State Comp. Ins. Fund v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd.
Decision Date | 27 June 1977 |
Citation | 71 Cal.App.3d 133,139 Cal.Rptr. 410 |
Parties | STATE COMPENSATION INSURANCE FUND, Petitioner, v. WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD of the State of California and Edward J. Silva, Respondents. Civ. 40411. |
Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
James J. Vonk, George S. Bjornsen, Arthur Hershenson, Frank Evans, San Francisco, for petitioner.
Airola & Ringgold, Lowell A. Airola, San Francisco, for respondent Edward J. Silva.
A writ of review was issued in this case, on the petition of the insurer, for the purpose of inquiring into and determining the lawfulness of an opinion and order after reconsideration of the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board, sitting en banc, three commissioners dissenting. The opinion affirmed and adopted as its decision after reconsideration, an order filed April 16, 1976, granting an employee-applicant, injured prior to January 1, 1976, the right to designate a physician under the provisions of section 4600 of the Labor Code, which became effective as of that date. 1 The petitioner contends that the amendments to the statute affected substantive rights and cannot be retroactively applied to a prior injury, and that the construction given the amendments by the appeals board should not be allowed because it may disrupt existing compatible physician-client relationships. We reject these contentions; the amendments affect to substantive rights. The opinion and order of the appeals board must be affirmed.
The applicant, an employee of the Oakland Unified School District, was injured on January 22, 1975 in the course of his duties as a schoolteacher. In addition to receiving treatment for his physical injuries, the applicant consulted a psychiatrist for attendant emotional problems. Several months after the incident, when first notified of the psychiatric treatment, petitioner arranged for the applicant to be examined by another psychiatrist. Upon his recommendation that the applicant's treatment be changed, petitioner arranged for the employee to be treated by a psychiatrist it had chosen, and on July 3, 1975, petitioner informed the applicant that it would not pay for any further treatments by the psychiatrist he had been consulting. After receiving some treatment from the psychiatrist selected by petitioner, the applicant on January 5, 1976, petitioned the board to be allowed to continue treatment with his own physician. Before a hearing was held on that petition, the applicant on February 19, 1976, gave notice of his choice of physician. The insurer refused to recognize his right to do so, and on March 4, 1976, he filed his petition to confirm his right to designate his own physician pursuant to section 4600 and an administrative rule, rule 9783, adopted by the administrative director January 22, 1976. The order under review resulted.
It is established that '(s)ince the industrial injury is the basis for any compensation award, the law in force at the time of injury is to be taken as the measure of the injured person's right of recovery.'
In Charlesworth, supra, the court reviewed a change in the law which modified a prior restriction on the award of both temporary and permanent disability payments. It added: (30 Cal.2d at p. 392, 182 P.2d at p. 161.) The decision continues: (Id., at pp. 392-- 393, 182 p.2D at p. 161. seE also maNnheim v. Superior Court (1970) 3 Cal.3d 678, 686, 91 Cal.Rptr. 585, 478 P.2d 17; DiGenova v. State Board of Education (1962) 57 Cal.2d 167, 172--173, 18 Cal.Rptr. 369, 367 P.2d 865; State of California v. Ind. Acc. Com., supra, 48 Cal.2d 355, 361, 310 P.2d 1; Harrison v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd., supra, 44 Cal.App.3d 197, 204, 118 Cal.Rptr. 508; and Coast Bank v. Holmes (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 581, 594, 97 Cal.Rptr. 30.)
Acknowledgedly the medical, surgical, chiropractic and hospital treatment to be provided by the employer or his insured are benefits under the act. In Union Iron Wks. v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1922) 190 Cal. 33, 210 P. 410, the court noted, after referring to disability payments paid in lieu of wages, In McCoy the court referred to 'the mandate of section 4600 according him (the employer) The right to control the employee's medical care . . ..' (64 Cal.2d at p. 89, 48 Cal.Rptr. at p. 862, 410 P.2d at p. 366, emphasis added.) In Zeeb, the court explained the rationale for the control vested in the employer prior to January 1, 1976, as follows: (67 Cal.2d at p. 501, 62 Cal.Rptr. at p. 756, 432 P.2d at p. 364.)
From the foregoing the insurer, and the dissenting minority of the appeals board, conclude, as stated by the latter: 'It is abundantly clear that the Supreme Court has interpreted the right of medical control under Labor Code section 4600 prior to the 1975 amendment to be a substantive one.' We disagree. In McCoy the court carefully distinguished between the medical benefits due from the employer to the employee and the manner in which they were to be furnished, as follows: (64 Cal.2d at p. 86, 48 Cal.Rptr. at p. 861, 410 P.2d at p. 365, emphasis added.) It also referred to the employer's 'opportunity to render medical assistance.' (Id., at p. 87, 48 Cal.Rptr. 858, 410 P.2d 362, emphasis added.)
The rationale of Zeeb, which is quoted above, does not bear analysis. If there is unnecessary and extravagent treatment the employer or his insurer should not bear the cost of such treatment. As stated in McCoy and recognized in Zeeb, 'And we emphasize also that, whether the treatment is administered by a doctor chosen by the employee or one selected by the employer, the latter is liable for no more than the reasonable cost of such treatment as is reasonably required to cure or relieve from the effects of the injury.'
The Legislature has neither increased nor decreased the cost of the medical benefits due from the employer to the employee. It has rejected the rationale of Zeeb, and changed the procedure under which the benefits will be furnished. As a matter of policy it has recognized that the employee may secure a speedier and more efficient recovery under the care of a physician of his own selection in whom he has trust and confidence. We can no more assume that...
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