State, Dept. of Public Safety v. Mulvihill
| Decision Date | 28 March 1975 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 44810,44857,44864 and 45052,s. 44810 |
| Citation | 227 N.W.2d 813,303 Minn. 361 |
| Parties | STATE of Minnesota, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, Appellant, v. Michael MULVIHILL, Respondent. STATE of Minnesota, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, Appellant, v. Weldon Ralph SWEARINGEN, Respondent. STATE of Minnesota, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, Appellant, v. David Joseph HUTTON, Respondent. STATE of Minnesota, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, Appellant, v. Carroll Kenneth CORDES, Respondent. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
1. Under our decision in State, Department of Highways, v. Schlief, 289 Minn. 461, 185 N.W.2d 274 (1971), a defendant who subjected himself to the criminal sanction of revocation of his driver's license under Minn.St.1971, § 169.121, could not have his license also revoked under the sanctions of our implied-consent statute, Minn.St. § 169.123.
2. To qualify under the Schlief holding, a defendant (1) at the time of refusing chemical testing, must intend to plead guilty to a charge of violating § 169.121, subd. 1; (2) must plead guilty to a charge which subjects him to automatic revocation under § 169.121, subd. 3; and (3) must plead guilty at the first available opportunity.
3. License revocations under § 169.121, subd. 3, and under § 169.123, subd. 4, are essentially different. The former is automatically imposed as a criminal sanction and is triggered by the outcome of the criminal proceedings and is imposed through the judicial system.
4. A defendant arrested under Minn.St.1971, § 169.121, subd. 1(d), a violation of which constituted a petty misdemeanor, cannot object to revocation of his license under Minn.St. § 169.123, subd. 4, since these proceedings are civil in nature and not dependent upon the criminal sanctions to which defendant may be subjected. Where probable cause exists for an arrest under § 169.121, reasonable and probable grounds exist to request chemical testing under § 169.123.
The decision of the lower court in each of these cases is reversed and remanded with instructions to enter an order sustaining the revocation order of the state.
Warren Spannaus, Atty. Gen., Joel A. Watne and Thomas G. Lockhart, Sp. Asst. Attys. Gen., St. Paul, for appellant.
Harry Ray and Bjorn J. Ulstad, Minneapolis, for Mulvihill.
Thomas E. Moore, St. Paul, for Swearingen.
George H. Frisch, Minneapolis, for Hutton.
Jack M. Winick, Minneapolis, for Cordes.
Heard before PETERSON, TODD, and SCOTT, JJ., and considered and decided by the court en banc.
The State of Minnesota appeals from four separate lower court decisions rescinding orders of the commissioner of public safety which had revoked the driver's license of each of the respective defendants under the provisions of Minn.St. § 169.123, subd. 4, the implied-consent statute. The appeals were consolidated for hearing. Three of the defendants were arrested for and charged with driving while under the influence of an intoxicating beverage in violation of Minn.St.1971, § 169.121, subd. 1(a). The fourth, David Joseph Hutton, was charged with driving with a blood alcohol content in excess of .10 percent in violation of Minn.St.1971, § 169.121, subd. 1(d). There is a dispute as to whether Hutton was arrested for a violation of subd. 1(a) or subd. 1(d). All subsequently pled guilty to the charge of driving a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol content in excess of .10 percent. This offense constituted a petty misdemeanor at the time of the pleas. We have held that a conviction under Minn.St.1971, § 169.121, subd. 1(d), violation of which constituted a petty misdemeanor, could not result in license revocation under § 169.121, subd. 3. In re Driver's License of LeClaire v. Hoaglund, 296 Minn. 85, 208 N.W.2d 90 (1973). We narrowly construe our decisions which restrict the application of the implied-consent statute and hold that in each of the cases here on appeal there existed proper circumstances to permit revocation under the implied-consent statute, Minn.St. 169.123. We accordingly reverse the decisions of the lower courts.
The facts giving rise to the respective appeals are briefly summarized as to each defendant:
Michael Mulvihill
On March 4, 1973, defendant was arrested by a St. Paul police officer on a charge of driving while under the influence of an alcoholic beverage. He was taken to police headquarters and read the implied-consent advisory. Defendant refused to take either a blood or breath test for the reason that he considered himself to be under false arrest and intended to do whatever his attorney advised him to do. On March 12, 1973, defendant entered a plea of not guilty to the charge of driving while under the influence of an alcoholic beverage, Minn.St.1971, § 169.121, subd. 1(a). On May 31, 1973, he entered a plea of guilty to a reduced charge of driving with more than a .10 percent blood alcohol level, § 169.121, subd. 1(d). On April 13, 1973, the state notified defendant of its intention to revoke his driver's license under the implied-consent statute, Minn.St. 169.123, subd. 4. On April 23, 1973, defendant requested a hearing upon the revocation. On December 10, 1973, the municipal court of St. Paul entered an order rescinding the revocation order.
