State, Dept. of Juvenile Justice v. Soud, 96-2551
| Decision Date | 06 January 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 96-2551,96-2551 |
| Parties | 22 Fla. L. Weekly D165 STATE of Florida, DEPARTMENT OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, Petitioner, v. A.C. SOUD, Jr., Respondent. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
John Milla, Assistant General Counsel, Department of Juvenile Justice, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Jean-Jacques A. Darius, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
By a petition for a writ of certiorari, the Department of Juvenile Justice seeks review of an "administrative order" entered by the respondent circuit judge. The "administrative order" purports to direct that the Department "consider for appropriate aggravation" a list of "factors and circumstances" when performing its statutory duty in juvenile delinquency cases to prepare risk assessment instruments for those accused of having committed a delinquent act. We conclude that we possess jurisdiction to consider the petition, and that the "administrative order" was entered in excess of the respondent's jurisdiction. Accordingly, we grant the petition, and quash the "administrative order."
On June 11, 1996, on his "own motion," the respondent issued an "administrative order" titled "In re: Aggravating Factors for Consideration and Use by the Department of Juvenile Justice when Preparing Risk Assessment Instruments." That "administrative order," which is apparently intended to have general application in the Juvenile Division of the Fourth Judicial Circuit, states that, "when preparing a risk assessment instrument on each child alleged to have committed a crime [sic]," the Department "shall consider for appropriate aggravation on the risk assessment instrument" a list of 21 "factors and circumstances." The Department challenges this "administrative order" as beyond the jurisdiction of the respondent because the respondent is not the chief judge of the Fourth Judicial Circuit, and because the "administrative order" would have the effect of overriding the statutory scheme for development and revision of risk assessment instruments. On behalf of the respondent, the Attorney General's Office takes the position that the "administrative order" is a valid exercise of the respondent's jurisdiction, and that it purports to do nothing more than to "interpret the [relevant] statute," because of a dispute between the Department and "the juvenile court" over its intended meaning.
Certiorari is the proper remedy when a lower court acts "without or in excess of" its jurisdiction. Hazouri v. Maillet, 276 So.2d 70, 71 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973). See also Valdez v. Chief Judge, Eleventh Judicial Circuit, 640 So.2d 1164 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994) (), review denied, 652 So.2d 816 (Fla.1995); State ex rel. Wainwright v. Booth, 291 So.2d 74, 76 (Fla. 2d DCA) (), cert. discharged, 300 So.2d 257 (Fla.1974). Because the petition alleges that the respondent exceeded his jurisdiction when he issued the "administrative order," we conclude that certiorari is the appropriate remedy, and that we have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 4(b)(3), Fla. Const.; Fla.R.App.P. 9.030(b)(2) & (3).
Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.050(b)(2) provides that "[t]he chief judge [of a circuit] may enter and sign administrative orders." It is undisputed that the respondent is not the chief judge of the Fourth Judicial Circuit. Read in context, it seems to us that the intent behind this provision is that only the chief judge "may enter and sign administrative orders." Accordingly, we hold that the respondent lacked the authority to enter the "administrative order" in question.
We hold, further, that the subject matter of the "administrative order" in question is beyond that which is the proper concern of administrative orders, as contemplated by the Rules of Judicial Administration. Therefore, the order could not stand, even if it had been entered by the chief judge of the circuit.
Florida Rule of Judicial Administration 2.020(c) defines an "administrative order" as "a directive necessary to administer properly the court's affairs." It seems to us relatively clear that the "administrative order" in question has nothing to do with the proper administration of the affairs of the Fourth Judicial Circuit, or of its Juvenile Division. Instead, it appears that the "administrative order" is intended to usurp the role given by the legislature to the Department regarding development and revision of risk assessment instruments.
Section 39.042(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1995), requires that, subject to one exception not relevant for purposes of this discussion, "[a]ll determinations and court orders regarding placement of a child into detention care ... shall be based on a risk assessment of the child." Section 39.042(2)(b)1 reads:
The risk assessment instrument for detention care placement determinations and orders shall be developed by the Department of Juvenile Justice in agreement with representatives appointed by the following associations: the Conference of Circuit Judges of Florida, the Prosecuting Attorneys Association, and the Public Defenders Association. Each association shall appoint two individuals, one representing an urban area and one representing a rural area. The parties involved shall evaluate and revise the risk assessment instrument as is considered necessary using the method for revision as agreed by the parties. The risk assessment instrument shall take into consideration, but need not be limited to, prior history of failure to appear, prior offenses, offenses committed pending adjudication, any unlawful possession of a firearm, theft of a motor vehicle or possession of a stolen motor vehicle, and community control status at the time the child is taken into custody. The risk assessment instrument shall also take into consideration appropriate aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and shall be designed to target a narrower population of children than s. 39.044(2). The risk assessment instrument shall also include any information concerning the child's history of abuse and neglect. The risk assessment shall indicate whether detention care is warranted, and, if detention care is warranted, whether the child should be placed into secure, nonsecure, or home detention care.
As we explained in S.W. v. Woolsey, 673 So.2d 152, 154 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996), a risk assessment instrument form has been developed by the Department, in an effort to comply with this statutory mandate. In S.W., we described the risk assessment instrument thus:
Section II of the document is entitled "Admission...
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