State Board of Law Examiners v. Hart

Decision Date24 April 1908
Docket Number15,562
PartiesSTATE BOARD OF LAW EXAMINERS v. FRANCIS B. HART
CourtMinnesota Supreme Court

Verified accusation of the secretary of the state board of law examiners charging Francis B. Hart, who for more than thirty years had been an attorney at law of the state of Minnesota, with the wilful violation of his official oath as such attorney at law and of the duties imposed upon him by the state statutes to (1) observe and carry out the terms of his oath, and (2) maintain the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers.

It was charged that such violation was committed by composing and publishing a letter over his own name addressed to the chief justice of this court by name and official title, which was couched in insulting and contemptuous language, and purposely so worded as to cause those persons who might read the letter, and believe the statements and insinuations contained therein, to doubt the honesty and integrity of this court the justices composing the same, and of certain judges of the district courts of the state. That among many charges and insinuations the letter contained the following language:

On Jan 1, 1900, Mitchell, the last of the old guard, retired by expiration of his term, and three new members constituting a majority of the court, were installed. This date and event marks the finis of the old regime and the dawn of a new judicial epoch in Minnesota. The sharp contrast between the lofty ideals which actuated the old court, and the predominating tendencies of the reorganized court can be gathered from the case of Minneapolis Trust Co. v. Menage reported (1) in 73 Minn. 441; (2) 81 Minn. 186; (3) 86 Minn. 1.

That the accused inserted in said letter a long, garbled and one-sided statement purporting to be a fair history of that case, interspersed with comments laudatory of the first decision of the supreme court in the case, which decision was favorable to the side which had employed the accused as attorney, and derogatory and condemnatory of the two later decisions therein, which were adverse to the interests represented by him, and ended his pretended account of the case with these words:

We do not here and now charge, insinuate, or suggest, that the decisions were prompted by interest, or promise, or hope, or fear. We do submit that on the record, and by the record, the conclusions arrived at and acquiesced in are illogical, illegal, unsupported, and indefensible from any rational standpoint; that from want of understanding, or the abuse of it, the cause has not been judicially considered or determined.

That under "second specification," the accused inserted what purported to be a fair and correct statement of the facts and law involved in the case of Griswold v. McGee, 102 Minn. 114, and in commenting on said decision stated that "You" (referring to the chief justice, to whom the letter was addressed, and the other justices constituting this court) "assigned it," (meaning the property involved) "to one who has no better right to it than the burglar to his plunder. It seems like robbing a widow to reward a fraud, with the court acting as a fence or umpire, watchful and vigilant that the widow get no undue advantage."

That in his discussion of the last decision in the case of Minneapolis Trust Co. v. Menage, the accused insinuates and in effect charges that the decision made by the district judge who tried the case, whose decision was affirmed by this court, knowingly decided the case contrary to the evidence given on the trial. That in his "second specification" he accused the district judge whose decision was affirmed by this court with having decided the case of Griswold v. McGee "without giving the question" presented for settlement "any consideration whatever."

That this letter, though formally addressed to the chief justice of the supreme court, was really intended for publication in newspapers and otherwise, and to create in the minds of the general public distrust in this court and other courts of Minnesota and to lead the general public to believe these courts were corrupt. That to cause the general public to believe the justices of the supreme court could be impeached under the state laws for corrupt acts and that impeachment proceedings were about to be begun, the letter began with this language:

Sir: The organic law creating the tribunal over which you now preside renders its constituent membership immune from civil liability for any erroneous decision officially made, even though it be corrupt. The sole remedy is by impeachment. Preliminary to moving articles, I submit three specifications:

That to cause the general public to believe that grounds for the impeachment of said justices existed and were truthfully stated in this letter, the accused composed and published another letter, addressed to the governor of the state, by name and title, as follows:

December 7, 1907.

Gov. John A. Johnson, Executive Office, Capitol Building, St. Paul, Minn.

Dear Sir:

Enclosed I hand you copy of a letter this day mailed to Hon. Charles M. Start, chief justice of the supreme court of the state. It explains itself. My object in preparing the paper is to present in an orderly manner the character of alleged grievances existing against the court, and to advise the court thereof, that proper inquiry may be made (1) as to whether they are in fact grievances. That is, are the decisions referred to, or any of them, right? (2) If not right, is it possible in the making of them for the court to have been honestly wrong? (3) If not, is such flagrant disregard and violation of the rights of litigants, without warrant of law or any apparent honest purpose or excuse a just cause of impeachment?

It is a serious matter, and, therefore, an important one. I leave it to your good judgment as to what shall, at this time, be done in the premise. Political complications may suggest themselves, but it is not a question of politics. It goes to the integrity and stability of the state if the members of the court cannot be "men learned in the law," as required by the constitution, or honest, as required by good morals, and if there exist good prima facie reasons for challenging them in either regard, the matter should receive prompt attention. Presumptions undoubtedly exist in their favor, but if the cases cited render such presumptions violent and absurd, they should not stand in the way.

The attorney general's office, or the judiciary committee of the house, or both, are your properly constituted legal advisers in this matter. You surely will not act hastily, and as the merits of the charges rest entirely upon what the court itself has said and done, it is not easy for you to act unjustly. If no proper motive for the decisions can be gathered from the decisions themselves, it seems to me that impeachment would be proper, leaving the senate free to make inquiry as to motive outside of the decisions, and I am constrained to think that not a little evidence can be adduced relevant thereto.

Very sincerely yours,

(Signed) Francis B. Hart.

That as the accused well knew at the time he composed and published these letters, no grounds for questioning the honesty and integrity of this court, or of any justice thereof, or for the impeachment of any justice thereof, existed in either of the acts or decisions of the court specified by him. That as he well knew, these letters stated no facts which would justify the taking of any official action thereon by the governor. That these letters were not composed or published with the intent or expectation that official action for the impeachment of said justices would be taken, but were written and published for the purpose and object of creating distrust in all said courts, justices and judges who had decided causes submitted to them adversely to the interests represented by and contentions of the accused. That about December 7, 1907, these letters were furnished by the accused to certain newspapers in the state for publication and general distribution, and after being so furnished the letter addressed to the governor was sent by mail to his office and a carbon copy or duplicate of the letter addressed to the chief justice was sent in the same manner to his office. That the copy so sent to the chief justice was not sent to him for any official or other action thereon, but was so sent for the purpose of insulting the chief justice and the other justices of this court. The accusation prayed for the removal of the accused from his office as attorney at law of the state.

An order having been made that the accused appear before the court and answer the accusation, the chief justice addressed a letter to the governor stating that the justices "deem themselves disqualified within the meaning of section 3, article 6, of the state constitution, to hear and determine" the matter, and requested him to assign five judges of the district court to sit in their place. Thereupon the governor appointed the five judges named in the footnote on page 108 to constitute a special supreme court to hear and determine this proceeding.

On the return day of the order the accused filed objections to the accusation on the grounds that the facts stated did not warrant the relief asked, and it affirmatively appeared from the accusation that the accused observed the obligations of his official oath as an attorney and rendered full obedience to all requirements imposed on him by the statutes of the state. These objections having been overruled the accused entered an oral plea of "not guilty." A referee was appointed to take and report the testimony, and after he had made his report, the matter was argued before the special court.

SYLLABUS

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