State by Beaulieu v. City of Mounds View

• Citation: 518 N.W.2d 567
• Decision Date: 30 June 1994
• Docket Number: No. C3-92-1780,C3-92-1780
• Parties: STATE of Minnesota, by David BEAULIEU, Commissioner, Department of Human Rights, Respondent, v. CITY OF MOUNDS VIEW, Minnesota, et al., petitioners, Appellants.
• Court: Supreme Court of Minnesota (US)

Page 567

518 N.W.2d 567

STATE of Minnesota, by David BEAULIEU, Commissioner Department of Human Rights, Respondent, v. CITY OF MOUNDS VIEW, Minnesota, et al., petitioners, Appellants.

No. C3-92-1780.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

June 30, 1994.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Police officers may assert official immunity as a defense to a lawsuit under the Minnesota Human Rights Act, Minn.Stat. Sec. 363.03, subd. 4 (1990), alleging officers' execution of felony stop was discriminatory. The official immunity doctrine does not protect officers who commit a willful or malicious wrong.

2. Petitioners' motion for summary judgment was properly denied because there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether investigatory stop constituted a willful Mary A. Rice, David J. Hoekstra, St. Paul, for relator.

or malicious violation of complainant's rights.

Hubert H. Humphrey, III, Atty. Gen., Richard L. Varco, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., St. Paul, for respondent.

Carla J. Heyl, League of Minnesota Cities, Shoreview, for amicus curiae.

Heard, considered and decided by the court en banc.

OPINION

TOMLJANOVICH, Justice.

We are asked to decide whether the defense of official immunity is available to police officers sued for racial discrimination under the Minnesota Human Rights Act, Minn.Stat. Sec. 363.03, subd. 4(1) (1990), and if the defense is available, whether petitioners were properly denied summary judgment. ¹ The court of appeals held that the official immunity doctrine does not apply to a claim asserted under the Human Rights Act and affirmed the administrative law judge's order denying summary judgment. We reverse in part, affirm in part, and remand for further proceedings.

The case arises out of an investigatory stop of Lateesa Agunbiade and her 13-year-old son, Adewale Agunbiade, who are African American, by three Mounds View police officers. On October 19, 1989, police officers Jack Chambers, Larry Siluk, and Lieutenant David Brick received a police dispatch that an armed robbery had just occurred at the VFW post on Pleasant View Drive in Spring Lake Park. The dispatch described the suspect as a black male wearing black clothing and a shiny black shirt. The dispatch reported that the suspect had left on foot with the direction of travel unknown. ²

All three officers responded to the dispatch. Officers Chambers and Siluk responded by driving northwest on Highway 10 toward the VFW post in an unmarked car. Lieutenant Brick responded by driving northwest on Highway 10 in a marked car. Brick was some distance behind Siluk and Chambers. The officers intended to cut off possible escape routes the suspect may have taken from the VFW. Siluk and Chambers were to proceed from Highway 10 to County Road I en route to the VFW. Brick was to proceed west on Highway 10 instead of turning onto County Road I.

At the intersection of Highway 10 and County Road I, Chambers and Siluk pulled into the left-hand lane to turn onto County Road I. While waiting for the stop light to change they observed a light-colored car with two occupants traveling eastbound on County Road I come to a stop at the intersection. The officers observed that the passenger was a black male with short-cropped hair wearing a dark colored shirt or sweater. The officers observed that the driver was black, but could not determine the driver's gender or any other physical characteristics. The car was in fact being driven by Lateesa Agunbiade and the passenger was her 13-year-old son, Adewale Agunbiade.

The officers made a U-turn to follow the Agunbiades and radioed Officer Brick that they were pursuing a possible suspect. When Brick reached the intersection of County Road I and Highway 10, he made a U-turn and joined the pursuit. According to Siluk and Chambers, as they followed the Agunbiades' car, they noticed the following: (1) the car was traveling a high rate of speed and faster than the flow of traffic; (2) the car appeared to be weaving in and out of traffic, sometimes without making proper turn signals; and (3) the passenger turned around to do something in the back seat. Brick, who was in the marked car, stopped the vehicle.

Lateesa and Adewale Agunbiade dispute the officers' description of these events. Lateesa Agunbiade asserts that she was not speeding and that she properly changed lanes once or twice, using appropriate turn signals. Adewale Agunbiade asserts that he did not turn around to look in the backseat of the car until he heard Brick's siren, just before the car was stopped.

