State, Dep't of Revenue ex rel. Johnson v. Haughton

Decision Date09 March 2016
Docket NumberNo. 3D15–291.,3D15–291.
Citation188 So.3d 32
Parties The STATE of Florida, DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE ex rel. Tomeika L. JOHNSON, Appellant, v. James HAUGHTON, Appellee.
CourtFlorida District Court of Appeals

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and William H. Branch (Tallahassee), Assistant Attorney General, for appellant.

James Haughton, in proper person.

Before SHEPHERD, ROTHENBERG, and SALTER, JJ.

ROTHENBERG, J.

The State of Florida, Department of Revenue ("DOR") appeals the trial court's order denying its rule 1.540(b)(4) motion to vacate the order terminating James Haughton's ("Haughton") obligation to pay child support arrears. Because DOR did not receive any notice of the hearing conducted on Haughton's motion to terminate the arrears, DOR's due process rights were violated and the order terminating Haughton's obligation to pay arrears is void. We therefore reverse the order denying DOR's rule 1.540(b)(4) motion and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

BACKGROUND

In 1997, Haughton was adjudicated the biological father of Tomeika Johnson's child. At the time, Haughton waived any paternity test. After discovering that he might not be the child's father, Haughton filed an action in circuit court contesting his paternity and child support obligations from 2010 to 2012. When DNA tests confirmed that there was a zero percent chance that Haughton was the child's biological father, the trial court issued an order disestablishing paternity, suspending Haughton's child support obligations from June 1, 2011 (the filing date of Haughton's amended and final petition) onwards, and requiring DOR to conduct a financial review of Haughton's child support payment history to determine what child support arrears were currently due.

In June 2012, Haughton filed a motion seeking to terminate all of his child support obligations and arrears. Following a hearing conducted in August 2012, the trial court entered an order: (1) finding that the prior order terminating Haughton's child support obligations did not specify whether Haughton was required to pay arrears, (2) requiring DOR to attempt to clarify the prior order, and (3) reserving ruling on the arrears. Although DOR moved to amend the prior order terminating Haughton's child support obligations, the motion was denied when DOR failed to appear at the hearing on the motion.

In November 2013, Haughton requested a hearing on his motion to terminate his child support arrears. Haughton, however, filed his request under a different case number and failed to send a copy of his motion to DOR, and when the trial court issued its notice of the hearing for November 26, 2013, this notice was also not sent to DOR. At the scheduled hearing, the trial court issued the order under review, which granted Haughton's motion to terminate the child support arrears based on the fact that Haughton was not the child's biological father.

On August 29, 2014, DOR filed a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b)(4), alleging that DOR first discovered the November 26, 2013 order in August 2014; it has been involved in this case since 2010; Haughton's motion for a hearing on his motion to terminate the child support arrears was improperly filed under a different case number than the one under which the 2012 order terminating the child support obligations was entered; and DOR was not provided with notice of the November 26, 2013 hearing, in violation of its due process rights. The motion requested that the trial court set aside its order terminating the child support arrears and allow DOR to proceed with its pending motion to determine arrears in the prior case number.

At the hearing on DOR's rule 1.540(b)(4) motion, the trial court issued an order denying DOR's motion and found that Haughton was not responsible for the arrears due prior to disestablishing paternity because he was not the father of the child.

ANALYSIS

Section 742.18(5), Florida Statutes (2006), requires a party to pay child support arrears that accumulated during the time that he was considered the legal father of the child, even if his paternity is later disestablished. We, however, do not address the propriety of the trial court's order setting aside the arrears. The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred by denying DOR's rule 1.540(b)(4) motion, which sought to vacate the trial court's order terminating the child support arrears based on the failure to provide DOR with notice.

A trial court's denial of a rule 1.540 motion is reviewed for an...

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3 cases
  • Silvio Membreno & Fla. Ass'n of Vendors, Inc. v. City of Hialeah
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • March 9, 2016
  • Reyes v. Aqua Life Corp.
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • December 14, 2016
    ...notice and an opportunity to be heard, which denied Reyes his fundamental right to due process. State, Dep't of Revenue ex rel. Johnson v. Haughton , 188 So.3d 32, 34 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016) ; Jade Winds Ass'n v. Citibank, N.A. , 63 So.3d 819, 822 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011). As the First District Court ......
  • Renovaship, Inc. v. Quatremain
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • December 21, 2016
    ...(quoting Viets v. Am. Recruiters Enterprs., Inc. , 922 So.2d 1090, 1095 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) ).For example, in State ex rel. Johnson v. Haughton , 188 So.3d 32 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016), the trial court entered an order terminating a father's obligation to pay child support arrearages. The Departme......
4 books & journal articles
  • Chapter 9-4 Post-Foreclosure
    • United States
    • Full Court Press Florida Foreclosure Law 2020 Title Chapter 9 Litigating With Associations in the Foreclosure Context
    • Invalid date
    ...218 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011); Boosinger v. Davis, 46 So. 3d 152, 154 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (same). Cf. State Department of Revenue v. Haughton, 188 So. 3d 32 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016) (reversing trial court order denying Rule 1.540(b) (4) motion; holding that pursuant to Rule 1.540(b)(b)(4), trial court sh......
  • Chapter 14-3 Rule 1.540 and Motions to Vacate Judgment
    • United States
    • Full Court Press Florida Foreclosure Law 2020 Title Chapter 14 Post-Judgment Motion Practice
    • Invalid date
    ...3d 216, 218 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011); Boosinger v. Davis, 46 So. 3d 152, 154 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010). Cf. State Department of Revenue v. Haughton, 188 So. 3d 32 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016) (reversing trial court order denying Rule 1.540(b)(4) motion; holding that pursuant to Rule 1.540(b)(b)(4), trial court sh......
  • Chapter 14-3 Rule 1.540 and Motions to Vacate Judgment
    • United States
    • Full Court Press Florida Foreclosure Law 2022 Chapter 14 Post-Judgment Motion Practice
    • Invalid date
    ...3d 216, 218 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011); Boosinger v. Davis, 46 So. 3d 152, 154 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010). Cf. State Department of Revenue v. Haughton, 188 So. 3d 32 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016) (reversing trial court order denying Rule 1.540(b)(4) motion; holding that pursuant to Rule 1.540(b)(b)(4), trial court sh......
  • Chapter 9-4 Post-Foreclosure
    • United States
    • Full Court Press Florida Foreclosure Law 2022 Chapter 9 Litigating With Associations in the Foreclosure Context
    • Invalid date
    ...218 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011); Boosinger v. Davis, 46 So. 3d 152, 154 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (same). Cf. State Department of Revenue v. Haughton, 188 So. 3d 32 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016) (reversing trial court order denying Rule 1.540(b) (4) motion; holding that pursuant to Rule 1.540(b)(b)(4), trial court sh......

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