court judgment. We transferred the appeal to this court on our own motion and affirm the judgment.

The case was heard largely on a statement of agreed facts. By virtue of c. 478 of the Acts of 1978, known as the Court Reorganization Act, all judicial employees of counties became employees of the Commonwealth as of July 1, 1978. The Court Reorganization Act mandated that "[a]ll pensions and retirement allowances payable to judges, clerks, court officers and all other persons employed in the judicial branch of the commonwealth on or after the effective date of this section, who retire or resign after such date ... shall be deemed to be a cost of maintenance and operation of the judicial branch and shall be paid by the commonwealth, subject to the provisions of chapter thirty-two of the General Laws." St.1978, c. 478, § 328.

The parties are in agreement that G.L. c. 32, § 3(8)(a), governs this case. Section 3(8)(a ) of G.L. c. 32, as appearing in St.1945, c. 658, § 1, provides, in pertinent part: "Any member of any contributory retirement system ... who ... becomes employed in a position in any other governmental unit in which such a system is operative, shall thereupon have his membership transferred to the second system .... Such transfer of membership, if required, shall be effectuated by transferring within ninety days after the date of commencement of his new employment the amount of the accumulated total deductions credited to his account in the annuity savings fund of the system from which he is being separated to the annuity savings fund of the second system" (emphasis supplied). The parties have stipulated that the sole issue in this case is whether, in view of the relevant provisions of G.L. c. 32, the defendant is required to transfer cash, as the plaintiff maintains, or securities at book value, as the defendant proposes, from the State-Boston retirement system to the State retirement system. A Superior Court judge ruled that payment by the defendant of the accumulated total deductions of State-Boston retirement system members who were transferred to the Massachusetts State retirement system by St.1978, c. 478, be made in cash or in securities with an equivalent market value.

The retirement provisions for public employees set forth in G.L. c. 32 have been described as being of "great complexity." Boston Retirement Bd. v. McCormick, 345 Mass. 692, 695, 189 N.E.2d 204 (1963). See Opinion of the Justices, 364 Mass. 847, 303 N.E.2d 320 (1973). We need not, however, delve too deeply into such complexities to resolve this appeal. We follow a principal rule of statutory interpretation that we need not look beyond the words of the statute where the language is plain and unambiguous. "[T]he statutory language itself is the principal source of insight into the legislative purpose." Hoffman v. Howmedica, Inc., 373 Mass. 32, 37, 364 N.E.2d 1215 (1977). The general rule of construction of statutory language is that " 'a statute must be interpreted according to the intent of the Legislature ascertained from all its words construed by the ordinary and approved usage of the language, considered in connection with the cause of its enactment, the mischief or imperfection to be remedied and the main object to be accomplished, to the end that the purpose of its framers may be effectuated.' Board of Educ. v. Assessor of Worcester, 368 Mass. 511, 513 (1975), quoting from Industrial Fin. Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 367 Mass. 360, 364 (1975)." Registrar of Motor Vehicles v. Board of Appeal on Motor Vehicle Liab. Policies & Bonds, 382 Mass. 580, 585, 416 N.E.2d 1380 (1981).

The dispositive statutory words are clear and are defined by G.L. c. 32 itself. The Boston board is required by § 3(8)(a ) to transfer for each employee transferred to the Massachusetts State retirement system "the amount of the accumulated total deductions" of that employee. "Accumulated total deductions" is defined by c. 32, § 1, as appearing in St.1945, c. 658, § 1, as "the sum of the amount of the accumulated regular deductions and the amount of the accumulated additional deductions, if any, credited to any member's account in the annuity savings fund of any system." In turn, "accumulated regular deductions" is defined by that section as "the sum of the amount of the regular deductions and the amount of regular interest thereon credited to any member's account in the...