State v. Weber

• Decision Date: 28 April 2004
• Docket Number: No. 30083.,30083.
• Citation: 140 Idaho 89,90 P.3d 314
• Parties: STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Gerald R. WEBER, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

90 P.3d 314

140 Idaho 89

STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Gerald R. WEBER, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 30083.

Supreme Court of Idaho, Boise, February 2004 Term.

April 28, 2004.

Molly J. Huskey, State Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. Eric D. Fredericksen argued.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Lori A. Fleming argued.

SCHROEDER, Justice.

This case concerns the scope of a defendant's right to collaterally attack the validity of predicate misdemeanor driving under the influence (DUI) convictions offered by the State to support a charge of felony DUI pursuant to I.C. § 18-8005(5).

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Gerald R. Weber ("Weber") was charged with felony DUI pursuant to I.C. §§ 18-8004 and 18-8005(5)¹, and misdemeanor possession of an open container of alcohol in a motor vehicle pursuant to I.C. § 23-505. Weber filed a motion in limine, seeking to prohibit the State from using two previous 1998 misdemeanor DUI convictions to enhance his current DUI charge to a felony. The motion was denied. Weber entered a conditional plea to the felony DUI charge pursuant to I.C.R. 11(a)(2), reserving his right to appeal from the denial of his motion in limine. The district court withheld judgment and placed Weber on probation. Weber appealed, challenging the validity of his prior convictions on the basis that his guilty pleas were obtained in violation of I.C.R. 11(c) and constitutional standards intended to ensure that guilty pleas are knowing and voluntary. The Court of Appeals rejected Weber's constitutional challenge but held that the district court erred in denying the motion in limine to exclude his prior convictions because the record did not establish that Weber was adequately informed of the consequences of entering his guilty pleas as required by Idaho Criminal Rule 11(c). Weber's judgment of conviction for felony DUI was vacated and the case was remanded for further proceedings.

Both parties filed petitions for review of the Court of Appeals' decision. This Court accepted review to determine: (1) whether Weber was entitled to collaterally attack the validity of his prior DUI convictions on the constitutional ground that his guilty pleas, which resulted in these convictions, were not made knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently, and (2) whether Idaho Criminal Rule 11(c) provides a defendant greater rights to collaterally attack the validity of prior convictions used for enhancement purposes than provided by the United States Constitution.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

When considering a case on review from the Court of Appeals, this Court does not merely review the correctness of the decision of the Court of Appeals. Leavitt v. Swain, 133 Idaho 624, 627, 991 P.2d 349, 352 (1999). This Court acts as though it is hearing the matter on direct appeal from the decision of the trial court. However, this Court does give serious consideration to the decision of the Court of Appeals. Id. See also Sato v. Schossberger, 117 Idaho 771, 774-75, 792 P.2d 336, 339-40 (1990). When this Court grants a petition to review a Court of Appeals decision, it will ordinarily hear all the issues presented to the Court of Appeals. Sato, 117 Idaho at 774, 792 P.2d at 339.

Constitutional issues are questions of law subject to free review by this Court. Struhs v. Prot. Tech.'s Inc., 133 Idaho 715, 722, 992 P.2d 164, 171 (1999). Likewise, where the trial court's decision turns upon the interpretation of an Idaho Criminal Rule, appellate courts exercise free review. See State v. Larios, 129 Idaho 631, 633, 931 P.2d 625, 627 (1997) (regarding the trial court's interpretation of I.C.R. 25(a)); State v. Dallas, 126 Idaho 273, 274, 882 P.2d 440, 441 (Ct.App.1994) (concerning the district court's interpretation of I.C.R. 35).

III. A DEFENDANT HAS NO RIGHT TO COLLATERALLY ATTACK THE CONSTITUTIONAL VALIDITY OF PRIOR DUI CONVICTIONS USED TO SUPPORT A CHARGE OF FELONY DUI UNLESS THE PRIOR CONVICTIONS WERE OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO COUNSEL

Weber contends that the district court erred in denying his motion in limine, thereby allowing the State to use his prior misdemeanor DUI convictions as a basis to seek a conviction of felony DUI pursuant to I.C. § 18-8005(5). Specifically, he maintains that his guilty pleas, and thus the resulting convictions, were invalid because they were obtained in violation of I.C.R. 11(c) and constitutional standards intended to ensure that guilty pleas are knowing and voluntary.

