State, Dept. of Transp. and Development v. Williamson

• Decision Date: 20 April 1992
• Docket Number: 91-C-2404,Nos. 91-C-2401,s. 91-C-2401
• Citation: 597 So.2d 439
• Parties: STATE Of Louisiana, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND DEVELOPMENT v. Nell Carter Ramage WILLIAMSON, et al. 597 So.2d 439
• Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

Page 439

597 So.2d 439

STATE Of Louisiana, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND DEVELOPMENT v. Nell Carter Ramage WILLIAMSON, et al.

Nos. 91-C-2401, 91-C-2404.

597 So.2d 439

Supreme Court of Louisiana April 20, 1992.

John Barkley Knight, Jr., Joe Hart Dixon, Jr., Arnold, Pettway, Dixon & Collier, for defendants-applicants.

Harvey Lee Hall, Charles E. Soileau, Bertrand & Soileau, for plaintiff-respondent.

MARCUS, Justice. ^*

The primary issue in this expropriation case is the reasonableness of the attorney fees.

In May of 1983, the Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development (DOTD), pursuant to La.R.S. 48:441, et seq., filed a petition to expropriate a narrow strip of vacant property running through the entirety of Franklin Parish in order to widen Louisiana Highway 15. The original petition named the Missouri Pacific Railroad Company (as owners of a servitude on the subject property) and "Unknown Owners" as defendants. ¹ The trial judge appointed a curator ad hoc to represent the interests of the unknown owners. Subsequently, DOTD deposited the sum of $1,267,153 in the registry of the court as just compensation and obtained an order of expropriation for the subject property.

The Missouri Pacific Railroad abandoned its claim to the servitude. Several individuals came forth and alleged ownership of a portion of the expropriated property. This portion was about 100 feet wide by 11,000 feet long (or about 27 acres). Those persons claiming an interest in the subject property were Nell Carter Ramage Williamson, Rowena P. Ramage, Charles L. Ramage, Julian H. Adams, and Charles Ramage Adams. ² In addition to their ownership claim to the subject property, defendants also alleged that the amount deposited in the registry of the court was not sufficient to compensate them for their expropriated property. The sum deposited in the registry of the court representing the just compensation for the defendants' share of the property amounted to $394,329.50.

In the trial court, the issues of ownership and just compensation were tried separately. The issue of ownership was tried first. The property was divided into three parcels according to legal description; parcel A, parcel B, and parcel C. Defendants successfully proved their ownership of the expropriated property. The trial judge found that parcel A was owned in indivision by Nell Ramage Williamson, Rowena P. Ramage, Charles L. Ramage, Julian H. Adams, and Charles Ramage Adams and parcels B and C were owned in indivision by Nell Ramage Williamson, Rowena P. Ramage, and Charles L. Ramage. ³ This trial lasted one day.

The trial on the issue of just compensation was held about one year later. This portion of the case lasted three days. The trial judge rendered judgment in favor of defendants, finding the value of parcels A, B, and C to be $1,415,500, which is $1,021,171.50 over the amount deposited in the registry of the court by DOTD. ⁴ The trial judge awarded defendants the value of their expropriated property ($1,415,500) subject to a credit for the amount already deposited in the registry of the court ($394,329.50); in addition, he awarded attorney fees in the amount of 25% on the aggregate of the award in excess of the amount deposited in the registry of the court and legal interest on that amount from the date of the filing of the petition for expropriation through the date the judgment was rendered. This amounted to attorney fees of about $450,000.

The court of appeal affirmed the trial judge's valuation of the expropriated property; however, the court found that the amount of attorney fees awarded by the trial judge appeared to be unreasonable in light of the value of the property and accrued interest. ⁵ Noting the lack of evidence in the record specifically relating to the amount of effort expended by the attorneys, the amount of time involved, or any evidence relating to the reasonableness of the award, the court set aside the 25% attorney fee award and remanded the case to the trial court for the limited purpose of permitting evidence to be offered in connection with the amount of attorney fees to be assessed. ⁶

