State by Humphrey v. Byers

• Decision Date: 02 April 1996
• Docket Number: No. C9-95-1782,C9-95-1782
• Citation: 545 N.W.2d 669
• Parties: STATE of Minnesota, by Hubert H. HUMPHREY, III, its Attorney General, Petitioner, Respondent, v. Hilda BYERS, et al., Appellants, Richard Byers, et al., Lower Court Respondents.
• Court: Minnesota Court of Appeals

Page 669

545 N.W.2d 669

STATE of Minnesota, by Hubert H. HUMPHREY, III, its Attorney General, Petitioner, Respondent, v. Hilda BYERS, et al., Appellants Richard Byers, et al., Lower Court Respondents.

No. C9-95-1782.

Court of Appeals of Minnesota.

April 2, 1996.

Syllabus by the Court

1. The drainage exception to Minn.Stat. Chapter 117 (1994) does not limit the authority of condemning bodies. The exception merely allows drainage authorities to proceed in the acquisition of property under the procedures provided for in the Drainage Act, Minn.Stat. Chapter 103E (1994).

2. The Drainage Act does not limit authority of the state to condemn property where a drainage system is affected unless the Drainage Board has made an order pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 103E.075, subd. 3 (1994).

3. The Commissioner of Transportation's determination that condemnation of a drainage easement in order to compensate landowner for flooding damage to her property caused by the replacement of a culvert under a trunk highway to serve a drainage ditch was not arbitrary and capricious.

Appeal from District Court, Cottonwood County; Linda S. Titus, Judge.

Hubert H. Humphrey, III, Attorney General, Cassandra O. O'Hern, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul, for respondent.

Gerald W. Von Korff, Rinke-Noonan, St. Cloud, for appellants.

Considered and decided by DAVIES, P.J., and PARKER and SCHUMACHER, JJ.

OPINION

PARKER, Judge.

An assessed landowner, Hilda Byers, appeals from a district court order granting to the Department of Transportation a drainage easement over a portion of her property. We affirm.

FACTS

The state petitioned the district court to acquire from appellant a drainage easement over 43.96 acres in perpetuity. Parcel 329, upon which the easement is sought, is located near the intersection of Trunk Highway Route 92, renumbered 30 ("T.H.30") and County Ditch No. 42 (the ditch). In 1964, the Minnesota Department of Transportation (MnDOT) reconstructed T.H. 30's crossing over the ditch, replacing a double box culvert with a concrete pipe culvert in the process. The new culvert was about half the size of the culvert in place before reconstruction. Subsequently, water backed up at the culvert and flooded appellant's property. The state paid Byers for crop damages sustained in 1965, 1966, 1984, and 1993.

In December 1993, appellant formally petitioned the County Drainage Authority to remove, or cause MnDOT to remove, the "obstruction" to the drainage system created when MnDOT installed the smaller culvert. The County Drainage Authority, however, has repeatedly voted to take no action. ¹

MnDOT determined that it would be more economical to obtain a drainage easement than either to reconstruct T.H. 30's passage over the ditch or to continue paying crop damages to appellant. Accordingly, the Commissioner of Transportation determined that acquisition of a drainage easement was necessary to the construction and maintenance of T.H. 30. MnDOT was unable to negotiate a purchase with appellant, and the instant proceeding in eminent domain was commenced. At trial, appellant disputed the Commissioner's determination that the easement was necessary to the construction and maintenance of T.H. 30. Appellant argued that the easement was sought merely to avoid MnDOT's alleged obligations under the Drainage Act, Minn.Stat. §§ 103E.005-.811 to restore the capacity of the ditch, and thus was neither necessary nor for a public highway purpose.

The trial court found, however, that MnDOT could have obtained easements when it reconstructed T.H. 30 had it anticipated flooding, and hence could obtain an easement after the flooding had occurred. The district court found acquisition of the easement necessary to a public highway purpose because it would allow T.H. 30 to remain undisturbed.

Appellant contends that the underlying issue in this case is one of drainage rather than eminent domain law. Appellant argues that MnDOT obstructed the ditch when it reconstructed T.H. 30 in 1964 and that the Cottonwood County Drainage Authority was the proper forum to adjudicate the underlying drainage issue. Appellant concludes that MnDOT seeks to circumvent its obligations under the Drainage Code by condemning this easement rather than reconstructing T.H. 30 to restore its original capacity.

ISSUES

I. Does the drainage exception to Minn.Stat. Chapter 117 preclude MnDOT from exercising its condemnation power where a drainage system is affected?

II. Does the Drainage Act operate to vest exclusive jurisdiction over drainage matters in drainage authorities?

III. Does the Drainage Act impose a duty upon MnDOT to await decision by a drainage authority before taking action potentially subject to the drainage authority's jurisdiction?