On March 19, 1973, defendant was arrested by officers of the St. Paul Police Department for the offense of driving while intoxicated. Following arrest, he was taken to St. Paul police headquarters, informed of the provisions of the implied-consent law, and requested to provide a sample of his blood or breath for chemical testing. Defendant refused to submit to any form of chemical testing, complaining of police harassment. On May 22, 1973, defendant appeared in St. Paul municipal court and entered a plea of guilty to the reduced charge of driving a motor vehicle with over .10 percent blood alcohol in his system. On May 1, 1973, the state notified defendant of its intention to revoke his driver's license and on May 29, the state issued a revocation order under Minn.St. 169.123. On May 31, 1973, defendant requested a hearing upon said revocation order, since he had not received the notice of intent to revoke. On October 9, 1973, the St. Paul municipal court entered an order rescinding the revocation order of May 29, 1973.
Defendant was arrested on April 17, 1973, on a charge of driving while under the influence of an alcoholic beverage. After being read the implied-consent advisory and being requested to submit a blood or breath sample, defendant refused to submit either for the stated reason that he was arrested illegally. On May 11, 1973, he entered a plea of not guilty to the charge of driving while under the influence of an alcoholic beverage. On April 1, 1974, defendant pled guilty to the charge of driving with more than a .10 percent blood alcohol. On May 22, 1973, the state mailed to defendant a notice of intention to revoke his driver's license under Minn.St. 169.123. On May 31, 1973, defendant requested a hearing upon said revocation. On April 2, 1974, the Municipal Court of Hennepin County entered its order rescinding the revocation order entered by the state on May 22, 1973.
The state alleges that on March 17, 1972, defendant was arrested for the offense of driving while under the influence of an intoxicating beverage. Defendant contends that he was arrested for the offense of driving with more than .10 percent blood alcohol. The trial court subsequently found that he was charged with the offense of driving with more than .10 percent blood alcohol, a fact which is not disputed by the state. On October 6, 1972, defendant entered a plea of guilty to a charge of careless driving. On May 24, 1973, defendant entered a plea of guilty to driving with over .10 percent blood alcohol, in addition to his plea of careless driving. On April 21, 1972, defendant had been notified by the state of its intention to revoke his driver's license under Minn.St. 169.123. Defendant demanded a hearing on the revocation notice. The order of revocation was sustained by order of the Hennepin County Municipal Court on March 7, 1973, and defendant appealed this order to the District Court of Hennepin County. On November 20, 1973, the District Court of Hennepin County entered its order rescinding the revocation order of the state.
Procedurally, each of these cases fits within the time to which our decision in In re Driver's License of LeClaire v. Hoaglund, Supra, applies. In that case we held that legislative action with respect to Minn.St.1971, § 169.121, subd. 1(d), had created a situation in which a person convicted of operating a motor vehicle with more than .10 percent blood alcohol was guilty of a petty misdemeanor, thereby limiting the criminal sanction to a fine of $100 and precluding license revocation under § 169.121, subd. 3. 1
1. Defendants, while stating the legal issue in various ways, all rely on our decision in State, Department of Highways, v. Schlief, 289 Minn. 461, 185 N.W.2d 274 (1971). In that case, defendant was arrested for driving while under the influence of an alcoholic beverage. Two days later, he pled guilty to said charge. Upon learning that Schlief had refused chemical testing, the state notified him that it intended to revoke his driver's license under the provisions of the implied-consent statute. Defendant requested a hearing. At the hearing defendant testified that the reason he refused the chemical test was because he knew he had to plead guilty to the criminal charge and he did not know that the law applied if he pled guilty. The lower court rescinded the order of revocation, finding that he had reasonable grounds under Minn.St. 169.123, subd. 6, for refusing to take the test. With reference to this statute, we said (289 Minn. 462, 185 N.W.2d 275):
'This statute is unique in that it provides for consideration of the issue of defendant's reasonableness in...
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