State ex inf. Kell v. Buchanan
| Decision Date | 12 April 1948 |
| Docket Number | 40596 |
| Citation | 210 S.W.2d 359,357 Mo. 750 |
| Parties | State of Missouri ex inf. Esco v. Kell, Prosecuting Attorney, v. Monroe Buchanan, E. D. Matlock, Pearl Currie, Laura Lou Mason, Neta Wilbanks, Hatty Matlock, Dorothy Young, Lenora Winn, J. L. Whitlock, Olief Buchanan, and Mrs. Monroe Buchanan, Appellants |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Appeal from Dent Circuit Court; Hon. Claude E. Curtis Judge.
Affirmed.
H J. Griffin and Green & Green for appellants.
(1) There was introduced in evidence by the defendants, a judgment of the Probate Court of Howell County, Missouri wherein such probate court by valid judgment found that these defendants were the heirs and only heirs at law of John Matlock, deceased; that John Matlock died intestate and such defendants were entitled to his estate. Such judgment was within the jurisdiction of the probate court, was regular on it's face, was a judgment by a court of record, was not appealed from and therefore was res adjudicata of the issues therein decided and was not subject to collateral attack. (2) On the strength of such judgment the court erred in not finding for defendants and erred in permitting the introduction of parole evidence offered by plaintiff in a collateral attack upon such judgment. Texier v. Texier, 119 S.W.2d 778; State ex rel. Howe v. Hughes, 123 S.W.2d 105; State ex rel. Gott v. Fidelity Co., 317 Mo. 1093, 298 S.W. 83. (3) Orders of distribution made by the probate court are so far of the nature of judgment that, if not appealed from they become final as to the rights of the distributees and are not subject to collateral attack. State ex rel. Howe v. Hughes, 123 S.W.2d 105. (4) Probate courts being regarded as having general jurisdiction of matters committed to them and, where fact upon which power of said court to act is referred to it by legislature for determination its determination of such fact cannot be questioned in other than a direct proceeding though such judgment is erroneous. Crump & Murphy v. Hart & Murphy, 189 Mo.App. 572. (5) The Legislature conferred the jurisdiction duty, right and authority of the probate court to determine the amount of inheritance tax and the persons liable therefor and to determine any question which may arise in connection therewith. Sec. 585, R.S. 1939. (6) The Legislature having conferred such jurisdiction on the probate court the judgment of such court in determining the amount of inheritance tax and the persons liable therefor is final, conclusive and res adjudicata unless appealed from as provided by law.
Esco V. Kell, Prosecuting Attorney of Howell County, for respondent.
(1) Judgments rendered by the probate court attempting to vest title of real estate in appellants was void for reason that it afforded relief that only a court of equity could give, and may be entirely disregarded by any court. In re Mains Estate, 152 S.W.2d 696; Davison v. Arne, 155 S.W.2d 155. (2) Declarations and statements concerning matters of family history made ante litem motem and the declarant be dead, fall within a well established exception to the hearsay rule and are clearly admissible. Gordon v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 176 S.W.2d 506; Hemonos v. Orphan, 191 S.W.2d 352; Beckham v. Nacke, 56 Mo. 546. (3) Complete, original jurisdiction of escheat of land cases is expressly and specifically given to circuit courts. Secs. 625, 630, R.S. 1939; Art. 1, Secs. 625-640, R.S. 1939. (4) Circuit courts have original, exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine questions in which title to real estate is involved. Mo. Const. 1945, Art. 5, Sec. 14; Sec. 2100, R.S. 1939. (5) Probate courts have no jurisdiction to hear and determine the title to real estate. In re Estate of Strom, 213 Mo. 1; Nettleton Bank v. McGauhey's Estate, 2 S.W.2d 771; In re Woods Estate, 138 Mo.App. 258. (6) There must be identity of the thing sued for; identity of the cause of action; identity of the persons and parties to the action; and identity of the quality of the person for or against whom the claim is made in order to have estoppel by former judgment. Rossi v. Davis, 133 S.W.2d 363; Kirk v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 38 S.W.2d 519; Norwood v. Norwood, 183 S.W.2d 118.
Dalton, C. Bradley and Van Osdol, CC., concur.
This is a proceeding under the Statute of Escheats (Art. 1, Chap. 3, Sec. 620 et seq., R.S. 1939) to have described real estate in Howell County, previously owned by one John Matlock, who is now deceased, declared to be the property of the state. An information was filed by the prosecuting attorney of said county pursuant to Sec. 625 R.S. 1939, claiming that the property had escheated and that the state owned it. Scire facias was duly issued to defendants to appear and show cause why title to the property should not be vested in the state. Certain persons claiming to be the lawful heirs of John Matlock appeared, alleged ownership of the property, pleaded certain judgments of the probate court of Howell county as res adjudicata and charged that all issues and matters contained in said petition had been adjudicated and that plaintiff was barred and estopped from maintaining the action. The alleged heirs further filed a cross action under Sec. 1684 R.S. 1939 to have the title to the described premises quieted and determined in said defendants. The cause was tried to the court without the aid of a jury. The court found all issues for plaintiff and against defendants and adjudged that title to the described lands was vested in the State of Missouri; and that the defendants had no right, title or interest therein. Defendants have appealed.
It was admitted that John Matlock died intestate, in Howell county on the 15th day of January 1943, seized and possessed of the described real estate; that Roy Mitchell was duly appointed administrator of his estate by the probate court of Howell county; that said Mitchell qualified and served as such administrator; that the estate had been fully administered and all debts paid; and that final settlement was duly made and approved and the administrator fully and finally discharged.
Appellants in support of their claim of ownership under the statute of descents, Sec. 306 R.S. 1939, offered evidence as follows:
(1) A certified copy of the semi-annual settlement filed by the administrator of the estate of John Matlock, deceased, showing a balance due the estate of $ 623.47.
(2) A certified copy of the order and judgment of the probate court of Howell county, as entered on the 12th day of February 1944, in the matter of the estate of John Matlock, deceased, to the effect that John Matlock left no widow, child, children or their descendants, that appellants were his legal heirs and showing the relationship of each to the deceased. The order purports to be based on affidavits and other evidence.
(3) A certified copy of a motion filed in said estate by the prosecuting attorney of Howell county to vacate and annul the proceedings and order of the court declaring and finding that appellants were the legal and only heirs of John Matlock, deceased.
(4) A certified copy of the order of the probate court of Howell county overruling the said motion of the prosecuting attorney, as filed in the matter of the estate of John Matlock, deceased, to set aside said order determining the legal heirs of John Matlock, deceased.
(5) A certified copy of the order and judgment of the probate court of Howell county, in the matter of the estate of John Matlock, deceased, as entered on the 22nd day of February 1944, in the matter of the appointment of an appraiser for inheritance tax purposes. The order is in part, as follows: Appellants offered no other evidence.
It will not be necessary to review the evidence offered by respondent. There is no contention that respondent's evidence was insufficient to establish that John Matlock left no heirs or representatives capable of inheriting the described property. Appellants do not question the sufficiency of the evidence. Appellants contend that all of respondent's evidence was a collateral attack upon the above judgments of the probate court of Howell county; that the court erred in admitting the parol evidence offered by respondent; and that the court erred in not finding for appellants on the theory of res adjudicata.
With reference to the judgment of February 12, 1944, appellants state: ...
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