State Division of Human Rights v. Columbia University in City of New York

• Decision Date: 08 June 1976
• Citation: 385 N.Y.S.2d 19,350 N.E.2d 396,39 N.Y.2d 612
• Parties: , 350 N.E.2d 396, 20 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 520, 13 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 11,505 STATE DIVISION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, Respondent, v. COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY IN the CITY OF NEW YORK et al., Appellants.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 19

385 N.Y.S.2d 19

39 N.Y.2d 612, 350 N.E.2d 396, 20

Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 520,

13 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 11,505

STATE DIVISION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, Respondent, v. COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY IN the CITY OF NEW YORK et al., Appellants.

Court of Appeals of New York.

June 8, 1976.

Floyd Abrams, Joel C. Balsam, Patricia A. Pickrel, Robert S. Stitt and Anthony Limitone, Jr., New York City, for appellants.

Armand Gilinsky, New York City, for respondent.

GABRIELLI, Judge.

On this appeal, we must determine whether the State Human Rights Appeal Board exceeded its statutory authority in setting aside a determination of the Commissioner of the State Division of Human Rights that appellants did not discriminate against the complainant on the basis of her sex. In passing upon this question, we must, perforce, decide whether the decision of the commissioner is supported by substantial evidence.

In February, 1972, complainant, Dr. Alberta Gilinsky, a tenured professor at the University of Bridgeport and an alumna of Columbia's graduate school, made formal application to Columbia's president for an appointment to the faculty of the Department of Psychology. Subsequently, she was advised that her application had been rejected because there was no vacancy for a tenured appointment in her area of specialization. Thereafter, Dr. Gilinsky filed a complaint on September 8, 1972 with the State Division of Human Rights charging that Columbia University had discriminated against her as a woman. Following hearings before the Chief Hearing Examiner of the State Division, the commissioner held that 'respondents did not discriminate against Complainant because of her sex' and made the following pertinent findings of fact:

1. The Executive Committee of the Psychology Department at Columbia University decided that there was no need for a temporary or permanent appointment to a tenured position in the area of sensation and perception. Complainant was aware that the committee considered her area of specialization to be sensation and perception and members of the faculty informed her that the department had sufficient strength in that area.

2. Because of operating deficits in recent years, Columbia University undertook efforts to control spending, and as part of its program, restricted the number and level of new faculty appointments in all departments, including the Department of Psychology. As early as 1970, it was clear to the department that vacancies on its faculty would not automatically be filled and new appointments were restricted; it was the university's policy to replace deceas or retiring senior faculty members at the junior or nontenured level.

3. The Department of Psychology made two new appointments for the 1972--1973 academic year, both at the junior level. No recommendations for tenured appointments for the 1972--1973 academic year were made and the last such appointment was made in 1970.

The reviewing function of the State Human Rights Appeal Board is narrowly prescribed under subdivision 7 of section 297--a of the Executive Law which provides that '(t)he board may affirm, remand or reverse any order of the division * * * provided however that the board shall limit its review to whether the order of the division is: * * * d. supported by substantial evidence on the whole record; or e. not arbitrary, capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercised of discretion.' Thus, the authority of the appeal board in reviewing the determination of discrimination is limited by statute to the power of a court reviewing an administrative determination made after a hearing (see Matter of Mize v. State Div. of Human Rights, 33 N.Y.2d 53, 57, 349 N.Y.S.2d 364, 367, 304 N.E.2d 231, 233; New York Inst. of Technology v. State Div. of Human Rights, 48 A.D.2d 132, 134, 368 N.Y.S.2d 207, 209; State Div. of Human Rights v. Syracuse Univ., 46 A.D.2d 1002, 1003, 362 N.Y.S.2d 104, 105; Long Is. R.R. Co. v. New York State Div. of Human Rights, 42 A.D.2d 857, 346 N.Y.S.2d 849). We have summarized the scope of judicial review in the following manner: 'The courts may not weigh the evidence or reject the choice made by the Board where the evidence is conflicting and room for choice exists' (Matter of Stork Rest. v. Boland, 282 N.Y. 256, 267, 26 N.E.2d 247, 252). We conclude that the determination of the commissioner was supported by substantial evidence and that the appeal board was not entitled to conclude that complainant had been discriminated against. Such determination by the board was based on a contrary view of the weight of the evidence, a standard of review which the board is not authorized to apply. The board is not empowered to find new facts or take a different view of the weight of the evidence if the commissioner's determination is supported by substantial evidence; and a review of the commissioner's findings and the evidence present at the hearing amply demonstrates that they were founded upon substantial evidence. Prefatorily, we note that there is no reason to disturb the commissioner's finding that Dr. Gilinsky first applied for a faculty position in 1972. Her prior inquiries consisted of correspondence with members of the Psychology Department to whom she expressed an interest in teaching at Columbia but who were not involved in the hiring of new faculty; other correspondence with the president of Columbia University and the chairmen of the Psychology Department consisted of offers to assist...