State Compensation Ins. Fund v. Walter

• Decision Date: 08 August 1960
• Docket Number: No. 19245,19245
• Citation: 354 P.2d 591,143 Colo. 549
• Parties: STATE COMPENSATION INSURANCE FUND, Plaintiff in Error, v. Harry W. WALTER and Industrial Commission of Colorado, Defendants in Error.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Page 591

354 P.2d 591

143 Colo. 549

STATE COMPENSATION INSURANCE FUND, Plaintiff in Error, v. Harry W. WALTER and Industrial Commission of Colorado,

Defendants in Error.

No. 19245.

Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc.

Aug. 8, 1960.

Harold Clark Thompson, Louis Schiff, Alious Rockett, Fred B. Dudley, Denver, for plaintiff in error.

Duke W. Dunbar, Atty. Gen., Frank E. Hickey, Deputy Atty. Gen., Peter L. Dye, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendants in error.

MOORE, Justice.

Harry W. Walter, to whom we will refer as claimant, was awarded workmen's compensation for injuries sustained under the circumstances hereinafter set forth. The insurance carrier, to whom we will refer as the Fund, brought this action in the district court of the City and County of Denver to review the order of the Industrial Commission awarding compensation to claimant. The district court upheld the award and the Fund is here on writ of error directed to that judgment.

As grounds for reversal counsel for the Fund argue that claimant was not performing a service for his employer at the time of the accident and for that reason the injuries were not caused by an accident 'arising out of and in the course of his employment.' It is also contended that the findings of the Commission are insufficient to support the award.

The supplemental award and final findings made by the Commission are, in pertinent part, as follows:

'Claimant was employed on August 30, 1957 by the University of Colorado. As an employee, claimant was assigned a space in the 'I' zone parking lot, a lot maintained by the University on University property and reserved for employees of the University. This lot is south of Pennsylvania Street. Employees are assigned to a parking space and are not permitted to park elsewhere on the campus.

'Claimant, on that date, was employed at the shop in the stadium, a property of the University which is north of Pennsylvania Street. No ready access from the parking lot to the shop in the stadium is available except by crossing Pennsylvania Street.

'It was customary for employees working in the stadium who used this parking lot to leave the lot on foot and proceed across Pennsylvania Street to the stadium and to return by the same route.

'During the day the crossing is protected by signs 'Stop for Pedestrians' which are placed each morning and taken in in the evening by the University Police.

'Claimant left work on August 30, 1957 at 5:00 P.M. and proceeded directly toward the assigned parking lot. As he was crossing Pennsylvania Street, he had to jump a ditch, which had been excavated along the side of the roadway and, in alighting, turned his left ankle on a clod. He was disabled from August 30, 1957 to October 21, 1957, when he returned to work. He sustained no permanent disability. His average weekly wage was $49.61.

'The Commission finds that the claimant was proceeding by the route ordinarily used by employees proceeding from the shops in the stadium to the parking lot assigned to employees and that it was necessary for him to cross Pennsylvania Street to reach his parking lot. The stadium is isolated from other parts of the campus by public highways which run through the campus and constitute a sort of 'island' in University property. It is necessary to cross some public street to get from the parking lot to the stadium and return. Claimant was, for all practical purposes, upon University property when the accident occurred. It is an elemental principle of compensation law that the respondent employer is required to furnish safe means of ingress and egress to and from the working place. The Commission, therefore, finds that the claimant's accident arose out of and in the course of his employment.'

There is no dispute of any kind in the evidence, and the foregoing quotation accurately sets forth the circumstances under which the accident occurred.

Question to be Determined

Where an employee is injured crossing a public street bisecting the premises of his employer while on his way to the place where parking space is assigned to him on the premises of his employer; are such injuries compensable under the Workmen's Compensation Act?

The question is answered in the affirmative. An accident arises out of and in the course of the employment of a workman when there is apparent to the rational mind upon consideration of all the circumstances, a causal connection between the conditions under which the work is to be performed and the resulting injury. Claimants of Bennett v. Durango Furniture Mart et al., 136 Colo. 529, 319 P.2d 494.

In Industrial Commission of Colorado et al. v. Anderson, 69 Colo. 147, 169 P. 135, 137, L.R.A.1918F, 885, we find the following:

'By the great weight of authority it appears, in the absence of special circumstances bringing the accident within the scope of the employment, that no compensation is recoverable by a workman who is injured while on his way to or from his work.' (Emphasis supplied.)

A significant phrase included within the above rule is that portion which has been italicized. Following the Anderson case this court has examined some fact situations to determine whether 'special circumstances' were present warranting an award of compensation. Among these appears the case of Industrial Commission v. Enyeart, 81 Colo. 521, 256 P. 314, involving an accident caused by a mechanical defect in an automobile being driven on the employer's premises while leaving work. It did not involve a defect in the premises or a public road upon the premises. Also of interest is Aetna Life Insurance Co. et al. v. Industrial Commission et al., 81 Colo. 233, 254 P. 995, where an accident occurring to a farm hand on his way from his place of employment was held to be compensable. To like effect is Industrial Commission v. Moynihan, 94 Colo. 438, 32 P.2d 802, in which an accident sustained by an attorney while driving an automobile on the public highway on his way home from his place of employment was held to be compensable. See also O. P. Skaggs Company et al. v. Nixon et al., 101 Colo. 203, 72 P.2d 1102. In the recent case of Divelbiss v. Industrial Commission of Colorado, 140 Colo. 452, 344 P.2d 1084, it was held that an accident occurring while an employee was taking a shower on the employer's premises following the completion of his day's work arose out of and in the course of his employment and was compensable.

From the foregoing we glean that 'special circumstances' may give rise to benefits under the ...