State Dept. of Corrections v. Fluor Daniel
Decision Date | 06 July 2007 |
Docket Number | No. 78290-3.,78290-3. |
Citation | 161 P.3d 372,160 Wn.2d 786 |
Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Parties | STATE of Washington DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, in its own capacity and as assignee of claims of University Mechanical Contractors, and Pacific Construction Systems, Inc., Respondents, v. FLUOR DANIEL, INC., a foreign corporation, and Fireman'S Fund Insurance Company, a foreign corporation, Petitioners. |
Richard Miles Stanislaw, Christopher Wright, Stanislaw Ashbaugh LLP, Seattle, WA, for Petitioners.
Douglas D. Shaftel, Office of the Atty. General, Steve Edwin Dietrich, Attorney General of Washington, Olympia, WA, for Respondents.
¶ 1 The parties before us agreed to resolve their underlying dispute in binding arbitration. Fluor Daniel, Inc. (Fluor) prevailed and moved to reduce the arbitration award to judgment. Concluding that the arbitration award liquidated previously nonliquidated damages, the trial court reduced that award to judgment and added prejudgment interest from the date the arbitrator rendered the award to the time it was entered into judgment. We conclude that an arbitration award does not transform an unliquidated claim into a fully liquidated sum entitling the prevailing party to prejudgment interest. Unliquidated damages accrue interest from the date of judgment, not the date of an arbitration award. We affirm the Court of Appeals and remand to the trial court for entry of judgment without prejudgment interest.
¶ 2 The Department of Corrections (Department) contracted with Fluor to build a prison. Clerk's Papers (CP) at 3. The parties tell us that "major disputes developed," leading to "extremely expensive" litigation. CP at 3.1 Shortly before the scheduled trial, Fluor and the Department negotiated and signed a partial settlement and dispute resolution agreement, agreeing to resolve their dispute through binding arbitration. The dispute proceeded to arbitration and the arbitrator found in favor of Fluor for $5,997,645.
¶ 3 Twenty one days later, Fluor reduced the award to judgment. Fluor asked, over the Department's objection, for prejudgment interest from the date of the arbitration until judgment. Fluor's request for prejudgment interest was based on the theory that the amount of damages became liquidated by virtue of the arbitration award. The trial judge agreed and awarded Fluor prejudgment interest of $43,380.22. The Department appealed only the award of prejudgment interest.2 The Court of Appeals reversed. Dep't of Corrs. v. Fluor Daniel, Inc., 130 Wash.App. 629, 126 P.3d 52 (2005). Fluor sought and we granted review. Dep't of Corrs. v. Fluor Daniel, Inc., 158 Wash.2d 1005, 143 P.3d 829 (2006).
¶ 4 Only questions of law are presented. Our review is de novo. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 149 Wash.2d 660, 670, 72 P.3d 151 (2003).
¶ 5 A party is entitled to prejudgment interest if the damages awarded are liquidated. Historically, contract damages were considered "liquidated" if they could be determined by "reference to a fixed standard contained in the contract, without reliance upon opinion or discretion," and interest has long been available from the moment of breach. Mall Tool Co. v. Far W. Equip. Co., 45 Wash.2d 158, 176, 273 P.2d 652 (1954) (emphasis omitted); see also Wright v. City of Tacoma, 87 Wash. 334, 353, 151 P. 837 (1915) (same); 14A KARL B. TEGLAND, WASHINGTON PRACTICE: CIVIL PROCEDURE § 35.13, at 434 (2003). It is comparatively easy to determine whether damages are liquidated when the parties' own contract so provides. E.g., Trompeter v. United Ins. Co., 51 Wash.2d 133, 316 P.2d 455 (1957) ( ). Sometimes statutory law will provide fixed standards that will allow damages to be liquidated. E.g., Egerer v. CSR W., L.L.C., 116 Wash.App. 645, 653-56, 67 P.3d 1128 (2003) ( ). This court has recently found a claim for overtime was liquidated when we could determine the amount precisely. Bostain v. Food Exp., Inc., 159 Wash.2d 700, 723, 153 P.3d 846 (2007) ( ). These principles have been applied even occasionally in the tort context. E.g. Hansen v. Rothaus, 107 Wash.2d 468, 473-75, 730 P.2d 662 (1986). However, damages that cannot be calculated without the use of discretion are not liquidated. E.g., Safeco Ins. Co. v. Woodley, 150 Wash.2d 765, 773, 82 P.3d 660 (2004) ( ); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 142 Wash.2d 654, 687, 15 P.3d 115 (2000) ( ); Maryhill Museum of Fine Arts v. Emil's Concrete Constr. Co., 50 Wash.App. 895, 903, 751 P.2d 866 (1988) ( ).
