State Ex Rel. 0. Emerson Campe v. Bd. Of Educ. Of Loudon Dist.

• Decision Date: 30 August 1923
• Docket Number: No. 5001.,5001.
• Citation: 94 W.Va. 408
• Court: West Virginia Supreme Court
• Parties: State ex rel. 0. Emerson Campe v. Board of Education of Loudon District, Kanawha County, et al.

94 W.Va. 408

State ex rel. 0. Emerson Campe

v. Board of Education ofLoudon District, Kanawha County, et al.

No. 5001.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted August 29, 1923.

Decided August 30, 1923.

1. Schools and School Districts Contract by Board of Educa-

tion Prior to Commencement of School Year, for Employment of Teacher, Held Valid.

The school year begins on July first of each calendar year and ends on June thirtieth following. Under section 57, chapter 45, Code, a contract made by a board of education, prior to July first, for the employment of a teacher for the ensuing school year, is not void because it may be made in anticipation of the school levy for that school year; nor because when made, there may be uncertainty as to what amount of moneys the board will have at its disposal for the discharge of such contract, unless the obligation of the contract requires the expenditure of moneys in excess of the amount which will be legally at its disposal for that purpose during the school year in which the service is to be performed; nor because made by officers of the board whose terms would expire before the beginning of the ensuing school year. (p. 409).

2. Same Board of Education Continuing Corporate Body; Con-

tracts of Board of Education, If Valid When Made, Binding, Though Succeeding Officers Attempt to Nullify Them. A board of education is a continuing corporate body; it does not change with changes in its members. Its contracts, once made by its officers, if valid when made, are binding upon the corporation, though its succeeding officers disapprove of and attempt to nullify them. (p. 412).

Petition for mandamus by the State, on the relation of 0. Emerson Campe, against the Board of Education of Loudon District, Kanawha County, and others.

Peremptory writ awarded.

Harold A. Ritz and Lively & Stambaugh, for relator. Elmer L. Stone, for respondents.

Meredith, Judge:

The petitioner, in June, 1923, was employed by the Board of Education of Loudon District, Kanawha County, as principal of the public schools at Kanawha City for the ensuing school year, and a written contract therefor was duly executed. On July 1, 1923 the personnel of the board changed; a new president and a new member, who were elected at the last preceding general election, took their places upon the board and succeeded those whose terms had expired. The new board as thus constituted, refused to recognize the validity of the contract of employment of petitioner made by the old board; hence petitioner's application to this court to compel the respondents to recognize him as principal of the schools in question and the contract as binding upon the new board.

While some collateral questions have been raised, we do not deem them important. It is conceded by counsel for both parties that there is but one material question in the case, and that is whether a contract for the employment of a teacher by a board of education, made before July first, for the ensuing school year is valid. The school year begins on July first, and ends on June 30th of the year following. It is contended by counsel for respondents that no contract of employment of a teacher for the school year can be made until after the school year in which the service is to be rendered has begun, hence they say the contract must be made on or after the first of July.

Prior to the adoption of the present school code, chapter 2, Acts 1919, under the general school law, teachers could not be employed until after the beginning of the school year. The date of their employment by trustees was fixed on the third Monday of July, Barnes' Code, 1918, ch. 45, §56. Since then very material changes have been made in the school laws. In 1919 the legislature adopted a school code drawn by the school code commission, which comprehensively and thoroughly re vised the school laws. Some minor changes have been made by succeeding legislatures, but in effect, the general revision stands. One material change made in the old law is that a board of education may, but is not required to, appoint trustees for each sub-district; the board now may forego its right to appoint school trustees, and may exercise direct management of all the schools in its district. Under the old law, the trustees were required to employ teachers on the third Monday in July; under the revised school code, if the board appoints trustees for a sub-district, the trustees are still required to employ teachers for their school on the third Monday of July, or as soon thereafter as practicable. Barnes' Code, 1923, ch. 45, §53. But under the revised laws, the board itself may employ teachers; it is not required to appoint trustees and indeed boards now seldom do so. They themselves enter into all contracts with teachers and discharge their other duties without appointing trustees to perform them. If the board itself exercises the power of appointing teachers, when may it do so? Section 57, chapter 45, Barnes' Code, 1923, furnishes the answer. It reads:

"The board of education shall on or before the first Monday in July in each year, if practicable, appoint the principals and teachers for all the schools in the district and shall fix their salaries as provided by section fifty-five of this act.''

The statute quoted seems to be so plain that interpretation could not make it plainer. But counsel for respondents undertake the task and urge a number of reasons why the statute does not mean what it says. One of these is that the expression "in each year" means in "each school year," and not "in each calendar year"; therefore, in order to employ teachers in "each school year" the contract must be made on or after, and not before, July first. But they have overlooked section 14, chapter 13, Code, which says: "In a statute the word ' month' shall mean a calendar month, and the word 'year' a calendar year." This is a sufficient answer to this contention. Another reason is found, so they say, in ...