Brick ultimately stopped the Agunbiades at the intersection of Highway 694 and Snelling Ave. The officers executed standard felony stop procedures. Brick pulled behind the vehicle, and Siluk and Chambers pulled in front. Brick exited his car, drew his weapon, and ordered the Agunbiades to place their hands on the windshield. Brick then ordered the driver, Lateesa Agunbiade, out of the car. Brick next ordered the passenger, Adewale, out of the car and frisked him for a weapon.

During the stop, the officers identified the driver of the vehicle as Lateesa Agunbiade and the passenger as her son. The Agunbiades were informed that they had been stopped in part because the suspect had been seen leaving the VFW post in a gray car, even though the officers did not in fact have knowledge that a car was used in the robbery. After telling the Agunbiades why they had been stopped, the officers determined that they were not suspects and released them. The Agunbiades were detained for approximately 15 minutes before they were released.

On March 26, 1990, Lateesa Agunbiade, on behalf of herself and her son, filed a charge of racial discrimination against the Mounds View Police Department with the Department of Human Rights ("the department"). On March 14, 1991, the department found probable cause to believe that defendants (the City of Mounds View, Chambers and Siluk), had committed an unfair discriminatory practice by denying the Agunbiades full utilization or benefit from a public service on account of their race. ³ The department filed a formal complaint against appellants on January 17, 1992. Prior to administrative hearing, defendants filed a prehearing brief asserting that the department's action was barred by the doctrines of qualified and official immunity. Treating the immunity arguments raised as a motion for summary judgment, the Administrative Law Judge concluded that an action brought against police officers under the Human Rights Act is not barred by qualified or official immunity. Defendants appealed the ALJ's ruling on the inapplicability of official immunity. ⁴ The court of appeals affirmed the ALJ's conclusion that official immunity did not apply to a claim brought under the Human Rights Act. State by Beaulieu v. City of Mounds View, 498 N.W.2d 503. This appeal followed.

I.

At issue is whether the common law doctrine of official immunity applies to an action under the Minnesota Human Rights Act against police officers for alleged racial discrimination in stopping people suspected of criminal wrongdoing. The doctrine of official immunity "provides that 'a public official charged by law with duties which call for the exercise of his judgment or discretion is not personally liable to an individual for damages unless he is guilty of a willful or malicious wrong.' " Elwood v. Rice County, 423 N.W.2d 671, 677 (Minn.1988) (quoting Susla v. State, 311 Minn. 166, 175, 247 N.W.2d 907, 912 (1976)). The purpose of official immunity is to protect "public officials from the fear of personal liability that might deter independent action and impair effective performance of their duties. Id. at 678.

We have recognized that generally the duties of police officers call for the exercise of significant judgment and discretion. See Pletan v. Gaines, 494 N.W.2d 38, 41 (Minn.1992); Elwood, 423 N.W.2d at 678-79. Official immunity is provided to police officers because "the community cannot expect its police officers to do their duty and then to second-guess them when they attempt conscientiously to do it." Pletan, 494 N.W.2d at 41. In Pletan, we held the decision to engage in and to continue a high-speed chase of a criminal suspect is protected by official immunity. We noted that the decision to engage in a car chase had to be reached "under emergency conditions with little time for reflection and often on the basis of incomplete and confusing information." Id.

In this case, police officers engaged in an investigatory stop of persons suspected of having committed an armed robbery only minutes before. The decision to stop and detain an armed robbery suspect, like the decision to engage in a high-speed car chase, requires a significant degree of independent judgment and discretion. The officers were required to weigh a multitude of factors requiring the exercise of their judgment and discretion under trying circumstances.

This is apparently the first time in which official immunity has been invoked as a defense to a discrimination claim brought under the public service provision of the Minnesota Human Rights Act, Minn.Stat. Sec. 363.03, subd. 4. ⁵ The department argues that official immunity is limited to common law tort claims.

This court has not heretofore distinguished between common law and statutory causes of action in applying official immunity, but rather, has broadly defined official immunity to apply to any claim against public officials involving personal liability "for damages." Moreover, this court has long followed the presumption that statutory enactments are consistent with common law doctrines. Wirig v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 461 N.W.2d 374, 377 (Minn.1990). If a statutory enactment is to abrogate common law, the abrogation must be by express wording or necessary implication. Id. at 378. ⁶ It is apparent that nothing in the Human Rights Act expressly disallows official immunity as a defense to a claim brought under the act. We focus our attention on whether the act...