This Court has previously considered whether a defendant may collaterally attack the validity of prior misdemeanor DUI convictions used to support a subsequent charge of felony DUI on the basis that the defendant's previous guilty pleas were not made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. See State v. Maxey, 125 Idaho 505, 873 P.2d 150 (1994); State v. Beloit, 123 Idaho 36, 844 P.2d 18 (1992). In both instances, the challenge was rejected. Subsequent to this Court's decisions in Beloit and Maxey, the United States Supreme Court held that, with the sole exception of convictions obtained in violation of the right to counsel, a defendant in a federal sentencing proceeding has no constitutional right to collaterally attack the validity of previous state convictions used to enhance a sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 114 S.Ct. 1732, 128 L.Ed.2d 517 (1994).

Custis calls into question this Court's decisions in State v. Beloit, 123 Idaho 36, 844 P.2d 18 (1992) and State v. Maxey, 125 Idaho 505, 873 P.2d 150 (1994), to the extent that they permit constitutional collateral attacks on the validity of prior convictions on grounds other than the denial of the right to counsel. In State v. Coby, 128 Idaho 90, 910 P.2d 762 (1996), a post-Custis decision, the trial court granted Coby's motion to reduce his felony DUI charge on the basis that the State failed to present evidence that Coby was informed of the dangers of self-representation or that Coby understood the consequences of his waiver of counsel. This Court affirmed the decision of the trial court, based not on the propriety of that decision, but rather on the fact that the State failed to establish the existence of one of Coby's prior DUI convictions. Coby does not resolve the issue in the case because the Court specifically declined the State's invitation to address the merits of Coby's constitutional arguments.

After the jury convicted Custis of possession of a firearm by a felon and another federal crime, the Government relied on his prior state-court convictions for robbery, burglary, and attempted burglary to support a motion under the ACCA, which provides for enhancement of the sentence of a convicted firearms possessor who "has three previous convictions ... for a violent felony or a serious drug offense." Custis, 511 U.S. at 487,114 S.Ct. 1732. Custis challenged the use of two convictions on various grounds, including ineffective assistance of counsel and that one of his guilty pleas was not knowing and intelligent as required by Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969). Id. at 488, 89 S.Ct. 1709. The district court held that the ACCA provides no statutory right to challenge such convictions and that the Constitution bars the use of a prior conviction for enhancement only when there was a complete denial of counsel in the prior proceeding. Id. at 489, 89 S.Ct. 1709. Custis was sentenced to an enhanced term of 235 months in prison, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Id. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. The United States Supreme Court held that, with the sole exception of convictions obtained in violation of the right to counsel, a defendant in a federal sentencing proceeding has no right to collaterally attack the validity of previous state convictions that are used to enhance his sentence under the ACCA. Id.,511 U.S. at 485,114 S.Ct. 1732. The Supreme Court noted that Congress did not intend to permit collateral attacks on prior convictions under the ACCA. Id. at 493, 114 S.Ct. 1732. The language of the ACCA focuses on the fact of the conviction, and nothing therein suggests that the prior final conviction may be subject to attack for potential constitutional errors before it may be counted. Id. at 490-91, 114 S.Ct. 1732. The Court also stated that the right, recognized in Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 88 S.Ct. 258, 19 L.Ed.2d 319 (1967), and United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 92 S.Ct. 589, 30 L.Ed.2d 592 (1972), to collaterally attack prior convictions used for sentence enhancement purposes cannot be extended beyond the right, established in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963), to have appointed counsel. Id. at 496, 83 S.Ct. 792. Since Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938), and running through Burgett and Tucker, "there has been a theme that failure to appoint counsel for an indigent defendant was a unique constitutional defect." Id. According to the U.S. Supreme Court, none of the constitutional violations alleged by Custis, including the claimed denial of effective assistance of counsel, "rises to the level of a jurisdictional defect resulting from the failure to appoint counsel at all."²Id.

The United States Supreme Court in Custis highlighted the following considerations in support of its holding limiting collateral attacks to those involving a violation of the right to counsel:

Ease of administration also supports the distinction. As revealed in a number of the cases cited in this opinion, failure to appoint counsel at all will generally appear from the judgment roll itself, or from an accompanying minute order. But determination of claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, and failure to assure that a guilty plea was voluntary, would require sentencing courts to rummage through frequently nonexistent or difficult to

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