IV. Was condemnation of appellant's property necessary and for a public purpose?

DISCUSSION

Standard of Review

On appeal, this court may reverse the decision of the agency if its decision is "in

                excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the agency."   Frost-Benco Elec. Ass'n v. Minnesota Pub. Utils.  Comm'n, 358 N.W.2d 639, 642 (Minn.1984);  Minn.Stat. § 14.69(b) (1994).  Public purpose and necessity are treated as questions of fact for the trial court and will not be reversed unless clearly erroneous.   State v. Ohman, 263 Minn. 115, 120 116 N.W.2d 101, 104 (1962)
                

I.

Minn.Stat. Chapter 117 governs the procedure by which state agencies (and other condemnors) exercise the power of eminent domain. Minn.Stat. § 117.011 expressly excludes acquisition of property for drainage system purposes. Id. The Drainage Act comprehensively regulates the creation, maintenance, and abandonment of drainage systems. See generally, Minn.Stat. §§ 103E.005-.811. Appellant argues that the drainage exception to Chapter 117 "means that establishment, construction, maintenance and repair of drainage systems is governed exclusively by [the Drainage Act]."

Minn.Stat. § 117.011 provides, in relevant part:

All bodies, public or private, who have the right of eminent domain, when exercising the right, shall do so in the manner prescribed by this chapter, even though a different procedure may be provided by charter provisions, ordinance or statute, but nothing herein shall apply to the taking of property under laws relating to drainage or to town roads when those laws themselves expressly provide for the taking and specifically prescribe the procedure.

The plain intent of the section is to prescribe, as far as practicable, a single procedure for the exercise of the condemnation power by bodies vested with the right of eminent domain. The drainage exception merely recognizes that special considerations attendant to establishing and maintaining drainage systems necessitate a different procedure. Thus, acquisition of interests in property by drainage authorities is governed by the Drainage Act, rather than Minn.Stat. Chapter 117. The drainage exception itself does not limit the authority, or the manner, in which other bodies exercise the condemnation power.

II.

Appellant argues the legislature intended the Drainage Act to govern all issues arising from the creation, life, and abandonment of a drainage system. The Drainage Act, in fact, sets out the powers and duties of Drainage Authorities and the procedure for creating and maintaining drainage systems, accounting for and distributing the costs of drainage systems, the rights and obligations of landowners whose property is part of a drainage system, and the procedure for removing property from a drainage system. See generally Minn.Stat. §§ 103E.005-.811. It does not follow, however, that the Drainage Act operates to constrain the authority of MnDOT, or the jurisdiction of the District Court.

When a drainage system is established, the drainage authority acquires jurisdiction over its constituent property, and landowners recovering damages or incurring assessments acquire property rights in the ditch system. Fischer v. Town of Albin, 258 Minn. 154, 156, 104 N.W.2d 32, 34 (Minn.1960) (citing Petition of Jacobson re County Ditch No. 24, 234 Minn. 296, 299, 48 N.W.2d 441, 444 (1951)). The alleged obstruction created by the 1964 reconstruction of T.H. 30 may affect the capacity, or maintenance costs, for the entire system. Indeed, if the alleged obstruction to T.H. 30 reduces the capacity of the system, condemnation of a drainage easement may affect the interests of other landowners in the system. ² For these reasons, appellant asserts the Cottonwood Drainage Authority, rather than the district court, is the appropriate forum to resolve this matter.

Property interests in a ditch system, like all property interests, may not be infringed without due process of law. Fischer The Minnesota Supreme Court has observed that "not all condemnors enjoy equal powers of eminent domain." Matter of the Commr's Order Denying Permit Application 93-1024, 527 N.W.2d 173, 176 (Minn.App.1995), review denied (Minn. Apr. 27, 1995) (citing State v. Christopher, 284 Minn. 233, 238, 170 N.W.2d 95, 96 (1969)). Rather, there is a hierarchy of entities, with the state at the top. Id. A drainage system may pass over a number of landowners' estates and even county lines. MnDOT, however, must balance concerns of statewide magnitude. Indeed, MnDOT exercises the power of the sovereign in highway matters. Christopher, 284 Minn. at 241, 170 N.W.2d at 99. The power of lesser subdivisions, such as a drainage authority, may not be equated with the power of the sovereign, as exercised by MnDOT. Id. the interest of the Cottonwood County Drainage Authority does not preclude MnDOT's exercise of its condemnation power. Similarly, the mere possibility that other landowners' interests in the drainage system may be affected also does not preclude exercise of MnDOT's eminent domain authority. Affected landowners may intervene in the condemnation proceeding, or commence a proceeding in inverse condemnation. In the present case, it appears that...