¶ 6 If damages are liquidated, interest accrues from the time they were incurred. Hansen, 107 Wash.2d at 473, 730 P.2d 662 () (emphasis added). Nothing in our case law or the underlying jurisprudence supports the proposition that the character of damages changes from unliquidated to liquidated by virtue of being decided. See generally Weyerhaeuser Co., 142 Wash.2d at 686, 15 P.3d 115 ( ).
¶ 7 Generally, interest on a damage award begins to run when judgment is formally entered by a trial court, not when a jury reaches a verdict or a trial court announces a decision. RCW 4.56.110(4) and .115; Kiessling v. Nw. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 38 Wash.2d 289, 297, 229 P.2d 335 (1951). No Washington court has held that a damage award for breach of contract changed character by virtue of being decided, and every time the question has been posed, the court has decided that it did not. See, e.g., Kiessling, 38 Wash.2d at 297, 229 P.2d 335 ( )(citing Rood v. Horton, 132 Wash. 82, 231 P. 450 (1924) (verdict of jury), and Phifer v. Burton, 141 Wash. 186, 251 P. 127 (1926) () ). Instead, the moment damage claims are decided, they become subject to the civil rules and laws governing judgments.3
¶ 8 We turn now to Fluor's arguments. Fluor does not argue that its damages were liquidated before the arbitrator reached his decision.4 Thus, if this case had been tried in court rather than arbitrated, no prejudgment interest would be available. See Boespflug v. Wilson, 58 Wash.2d 333, 336, 362 P.2d 747 (1961) ( ). Fluor argues that it is entitled to prejudgment interest after the arbitrator reached his decision because that decision could not be appealed. Thus, it argues, the damages became fixed and liquidated by the arbitrator's award. Fluor advances two arguments to support its position. First, Fluor argues that arbitration awards in general should be considered liquidated when decided because arbitration awards are typically not appealable. Second, Fluor argues that the terms of its agreement with the Department made the award nonappealable, and that liquidated its damages in the nature of a judgment.
¶ 9 The vast majority of courts considering this issue have rejected pleas to add prejudgment interest to arbitrator's awards. As the Supreme Court of Nevada ruled more than a decade ago, "[t]he weight of authority supports [the] position that the addition of prejudgment interest upon confirmation of an arbitration award constitutes an impermissible modification of the award." Mausbach v. Lemke, 110 Nev. 37, 40, 866 P.2d 1146 (1994) (citing Creative Builders, Inc. v. Ave. Devs. Inc., 148 Ariz. 452, 715 P.2d 308 (Ariz.Ct. App.1986); McDaniel v. Berhalter, 405 So.2d 1027, 1030 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1981); Leach v. O'Neill, 132 N.H. 665, 568 A.2d 1189 (1990)); Westmark Props., Inc. v. McGuire, 53 Wash. App. 400, 766 P.2d 1146 (1989);5 see also Duncan v. Nat'l Home Ins. Co., 36 P.3d 191, 193 (Colo.App.2001) ( ); Wolfe v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 128 Idaho 398, 403, 913 P.2d 1168 (1996) ( ); Palmer v. Duke Power Co., 129 N.C.App. 488, 498, 499 S.E.2d 801 (1998) (same); but see Ebasco Constructors, Inc. v. Ahtna, Inc., 932 P.2d 1312, 1318 (Alaska 1997) ( ); but cf. Kalawaia v. AIG Hawai`i Ins. Co., 90 Haw. 167, 174, 977 P.2d 175 (1999) ( ). Most states have found that adding prejudgment interest was an inappropriate modification of the arbitrator's award.
¶ 10 Fluor contends that a binding arbitration award is more like an entered judgment than a jury's verdict, on the theory that a jury's verdict is subject to substantial revision; a binding arbitration award, Fluor argues, is not. Cf. Kiessling, 38 Wash.2d at 297, 229 P.2d 335 (...
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