State Carolina v. Adams
| Decision Date | 17 May 2011 |
| Docket Number | NO. COA10-1363,COA10-1363 |
| Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
| Parties | STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. VONZEIL ADAMS |
An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Pitt County Nos. 05 CRS 53713 05 CRS 5889
Appeal by Defendant from judgments entered 6 April 2010 by Judge Clifton W. Everett, Jr. in Pitt County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 13 April 2011.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Mary Carla Hollis, for the State.
Geoffrey W. Hosford for Defendant-appellant.
Vonzeil Adams ("Defendant") appeals her convictions of one count of voluntary manslaughter, three counts of discharging a firearm into occupied property, and one count of assault with a deadly weapon. After careful review, we find no error.
A Pitt County Grand Jury indicted Defendant for first-degree murder, three counts of discharging a firearm intooccupied property, and fourteen counts of assault with a deadly weapon against fourteen separate victims. After a jury trial, the jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict. The trial court declared a mistrial. This appeal concerns Defendant's second trial, at which she was convicted by a jury of multiple offenses.
Defendant entered a not guilty plea as to all charges and filed several pre-trial motions in limine. Defendant moved to dismiss the criminal indictments. She also moved to exclude prospective ballistics testimony by Agent Beth Starosta-Desmond of the North Carolina State Bureau of Investigation ("SBI"). The trial court denied both of Defendant's motions. Agent Starosta-Desmond later testified over Defendant's objection.
This matter came on for trial on 22 March 2010. The State's evidence tended to show the following. During the afternoon of 19 April 2005, Loretta Strong and several of her female cousins and friends (collectively, the "Haddock girls") were socializing in a vacant lot across the street from the home of Strong's grandmother, Lossie Haddock. Defendant drove by the lot with a group of her girlfriends. A verbal altercation arose between the two groups of women. Defendant was angry with the Haddock girls because Defendant's sister had complained to Defendant that the Haddock girls had assaulted the sister in thepresence of Defendant's children. During the exchange, Defendant said she would return and that she had "something" for the Haddock girls.
Later that afternoon, some of the Haddock girls drove by Defendant's house where another verbal altercation occurred. The Haddock girls returned to and congregated on Lossie Haddock's porch.
Around 6:00 p.m. or 7:00 p.m., Defendant traveled to Lossie Haddock's house in a reddish Chevrolet Caprice driven by her boyfriend, Jemaul Green. Defendant's sister and several girlfriends were in the car as well. A car full of Defendant's girlfriends followed shortly behind. Jemaul parked the car across from Lossie Haddock's house. Defendant exited the vehicle and walked toward the house, exchanging words with the women on the porch. The other women exited the vehicle, but stayed behind Defendant. Strong stepped off the porch and began to approach Defendant, but stopped before she reached the street.
Defendant stopped in the middle of the road. She then exclaimed that someone should get a firearm and shoot the Haddock girls. At trial, witnesses testified that they heard her say various things to this effect: ; "get the gun and shoot"; "F-it, get the gun"; "shoot thembitches"; and "shoot that bitch." Jemaul exited the vehicle and fired a gun into the air. Jemaul then pointed the gun in the direction of Lossie Haddock's house and fired several shots. Jasmine Cox, who was on the porch, began running into the house after she saw Jemaul point the gun in the air. She was the first person to get into the house, and testified that, after she got in, she heard more gunfire following the first shots.
Ten-year-old Christopher Foggs, who had been playing in the area, was found face down next to the Haddock house. When he was turned over, a gunshot wound to his chest was discovered. He died from the wound at the hospital later that evening. At trial, a forensic pathologist testified that a bullet projectile entered Foggs' chest and exited through his back. The bullet projectile was not recovered. The record indicates no one else was shot.
Four bullet holes were discovered in the exterior of the Haddock house. An additional bullet hole was discovered in a vehicle parked in front of the house. Bullet fragments were discovered near the vehicle, in the eave of the house, on the right side of the house, on the porch, and near the walkway leading to the house. Eight spent nine-millimeter shell casings were found near where the Caprice was parked during theshooting. Law enforcement searched the Caprice, but did not find a firearm.
Agent Starosta-Desmond testified the spent shell casings were consistent with having been fired from the same Hi-Point nine-millimeter handgun. She also testified that the bullet fragments found in the eave of the house and the one found by the walkway were fired from a nine-millimeter Hi-Point, but that the bullets were too badly damaged to determine if they were fired from the same weapon. Because the gun was never discovered, she could not offer any testimony concerning a potential match between the bullet fragments and a particular firearm.
Defendant moved to dismiss all charges for lack of evidentiary support at the close of the State's evidence. That motion was denied.
Defendant offered evidence in her defense. Two codefendants, Tashua Hardy and Ebony Green, testified at trial. They stated Defendant did not direct Jemaul to shoot. Tashua testified that no one knew Jemaul had a gun, that no one told him to take a gun, and that they did not plan to shoot anyone. She also testified Jemaul was the only person shooting that day.
When called to testify, Jemaul invoked his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. The trial court admitted histestimony from the earlier trial without objection from the State. At the previous trial, Jemaul testified that, on the day of the shooting, Defendant called him repeatedly, told him she was upset, and informed him he needed to come to her house. At the time, Jemaul suspected Defendant was carrying his child. Jemaul explained that he took his gun, a nine-millimeter, for his own safety.
Jemaul also testified that Defendant knew the gun was in the car before the shooting occurred and that he heard Defendant and another girl say, "[S]hoot that bitch," referring to Strong. However, he explained that Defendant's statement was not the reason he fired his weapon. Rather, Jemaul testified that he did so in response to what he thought was gunfire. According to Jemaul, he saw a man lurking in the yard with a gun, and the two exchanged fire. He also testified that, after he fired at the man, Defendant grabbed the gun and fired two or three times at the Haddock house.1
Defendant admitted being angry with and wanting to fight the Haddock girls. She denied stating that she "had something for" the girls during the first encounter. However, she admitted to testifying during her first trial that she had madesuch a statement. Defendant denied that she asked Jemaul to do anything about the Haddock girls and testified that she did not know he had the gun with him. She testified she was so focused on Strong that she did not hear the gunfire at first. Defendant denied that she or anybody else told Jemaul to shoot.
At the close of all evidence, Defendant again moved to dismiss all charges. The trial court dismissed one charge of assault with a deadly weapon and denied the motion as to all remaining charges. The jury found Defendant guilty, under an aiding-and-abetting theory, of one count of voluntary manslaughter, three counts of discharging a firearm into occupied property, and one count of assault with a deadly weapon. The trial court consolidated two of the discharging a firearm into occupied property convictions and sentenced Defendant to consecutive terms of 64 months to 86 months in prison for voluntary manslaughter, 24 months to 38 months in prison for one count of discharging a firearm into occupied property, 24 months to 38 months in prison for the two consolidated discharging a firearm into occupied property convictions, and 150 days in prison for assault with a deadly weapon. Defendant gave timely notice of appeal.
We have jurisdiction over Defendant's appeal of right. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1444(a) (2009) (); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-27(b) (2009) ().
Defendant argues the trial court erred in failing to grant her motions to dismiss all charges at the close of the State's evidence and at the close of all evidence. We disagree.
When a trial court is presented with a motion to dismiss, it must determine whether the State has presented substantial evidence of each element of the crime charged and of the defendant being the perpetrator of the offense. State v. Olson, 330 N.C. 557, 564, 411 S.E.2d 592, 595 (1992).
What constitutes substantial evidence is a question of law for the court. To be "substantial," evidence must be existing and real, not just "seeming or imaginary." Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the trial court must examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the...
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