On remand, the trial judge conducted an evidentiary hearing. Defendants called two attorneys as expert witnesses to testify as to the reasonableness of the attorney fees awarded by the trial judge. After a review of the attorneys' files and the record in this case, both experts were of the opinion that the attorney fees awarded by the trial judge were reasonable in view of the effort expended by the attorneys and the customary fees charged in cases of this type. After noting that his original award might have been too high, the trial judge reduced the award for attorney fees from 25% to 20% of the aggregate of the award in excess of the amount deposited in the registry of the court and legal interest on that amount from the date of the filing of the petition for expropriation until paid. This award amounted to about $375,000. The trial judge also fixed expert witness fees at $2,150 and $1,980 for the two attorneys testifying at the hearing. These fees were taxed as costs against DOTD. DOTD appealed.

The court of appeal found that the award of attorney fees in the amount of 20% was excessive and should be reduced. The attorneys' time sheets submitted into evidence revealed that 456.75 hours were spent on the case. Noting the relative simplicity of the case, the court found that the highest attorney fee award would be $150 per hour for 456.75 hours, or $68,512.50. The court thus reduced the amount of attorney fees awarded by the trial judge from about $375,000 to $68,512.50. The court also found the expert witness fees for the attorneys testifying at the hearing were excessive and reduced them from $2,150 and $1,980 to $500 for each expert. The court assessed all costs of the proceeding against defendants. ⁷ Upon defendants' application, we granted certiorari to review the correctness of that decision. ⁸

The primary issue for our determination is the amount of reasonable attorney fees that should be awarded in this case.

At the outset, we note that attorney fees are not allowed except where authorized by statute or contract. Huddleston v. Bossier Bank and Trust Co., 475 So.2d 1082 (La.1985). In a case where DOTD expropriates property pursuant to La.R.S. 48:441, et seq., La.R.S. 48:453(E) provides statutory authority for such awards. That statute provides:

Reasonable attorney fees may be awarded by the court if the amount of the compensation deposited in the registry of the court is less than the amount of compensation awarded in the judgment. Such attorney fees in no event shall exceed twenty-five percent of the difference between the award and the amount deposited in the registry of the court.

Attorney fees in expropriation cases are discretionary with the trial court. State through the Department of Transportation and Development v. The Estate of Giles Davis, 572 So.2d 39 (La.1990). Courts may inquire as to the reasonableness of attorney fees as part of their prevailing, inherent authority to regulate the practice of law. City of Baton Rouge v. Stauffer Chemical Co., 500 So.2d 397 (La.1987); Leenerts Farms, Inc. v. Rogers, 421 So.2d 216 (La.1982). La.R.S. 48:453(E) provides that reasonable attorney fees may be awarded by the court but in no event shall exceed 25% of the difference between the award and the amount deposited in the registry of the court. Factors to be taken into consideration in determining the reasonableness of attorney fees include: (1) the ultimate result obtained; (2) the responsibility incurred; (3) the importance of the litigation; (4) amount of money involved; (5) extent and character of the work performed; (6) legal knowledge, attainment, and skill of the attorneys; (7) number of appearances made; (8) intricacies of the facts involved; (9) diligence and skill of counsel; and (10) the court's own knowledge. ⁹ State through Department of Transportation and Development v. Jacob, 491 So.2d 138 (La.App. 3d Cir.1986); State v. Ransome, 392 So.2d 490 (La.App 1st. Cir.1980). See also State through Department of Transportation and Development v. Estate of Giles Davis, supra.

Turning to this particular case, we must examine the record in light of the above mentioned factors to determine what constitutes reasonable attorney fees.

The ultimate result obtained by the attorneys for the defendants was a very good one. DOTD deposited $394,329.50 in the registry of the court as just compensation for the expropriated property. This amount was based on an appraisal conducted by DOTD's appraiser. The attorneys for defendants were able to increase that amount to $1,415,500 by going to trial. The value awarded by the trial judge is more than a million dollar increase. The attorneys in this particular case had a twofold responsibility. First, they had to prove that the defendants were in fact the owners of the property; second, they had to prove that the value of the property was greater than the amount deposited in the registry of the court. Additionally, there was much responsibility placed on the attorneys in this case...