State, City of Falcon Heights v. Pazderski
| Citation | 352 N.W.2d 85 |
| Decision Date | 24 July 1984 |
| Docket Number | No. CX-83-1624,CX-83-1624 |
| Parties | STATE of Minnesota, CITY OF FALCON HEIGHTS, Respondent, v. Ronald Raymond PAZDERSKI, Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Minnesota |
Syllabus by the Court
Where appellant was found sleeping in the front seat of his properly parked car in his own driveway, and where appellant had been sleeping there for three hours with the keys out of the ignition without any sign the car was being operated, and without any indication it was intended to be operated, appellant was not in physical control of the automobile while under the influence of alcohol.
Hubert H. Humphrey, III, Atty. Gen., St. Paul, Jerome P. Filla, White Bear Lake, for respondent.
James Ostgard, St. Paul, for appellant.
Considered and decided by POPOVICH, C.J., and NIERENGARTEN and RANDALL, JJ., with oral argument waived.
Ronald Pazderski appeals his conviction under Minn.Stat. § 169.121, subd. 1 (Supp.1983) for being in physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. He contends that he was not in physical control of a vehicle when he was found sleeping in the front seat of his parked car in his driveway with the keys out of the ignition. We reverse.
Appellant lived with his girlfriend in Falcon Heights, Minnesota. Following a domestic quarrel the night of May 4, 1983, appellant drove to two neighborhood taverns and had some drinks. He returned home around midnight, and parked the car on the apron of a parking area adjacent to their detached garage. This was the normal place for appellant to park his car. Appellant's girlfriend corroborated his testimony that his car was parked properly and in the place where he would normally park for the night.
Appellant got out of his car, walked to the back door of the house, and took a couple of steps inside with the intention of going to sleep. As he was a few steps inside his home, he thought it best for him to avoid a potential argument with his girlfriend and decided to go back outside and sleep in his car that night. He locked the back door (including the dead bolt) to the house, returned to his car, stretched out on the front seat and fell asleep.
A few hours later, appellant's girlfriend awoke. From a window she saw appellant's car but since she did not see appellant she became concerned and called the police. At approximately 3:00 a.m. an officer arrived in response to a report of a suspicious vehicle. He found appellant sleeping in the front seat, sitting in the driver's side with his head over towards the passenger side. The car was not running, and the keys were not in the ignition. There was no evidence that the car had been driven recently. Further, no facts in the record supported any inference other than that appellant had been soundly sleeping and had the intention of sleeping the rest of the night there as he claimed. Appellant testified that he had previous experience sleeping nights in his car during hunting trips. The officer woke appellant and after making the usual observations (unsteady walk, bloodshot eyes, strong odor of alcohol on his breath), arrested appellant for being in physical control of a vehicle while under the influence pursuant to M.S. 169.121 Subd. 1(d).
The parties stipulated that a subsequent breath test obtained a reading of .17 percent blood alcohol concentration and appellant waived his right to a jury trial.
Did appellant have physical control of a motor vehicle within the meaning of Minn.Stat. § 169.121, subd. 1.
It is settled that our laws prohibiting a person from driving while intoxicated are liberally interpreted in favor of the public interest and against the private interest of the driver involved. State, Dept. of Public Safety v. Juncewski, 308 N.W.2d 316, 319 (Minn.1981). The 1978 deletion of the adjective "actual" from the requirement that a driver be in "actual physical control" is evidence the legislature intended a broad interpretation of Minn.Stat. § 169.121, subd. 1. Id.
Minn.Stat. § 169.121, subd. 1 applies to physical control of motor vehicles on private property. Schafer v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 348 N.W.2d 365 (Minn.Ct.App.1984). Thus the only question here is whether appellant, by getting back in his car to sleep, was in physical control of his car within the meaning of the statute.
In examining the record, it is important to keep in mind that the case before us involves a criminal conviction for a violation of Minn.Stat. § 169.121, subd. 1, "drunken driving," and the standard of proof in misdemeanor cases is proof beyond a reasonable doubt. This case does not come before us involving Minn.Stat. § 169.123 (1982), "implied consent," which is a civil and remedial statute with the lesser burden of proof on the state of "a fair preponderance of the evidence." Although the phrase "in physical control of a motor vehicle" is the same in both statutes, the burden of proof the state must carry is greater for the charge of drunken driving.
Appellant was initially charged and went to trial on Minn.Stat. 169.121, subd. 1(a) () and Minn.Stat. 169.121, subd. 1(d) (). The trial court record is unclear about whether appellant was convicted under subdivision 1(a) or (d). The parties had stipulated that the breath test had been legally administered and resulted in a reading of .17. The proof at trial logically dictated a finding of guilty under subdivision 1(d), yet the trial court's findings stated "the court hereby finds the defendant guilty of being in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence" without specifying subdivision 1(a) or 1(d). Although the words used by the trial court fit more closely with 1(a), the proof fits more closely with 1(d). However, the subdivision is unimportant to our decision because the parties stipulated the only issue for determination is whether the defendant is guilty of being in physical control of the motor vehicle within the meaning of the statute.
We discussed the physical control requirement in State v. Thurmer, 348 N.W.2d 776, 778-79 (Minn.Ct.App.1984). In Thurmer, the defendant's car was in a snow-filled ditch off a county road. The keys were in the ignition, the defendant was found asleep and the defendant said he drove the car there. In analyzing relevant case law, we determined that the evidence in Thurmer supported the conclusion that defendant was in physical control of the car.
The purpose behind Minn.Stat. § 169.121, subd. 1 is to deter drunken individuals from "getting into their vehicles except as passengers." (emphasis added). Id. at 778; Juncewski, 308 N.W.2d at 320. We must determine whether the policy concerns of Minn.Stat. § 169.121, subd. 1 are served by finding the appellant was in physical control of his car within the meaning of the statute. In Juncewski, defendant was found slumped over the steering wheel. The vehicle...
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Guimont v. Comm'r Safety
...did not possess probable cause to believe that he maintained physical control over the vehicle. State, City of Falcon Heights v. Pazderski, 352 N.W.2d 85, 88 (Minn. App. 1984). We are not persuaded, for several reasons. The location of the keys is not dispositive to the issue of whether the......
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