State ex rel. Adams v. Fillebrown

• Decision Date: 29 May 1871
• Citation: 2 S.C. 404
• Parties: THE STATE Ex. Rel. ROBERT H. ADAMS v. J. S. FILLEBROWN, TRIAL JUSTICE.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

2 S.C. 404

THE STATE Ex. Rel. ROBERT H. ADAMS v. J. S. FILLEBROWN, TRIAL JUSTICE.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

May 29, 1871

The Act of March 1, 1870, giving to Trial Justices jurisdiction to " punish by fine, not exceeding $100, or imprisonment in the jail or house of correction, not exceeding thirty days all assaults and batteries" not of a high and aggravated nature, is not unconstitutional.

The Court of a Justice of the Peace is an inferior Court in the technical sense of the term.

The term " inferior Courts," in Sec. 1, Art. IV, of the Constitution, is used therein in its technical sense, as signifying a Court of special and limited powers, whose jurisdiction must appear on the face of the proceedings, or its judgment will be void.

Under Sec. 1, Art. IV, of the Constitution, the General Assembly may confer upon an inferior Court created by itself the same powers which, by the Constitution, is intended for Justices of the Peace.

BEFORE RUTLAND, J., AT CHAMBERS, OCTOBER, 1870.

Appeal from an order directing a writ of prohibition to issue from the Court of Common Pleas for Darlington County.

The facts were these: Robert H. Adams, the relator, was tried and convicted by J. S. Fillebrown, a Trial Justice for Darlington County, of an assault and battery, committed in that County upon one Samuel Abraham, and sentenced to imprisonment in the jail of the County for fifteen days, and to pay a fine of fifteen dollars. He applied to the Circuit Judge of the County for a writ of prohibition to restrain the execution of the sentence, on the ground that the Act of March 1, 1870 defining the criminal jurisdiction of Trial Justices, is unconstitutional, null and void. A rule to shew cause was issued, and on the return thereof an order was made directing a writ of prohibition to issue.

The respondent, the Trial Justice, appealed.

Chamberlain , Attorney General, for appellant, cited Bac. Abr., Tit. Courts, (D); Kempe's Lessee vs. Kennedy , 5 Cr. 184-5; Skillern vs. May , 6 Cr. 267; McCormick vs. Sullevant , 10 Wheat. 192; Cooley on Cons. Lim., 35; and commented on Section 19, Art. I, and Sections 1 and 22 of Art. IV of the State Constitution.

Spain , contra, filed no brief.

OPINION

MOSES C. J.

The single point raised upon the record in this case is as to the jurisdiction of a Trial Justice to prosecute for the offence of assault and battery, and the judgment of the Court will be confined to it.

The appointment of Trial Justices is provided for by the Act of February 28th, 1870, 14 Stat. at Large, 376. The mode of appointment, their number, term of office, and condition on which it shall terminate, are all prescribed by the said Act. Their criminal jurisdiction is defined by the Act of March 1, 1870, same VoL., 402, and is to be exercised " within their respective Counties."

The second Section confers upon them " jurisdiction of all offenses which may be subject to the penalties of either fine or forfeiture, not exceeding one hundred dollars, or imprisonment in the jail, or work house, not exceeding thirty days, and they may impose any sentence within those limits either singly or in the alternative."

The third Section is in the following words: " They may punish by fine not exceeding one hundred dollars, or imprisonment in the jail, or house of correction, not exceeding thirty days, all assaults and batteries, and other breaches of the peace, when the offense is not of a high and aggravated nature, requiring, in their judgment, greater punishment." It can, therefore, admit of no doubt that the Legislature has authorized the exercise of the power assumed by the said Trial Justice, Fillebrown, as set out in the suggestion.

This is in no way contradicted by the relator, but he contends that the Act so conferring the power is void, because in repugnance to the Constitution of the State. His proposition is, that as the Constitution, by the first, twenty-first and twenty-second Sections of the fourth Article, in express words, names and includes Justices of the Peace among those in whom the judicial power of the State shall be vested, and as the election of the said Justices, for each County, is required to be made by the qualified voters, in such manner as the General Assembly may direct, and as the performance of the same duties are enjoined upon them as are given to the Trial Justices by the said Act, the Legislature is without power to create a new office for the execution of the same duties, to be appointed in an entirely different mode, and that the Act, therefore, is unconstitutional and void.

If it can be made to appear, from the several parts of the Constitution in regard to the office of Justice of the Peace, all to be construed together as a whole, that his jurisdiction as a County officer, in prosecutions for assault and battery, is exclusive, then the relator is right. The Convention which framed it were at liberty to suggest to the people who were to pass upon it their scheme for the establishment of the Judiciary Department, both as regarded the Courts which were to be organized and the Judges who were to preside over them.

It is necessary, therefore, to inquire and ascertain if the jurisdiction which it was proposed to confer on Justices of the Peace was to be exclusive.

Section 19 of Article I provides " that all offenses less than felony, and in which the punishment does not exceed a fine of one hundred dollars, or imprisonment for thirty days, shall be tried summarily by a Justice of the Peace, or other officer authorized by law, on information or presentment of a grand jury, saving to the defendant the right of appeal."

This Section (which includes the offense of assault and battery, because it is " less than felony," ) does not restrict the jurisdiction contemplated by it to Justices of the Peace. On the contrary, it extends it to " other officer authorized by law; " and if there can be found in the Constitution any power on the part of the General Assembly to confer a like authority on some other officer, then it was not intended to be exclusively in Justices of the Peace.

If no portion of the judicial power of the State can vest in any officer except such as may be expressly named in the Constitution, then the hands of the Legislature are tied by that instrument, and they can make no further distribution of the judicial power...